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This thesis consists of three separate papers that focus on how socially responsible behavior, mainly 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), affects firm-level strategies and outcomes. CSR is the firms’ socially 
responsible behavior that is required beyond the law and has become an increasingly important issue over 
the past several decades. Different from the traditional profit-maximization viewpoint, stakeholders begin 
to emphasize corporate social activities and regard those firms with non-financial information as more 
transparent and legitimate. As such, an increasing number of firms engage in CSR to gain sociopolitical 
legitimacy, which helps them further elicit critical resources and supports from stakeholders. 
Acknowledging that social activities do have important implications for firms’ outcomes, it is often to 
witness firms are not able to seize benefits and advantages through engaging such social activities, 
sometimes even though they devote into substantial efforts. We believe that it is imperative to investigate 
the ways how firms engage in CSR and how firms develop their experience and capabilities and make better 
use of these resources to do CSR. Having this general direction in mind and based on previous literature on 
CSR, we investigate the relationship between philanthropy, an essential aspect of CSR, and financial 
performance within different life-cycle stages; unpack the mechanism between CSR and corporate 
investment, and uncover how CSR activities at home influence their outward foreign direct investment 
location choice portfolio. 
First, we investigate how a firm’s corporate philanthropy CP–CFP relationship changes as firms move 
through their life-cycle stages from a capability-development perspective. The controversial research 
results on the relationship between CP–CFP have led to the argument that it is not the amount of CP that 




of utilizing, allocating, and managing the resources firms invest in CP will determine the benefits that the 
firm can gain from CP, we, therefore, base on capability-life-cycle perspective and examine how a firm’s 
philanthropic capability evolves throughout the firm’s different life-cycle stages. We take a dynamic 
perspective and investigate the time-varying effects of CP from the capability-life-cycle perspective and 
find that the CP–CFP relationship is not monotonically linear throughout the firm’s life cycle, but changes 
from negative to positive from development to mature life-cycle stage. In other words, the sign of CP–CFP 
relationship changes from negative to positive as firms move through life-cycle stages. We provide a novel 
way to reconcile previous conflicting findings on the CP–CFP relationship. 
Second, we explain the benefits of CSR in helping a firm increase its investment from an integrated 
information-asymmetry and stakeholder perspective. Different from previous literature that takes internal 
aspects such as financial capability as its starting point to investigate firm investment, we argue that the 
external social-acceptance perspective is also crucial in determining a firm’s investment behavior. Firms’ 
CSR helps them build sound image and send a signal to stakeholders that they are good citizens, which 
helps promote and manage a trustful relationship with stakeholders. Such a healthy relationship will, in turn, 
increase the likelihood of obtaining investment opportunities from stakeholders, a prerequisite to increase 
investment expenditure. Therefore, we argue that a firm’s CSR should be another channel to improve firms’ 
investment expenditure. Building on the integrated information-asymmetry and stakeholder perspective, 
we broaden the corporate investment literature by showing that how firms increase their investment 
expenditure through CSR. 
Third, we link the firm’s CSR activities at home with foreign-market location choices through a 




CSR activities, which is an experience-accumulation process, help emerging market state-owned 
enterprises (EM-SOE) offset the legitimacy liabilities of investing abroad. Drawing on the springboard and 
learning perspective, we first argue that EM-MNEs have strong motivation to enter host countries with 
advanced know-how knowledge, but they may not likely be accepted by host-country stakeholders with 
stringent social and environmental requirements. We then argue that through engaging in CSR activities at 
home, firms can develop and accumulate the experience of doing CSR, which are essential to timely identify 
and adjust their behavior accord to the expectations of the stakeholders in the host market to facilitate them 
entering the host country with high CSR requirements. Instead of looking at the firms’ non-market strategy 
after they enter the host country, we look at how firms develop CSR experience and overcome legitimacy 
challenges before they enter the foreign market. 
This thesis has important implications for firms in both developed institutional environments and 
developing institutional contexts. First, chapter one of this thesis considers whether the capability of using 
resources will help firms generate benefits from a dynamic perspective. As firms in any economies need to 
deal with their ability to utilize resources to improve their competitive advantage, the life-cycle perspective 
provides us with a good viewpoint through which we understand this process. Therefore, we believe that 
this chapter can help people in the general institutional environment make relevant decisions from a 
developmental and dynamic perspective. The second chapter looks at how a firm’s CSR improves its social 
acceptance, which in turn promotes investment targets’ acceptance and their probability of getting more 
investment opportunities from them from an integrated information-asymmetry and stakeholder perspective. 
The issue of investment efficiency is prevailing in both developing and developed economies. How to 




developed but also for developing countries. Different from previous literature in firm investment literature, 
we change the traditionally believed passive perspective from investment target and take an active 
standpoint from investment target to demonstrate how the investment target acceptance will improve the 
firm’s investment efficiency. The third chapter looks at how CSR capability developed in the home country 
helps firms enter institutional environments with higher social requirements. Because firms in emerging 
economies always face institutional voids and the lack of resources and experience in making the oversea 
investment, engagement in CSR in the home country especially in developing home countries will thus help 
them improve such experience and therefore overcome international stakeholders’ negative evaluation 
which is known as the liability of origin and liability of foreignness. Therefore, this chapter has more 
implications for firms in emerging economies. 
The thesis research sample is Chinese publicly listed firms in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
market. According to the timeline of my PhD thesis, I first focused on the period between 2008 and 2015 
to finish my first chapter and checked philanthropy–financial performance relationship. For the second 
chapter, I used corporate social responsibility data from the RKS database from 2009 to 2015 because CSR 
data in the RKS database starts from 2009 and ends in 2015. I used the same period from 2009 to 2015 in 
my third chapter. 
Since China’s reform and open-door policy, a dramatic transition from state-controlled to a market-
based economy has been taking place in China. Despite the high-speed economic growth, the transition to 
a market-based economy accompanies with firms’ unethical behavior and social irresponsibility. Since 2006, 
when China’s 11th Five–Year Plan began to issue CSR reporting guidelines for large firms in order to pursue 




issues such as environment protection, reduction emission, and energy-saving, all of which aim at 
transferring to a greener and sustainable GDP growth. Therefore, how firms engage in CSR activities to 
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CHAPTER1: Untangling the Relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Financial 
Performance from the Capability-life-cycle Perspective 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates how companies’ philanthropic activities affect corporate financial performance (CFP) at 
different life stages of the firm. Considering that firms’ capabilities differ significantly in different life stages, 
particularly from development to maturity, we explore how the capability of engaging in corporate philanthropy 
(CP) alters in these life stages, and how it affects financial performance. Further, accepting that slack resources 
reflect firms’ capabilities for resource utilization, we also examine how absorbed and unabsorbed slack resources 
affect the underlying relationship between CP and CFP. Using panel threshold modeling on a sample of Chinese 
listed firms from 2008 to 2015, we indeed uncover significant variations in the relationship between CP and CFP 
at different life-cycle stages—the relationship changes from negative in the development stage to positive in the 
stage of maturity. We also find significant positive (negative) moderating effects of absorbed slack on the 
philanthropy–financial performance relationship in the development (later mature) life-cycle stages, and positive 
moderating effects of unabsorbed slack on this relationship in the later mature life-cycle stage. Our results are 
robust under different models and different measurements of firm financial performance after controlling for 
endogeneity. 
 






Corporate philanthropic behavior is an important component of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Carroll 1979, 1991; Wang, Choi, and Li 2008). Corporate philanthropy (CP) refers to the firm’s discretionary 
monetary and non-monetary support aimed at improving social welfare, particularly after natural disasters 
(Godfrey 2005). Interestingly, the relationship between CP and corporate financial performance (CFP) remains 
debatable (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang and Qian 2011; Masulis and Reza 2014). 
Neoclassical economists have long argued that companies should focus only on maximizing shareholder 
value. According to this view, CP is an unnecessary extra cost (Friedman 1970) that has mainly negative 
performance implications (Aggarwal et al. 2012) and an unclear cost-benefit outcome (Godfrey 2005; Margolis 
and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang and Choi 2013), and should, therefore, be avoided. However, 
nowadays, there is a growing acceptance that CFP can benefit from a firm’s engagement in philanthropic 
behavior. Firms adopting a more philanthropic agenda are known to gain a more positive reputation (Brammer 
and Pavelin 2006), attract higher-quality employees, and accumulate overall higher moral capital (Godfrey 2005; 
Godfrey et al. 2009). Thus, CP is essential for maintaining good stakeholder relationships (Berman et al. 1999; 
Jones 1995) and achieving the necessary legitimacy within a market to allow the business to continue to grow 
(Oliver 1997). 
From this perspective, if firms can strategically use their resources in doing CP with a rare, immobile and 
inimitable manner, they will thus develop CP as a process that provides firms with a competitive advantage 
(Brammer and Millington, 2008; Cantrell, Kyriazis, and Noble, 2015; Porter and Kramer 2002). Given that CP 
can help firms cultivate a good level of employee commitment (Dutton et al. 1994), customer attachment (Brown 




between the amount of philanthropy and firm financial performance may not fully capture the benefits derived 
from different engagement strategies (capabilities) for philanthropic behavior (Tang et al. 2012). Therefore, we 
track firms’ capability at different life-cycle stages to utilize resources to engage CP and argue that this capability 
is of paramount importance in firms achieving the benefits of CP, and will eventually improve their financial 
performance (Cantrell et al. 2015; Kim et al. 2018; Wang and Choi 2013). 
We, therefore, focus on the firm capability to engage in CP and how it is projected at different stages in a 
firm’s life cycle. We argue that the capability to engage in CP differs at different stages in the life cycle of a firm, 
specifically from the development stage to the stage of maturity. During the growth stage, firms are expected to 
allocate their resources in critical operational areas such as advertising and research and development (R&D), 
which are paramount for firm expansion. Because of this need, the amount of resources available for CP are 
limited (Elsayed and Paton 2009), as is the firm’s capability to engage in CP. In contrast, the more a firm moves 
toward maturity, the more its capacity to engage in socially responsible activities increases (Freeman 1984; 
Handelman and Arnold 1999; Suchman 1995), along with more experience in interacting with stakeholders 
encouraging the firm to seek out CP opportunities actively. Prior studies have suggested that a firm’s capability 
and life-cycle experience determine how well a firm can perform philanthropic activities, and how much it can 
benefit from these activities (Brammer and Millington 2008; Cantrell, Kyriazis, and Noble, 2015; Elsayed and 
Paton 2009). However, very few studies have investigated the CP–CFP relationship in consideration of different 
firm life-cycle stages. We bridge this gap in the literature. By building on the capability-life-cycle perspective, 
we shed fresh light on the debate about the CP–CFP relationship. Further, given that the level of slack resources 
can represent a firm’s capabilities to utilize resources, we frame the capability to utilize resources to engage in 




such capability variance on the CP–CFP relationship at different stages in a firm’s life cycle. 
Using data on Chinese publicly listed enterprises from 2008 to 2015, we use panel threshold modeling 
(Hansen 1999) to identify life-cycle stages, and generalized estimating equation (GEE) modeling to test our 
hypotheses. A set of robustness checks, including two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression and propensity score 
matching (PSM), are also employed to confirm that our results are not spurious or driven by endogeneity. We 
also use a firm’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization scaled by the total asset (EBIDTA 
Ratio) as the alternative measures of financial performance (Paeleman & Vanacker, 2015) to avoid potential 
earnings management. Our paper offers three distinct contributions to the literature. First, we take a dynamic 
perspective and investigate the time-varying effects of CP from the capability-life-cycle perspective. Suggesting 
that the CP–CFP relationship is not monotonically linear throughout the firm’s life cycle, we provide a novel 
way to reconcile previous conflicting findings on the CP–CFP relationship. Second, we offer a novel discourse 
on the moderating role of resource slack on the CP–CFP relationship at different stages in the firm’s life cycle. 
Third, we offer a methodological contribution; that is, rather than dividing firms’ life-cycle stages using an eight-
year cut-off point (Paeleman and Vanacker 2015) or according to cash-flow levels (Cuypers et al. 2015; 
Dickinson 2011), approaches that have been heavily criticized for being restrictive and biased, we use a panel 
threshold model that aptly and objectively detects points of overall structural change according to model fit 
(Hansen 1999). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first review prior studies on the relationship between 
CP and CFP. We continue our discussion with a discussion of the key theoretical underpinnings that formed the 
basis for our hypotheses. We then present the methodological considerations, along with the analysis of the data 




discussion of our contribution to theory and practice. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Philanthropy and financial performance  
CP refers to a charitable “unconditional transfer of cash or other assets to an entity or a settlement or 
cancellation of its liabilities in a voluntary nonreciprocal transfer by another entity acting other than as an owner” 
(Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 116, FAS116 Status Page, Accounting for Contributions 
Received and Contributions Made, 1993). Being purely voluntarily, CP is considered a firm’s most discretionary 
means of social responsiveness (Carroll 1979, 1991; Godfrey 2005; Hemingway and Maclagan 2004). With the 
current increasing expectations for firms to assume social and economic responsibility (Paine 2003), it is not 
surprising that discretionary charitable behaviors are associated with the following effects: (a) enhancing a firm’s 
inimitable resources such as reputation, goodwill, and overall moral capital; (b) strengthening stakeholder 
acceptance within the market (Doh et al. 2010); (c) improving a firm’s overall social and political legitimacy 
(Wang and Qian 2011). Given the above benefits of CP, positive implications of CP for CFP should be expected 
(Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). Unfortunately, the empirical results from research remain largely controversial, with 
only several studies providing clear support for a positive association between CP and CFP (Cuypers et al. 2015; 
Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang and Qian 2011; Wokutch and Spencer 1987), while others have found either non-
significant (Griffin and Mahon 1997; Seifert et al. 2004) or even a negative result for this relationship (Aggarwal 
et al. 2012; Aupperle et al. 1985; Friedman 1970; Masulis and Reza 2014).  
The controversial research results have led to the argument that it is not the amount of CP that affects 




2013). Indeed, recent research attention has been increasingly drawn to the capability of a firm to effectively 
utilize its engagement in CP to generate goodwill and a positive reputation among all its stakeholders (Cantrell, 
Kyriazis, and Noble, 2015). Although previous studies have added new insights such as the effects of 
stakeholders’ perception (Cuypers et al. 2015) and firm’s competitive action (Kim, Kim, and Qian, 2018) on 
firm’s CFP and acknowledged that philanthropic firm behavior can affect a firm’s financial performance 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2009; Choi and Wang 2009; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Wang and Qian 2011), a great deal of 
research interest has focused on stakeholder and resource management in relation to CP. Consequently, how a 
firm can utilize its overall resources to deliver and create benefits for stakeholders through its engagement in CP 
has become a central question in the debate on the CP–CFP relationship (Bhattacharya et al. 2009; Cuypers et 
al. 2015; Freeman 1984; Jones 1995).  
Thus, we argue that firms’ capability of utilizing, allocating, and managing the resources firms invest in CP 
will determine the benefits that the firm can gain from CP (Sirmon and Hitt 2003; Sirmon et al. 2007). However, 
recognizing that the needs of stakeholders evolve in line with the dynamics of the market (Jawahar and 
Mclaughlin 2001), we also expect that a firm’s philanthropic capability will also evolve dynamically and 
strategically in line with stakeholders’ requirements and expectations. To account for this dynamic evolution, we 
employ the capability-life-cycle perspective to examine how a firm’s philanthropic capability evolves throughout 
the firm’s different life-cycle stages (Helfat and Peferaf 2003). 
Capability life cycle and the firm CP–CFP relationship 
Capability-life-cycle perspective 
The life-cycle perspective determines not only how capably a firm will conduct its overall activities, but 




Wang et al. 2016). The capability-life-cycle literature focuses on the evolutionary characteristics of 
organizational capabilities over different life-cycle stages (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). As Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
advocate, it is not possible to understand fully how to achieve sustainable competitive advantage unless we 
investigate how firms’ resources and capabilities evolve.  
The capability-life-cycle perspective defines three main stages in the life cycle of a firm: the founding stage, 
the development stage, and the maturity stage (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). Each firm begins with a new-to-the-
world idea, typically exhibiting limited relevant experience and knowledge on resource attainment and capability 
development because the level of experience and knowledge predominately depends on that of the founders 
(Helfat and Peteraf 2003). However, and given that a firm’s experience is influenced by past experience and 
knowledge, as the company grows, new experience and knowledge are added at each stage (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). This knowledge constitutes the firm’s organizational memory (Moorman and Miner 1997), which is 
imperative to a firm’s sustainable performance throughout its different life stages (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). Prior 
studies have revealed that organizational memory determines a firm’s capability for resource orchestration and 
reconfiguration (Carnes et al. 2017; Miller and Friesen 1984; Sirmon et al. 2011), as well as a firm’s concurrent 
learning capability (Bingham et al. 2015).  
We closely examine how firms develop their philanthropic capabilities from development to maturity to 
gain a better understanding of how firms’ CP–CFP relationship evolves throughout the firm’s life cycle. Given 
the limited resources during the founding stage and the focus on firm survival at this stage, we expect that during 
the founding stage, the funding available for CP will be very limited because it goes beyond the firm’s priorities 
at that stage and because CP engagement needs a significant amount of financial resources (Clarkson, Li, 




philanthropic behavior; thus, given that our sample is Chinese listed companies, firms in our sample are in 
founding stage should be very limited. For consistency and convenience of explanation of our results, we 
combine this stage with the development stage in our discussion and analysis. Thus, we specifically examine the 
capability of engaging CP through the analysis of resource allocation and stakeholder legitimacy during the two 
distinct life-cycle stages of the development stage and the maturity stage. We display our theoretical model for 
this study in figure 1-1. 
[Insert Figure 1-1 about here] 
Resource Allocation during development and maturity stages 
While during the development stage, the emphasis of the firm is placed on obtaining a healthy customer 
base and a systematic delivery process (Churchill and Lewis 1983), the maturity stage focuses on how to “exploit 
the company’s accomplishments and expand or keep the company stable and profitable” (Churchill and Lewis 
1983, p. 5). Firms in the development stage are expected to focus on their most profitable projects (Samuelson 
and Nordhaus 2010), giving priority to market-related strategies, such as expanding product lines (Barringer and 
Greening 1998; Bruderl and Schussler 1990; Miller and Friesen 1984) and/or improving levels of innovation 
(Govindarajan and Trimble 2005; John et al. 2003) that will support the firm’s priorities for expansion. Thus, 
while for firms in the development stage, they tend to have slack that could be invested into non-market strategies 
such as CP (Campbell 2007; Jawahar and Mclaughlin 2001), it is not uncommon for firms in this stage to instead 
reinvest these slack resources into more demanding operational requirements to attempt to ensure further 
expansion (Scott and Bruce 1987). After all, continued expansion is typically associated with more enormous 
challenges in obtaining organizational legitimacy, overcoming liabilities of newness, and selecting and training 




(Barringer and Greening 1998).  
In contrast, during maturity, firms not only tend to present a stronger resource base but also a good breadth 
of experience in using resources to address social issues proactively (Jawahar and Mclaughlin 2001). Indeed, 
when a firm reaches maturity, it tends to exhibit good profitability with healthy cash flow (Wiklund et al. 2009), 
although not necessarily sufficient to distribute among its shareholders (Scott and Bruce 1987). Enjoying higher 
levels of financial and operational resources, companies at the maturity stage tend to concentrate on how to 
maintain efficiency and innovation momentum throughout their operations (Elsayed and Paton 2009; Gray and 
Ariss 1985; Helfat and Peteraf 2003). They, therefore, become more able to forecast the exact resource level 
required for their daily operations while reducing their reserves for unexpected emergencies (Hasan and Habib 
2017). Overall, mature firms present with higher confidence in allocating resources to non-operational or non-
market investment projects and therefore tend to invest in activities that will strengthen their reputation and 
legitimacy to support their sustainable growth, for example, engagement in philanthropic behavior. 
Stakeholder management during the development and maturity stages 
It has long been accepted by those life-cycle theorists that during different life-cycle stages, firms face 
different types of pressures, threats, and opportunities from different stakeholders in both their internal and 
external environments (Jawahar and Mclaughlin 2001). Thus, distinguishing the most beneficial targets at each 
stage of the life cycle and managing sustainable and fruitful relationships with those stakeholders becomes a key 
competence for firm success (Godfrey 2005).  
In the development stage, an uninterrupted stream of resources is imperative for a firm’s sustainable growth 
and survival. However, such resource intake cannot be attained without continuous support from key 




Martens et al. 2007). Unfortunately for firms in the development stage, developing and maintaining these 
relationships is not easy and is often hampered by the firm’s lack of market legitimacy at this stage. This is 
because market trust and legitimacy lead to “persistence because audiences are most likely to supply resources 
to organizations that appear desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). That is, while firms at 
their stage of development and growth require the support of the market the most, they are also the firms that 
find it the most difficult to convince the market to support them because of their limited track record of market 
successes (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). In fact, firms at this stage are typically faced with stakeholder scepticism and 
hostility (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Garud et al. 2014), making it even more difficult for them to develop and follow 
through market expectations, particularly concerning plans that are about non-market activities (e.g., 
engagement in philanthropic activities).  
Fortunately, while trust and legitimacy are never guaranteed for a firm (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Lounsbury 
and Glynn 2001; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002), they can both be gained with time. Thus, as firms survive their 
initial development stage, they tend to become more proficient in building stronger, long-lasting stakeholder 
relationships. Having already developed sound financial stability as well as having satisfied all immediate 
stakeholders’ needs, mature firms find it a great deal easier to promote and follow through non-market activities, 
such as engagement in CP (Jawahar and Mclaughlin 2001). After all, the more firms engage in social activities, 
the more they develop a transparent environment around them (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), thus simultaneously 
invoking managerial ethical behavior (Kim, Park, and Wier, 2012) and improvement in internal governance 
(Harjoto and Jo, 2011). These developments can only reinforce firms’ trust and reputation among stakeholders, 
which in turn lowers even further the firms’ cost of capital and improve overall financial conditions (Dhaliwal 




Given the arguments presented here, we posit that the relationship between CP and CFP is not monotonic. 
On the contrary, this relationship varies according to the life cycle of a firm. During the development stage, the 
relationship between CP and CFP is generally negative because of a lack of resource availability and the 
ineptitude of firms to handle stakeholder relationships. In contrast, during the maturity stage, firms experience a 
heightened legitimacy that positively affects their relationship with stakeholders of all types, which has positive 
implications for their overall reputation and performance. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: During the development stage of a firm’s life cycle, the relationship between CP and CFP is negative. 
Hypothesis 2: As firms move into maturity, the relationship between CP and CFP becomes stronger and positive. 
Moderating effects of slack resources on CP–CFP relationship  
Organizational slack is defined as the sum of excess absorbed and unabsorbed resources that a firm exhibits 
at any point in time (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and Voss 2008). The unabsorbed slack resources are the excess resources 
that are not committed to any use and can be easily redeployed, for example, cash or short-term securities (Paeleman 
and Vanacker 2015; Voss et al. 2008). Absorbed slack resources are excess resources that are committed to a specific 
use, for example, the excess amount of resources invested in knowledge, skills, and capabilities in organizations 
(Mishina, Pollock, and Porac 2004; Voss et al. 2008). Although slack resources remain idle and do not actively 
contribute to daily operations, these resources provide the firm with a cushion against unexpected changes in the 
market (Bourgeois 1981) and allow the firm to grasp new market opportunities quickly when presented (Pitelis 
2007; Poynter and White 1984). 
Nevertheless, the presence of excess resources can also indicate a lack of efficiency in resource utilization, 
which can be detrimental to a firm’s sustainability and survival (Paeleman and Vanacker 2015). It has therefore 




resources into productive economic benefits when required (Debruyne, Frambach, and Moenaert 2010; 
Mosakowski 2002). Acknowledging that a firm’s ability to effectively utilize excess resources can be altered with 
experience and knowledge, it is natural to expect that the capability of using slack resources to garner benefits from 
existing projects, and then positively affect performance could also change dramatically during a firm’s lifetime 
(Paeleman and Vanacker 2015; Wang et al. 2016).  
Given that the level of slack resources can represent a firm’s capability to utilize resources and in consideration 
of the differences between absorbed and unabsorbed slack resources, we argue here that different types of slack 
resources will have different effects on the CP–CFP relationship during a firm’s life cycle.  
Absorbed slack resources refer to all excess resources already embedded in the firm, that is, the excess human 
and operational costs that represent a firm’s operational capacity (Miller and Leiblein 1996; Bradley et al. 2011). 
Thus, it can be argued that the existence of absorbed slack resources can help a firm develop its CP competences. 
Unfortunately, absorbed slack resources, representing the least accessible resources (Mishina et al. 2004), can be 
recovered only through an extensive organizational redesign (Cheng and Kenser 1977). Such redesign entails 
changes to established routines and organizational processes, which could considerably disrupt a firm’s internal 
efficiency (Love and Nohria 2005). Accepting that during their earlier years, firms tend to suffer from inexperience, 
any attempts to positively transform absorbed slack resources are not only deemed unsuccessful but can also easily 
lead to waste. Indeed, absorbed slack resources have often been blamed for adding to “organizational fat” (Love 
and Nohria 2005) and increasing bureaucratic costs (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft 1994), resulting in an overall 
decrease of the overall efficiency of the organization (Wiseman and Bromiley 1996). 
Meanwhile, during maturity, at which stage firms enjoy the benefits of experience and age, they also suffer 




on scale economies so they can maintain large market shares and their competitive advantage over their newer 
counterparts. Thus, while mature firms may be more capable of exploiting these “sticky” resources to develop new 
capabilities (Miller and Friesen 1983, 1984), including CP competences, they may be disinclined to do so to avoid 
turning their absorbed slack resources into waste.  
Based on the above arguments, we posit that no matter in which life-cycle stage, absorbed slack resources 
negatively moderates the effect of CP on CFP. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Absorbed slack resources negatively moderate the negative CP–CFP relationship in the 
development life-cycle stage and negatively moderate the positive CP-CFP relationship in the mature life-cycle 
stage. 
The existence of unabsorbed slack resources can be considered to demonstrate the firm’s ability to generate a 
healthy cash flow, which is a result of sound operating performance. During the development stage, firms tend to 
give priority to critical issues that guarantee their survival and future sustainability; hence, all available accessible 
resources are devoted to developing the firm’s unique operational competences. During this stage, production, 
advertising, and marketing expenses are increased to enable the firm to develop a stable dominance within its 
market (Miller and Friesen 1983, 1984). Consequently, during the development stage, firms are expected to be able 
to fully exploit their resources, thus reducing any idle unabsorbed slack resources within the organization. 
Acknowledging that the development stage is heavily resource-demanding (Miller and Friesen 1984), the presence 
of any unabsorbed slack resources may signal a low level of efficiency in resource utilization. Thus, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 





In contrast to the development stage, during maturity, firms have overcome growth hurdles, and are enjoying 
both steady cash flow and market share (Dodge and Robbins 1992; Miller and Friesen 1984), as well as higher 
levels of access to external financing (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Hasan et al. 2015); thus, such firms are expected 
to have higher levels of unabsorbed slack resources (DeAngelo et al. 2006). This abundance of resources coupled 
with their increased levels of legitimacy and stakeholder trust allow mature firms to successfully reconfigure, 
reintegrate, and rebuild their resources and capabilities into new competencies such as CP engagement (Carnes et 
al. 2017). The same level of engagement in CP for a mature firm will likely generate more significant benefits than 
it will for a firm in the development stage because of the increased capabilities and competences of mature firms 
to engage in socially responsible behavior and their higher level of social credence. We thus expect that during the 
maturity life-cycle stage, the existence of abundant unabsorbed slack resources will positively moderate the CP–
CFP relationship, thus reinforcing the positive financial outcomes of engaging in CP.  
Hypothesis 4b: Unabsorbed slack resources positively moderate the CP–CFP relationship during maturity. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data and sample 
Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2015 are used to construct our panel dataset. The data are drawn 
from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Information from the China 
Statistical Yearbook and WIND database are further employed to obtain information on the regional 
development and firm characteristics of our sample. The main database (CSMAR) provides firm-level donation 
information and key accounting data for all firms in our sample. While our sample focuses on firms that engage 
in charitable activities, to avoid sampling biases, we employ the Heckman two-stage model (Heckman 1979), 




merging the three databases and dropping missing values of key variables, as well as excluding finance, 
government, and utilities (Deb et al. 2017; Kim and Bettis 2014; O'Brien and Folta 2009), we had 4,223 firm-
year observations. The sample was further reduced by 1,375 firm-year observations because of discontinuities; 
we did this to achieve a balanced dataset for our panel threshold model (Hansen 1999). Our final sample 
consisted of 2,848 firm-year observations between 2008 to 2015. Table 1-1 presents the sample composition by 
year and by industry. The sample distribution by industry is based on the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) industry code, which has a two-digit specification. Table 1-1 shows that manufacturing 
industries have 1600 observations, accounting for approximately 60% of our final sample. Other industries such 
as real estate, wholesale and retail trade, software, internet, and technology services account for approximately 
20% of our sample. As can be seen from the sample distribution by year, observations are strongly balanced with 
356 observations each year. 
[Insert Table 1-1 about here] 
Measurements 
Dependent variable 
In line with previous literature (Chang and Wong 2009; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Waddock and Graves 
1997), we use return on assets (ROA), measured as net income divided by total assets, to indicate a firm’s 
financial performance. Unlike market-based performance, which may be affected by a range of firm-unrelated 
factors (Shane and Spicer 1983), ROA indicates the profitability originating from a firm’s total assets under its 
control (Kostopoulos et al. 2011). This measurement of profitability also reflects the competitive advantage a 
firm gains from its own resources (Barney 1991), largely avoiding the probability of earnings management (Haw 





Firms’ charitable donations refer to the amount of philanthropic donations made in a specific year. 
Acknowledging that this variable is highly skewed (Galaskiewicz 1997), for our main independent variable, we 
use the natural logarithm transformed amount of total donation, as suggested by prior scholars (Brammer and 
Millington 2008; Cuypers et al. 2015; Lev et al. 2010; Wang, Choi, and Li 2008; Wang and Qian 2011).  
Threshold variable 
Following DeAngelo et al. (2006), we use the ratio of retained earnings to total assets (RETA) as the 
threshold variable to divide the full sample into different life-cycle stages. While Miller and Friesen (1980) 
suggested a four-stage life-cycle model (with firms moving through the stages of birth, growth, maturity, and 
revival), it is highly questionable that firms actually move from one stage to another. As Vyakarnam et al. (2000) 
note, it is inappropriate to set unidirectional linear implications of organismic life-cycle models mechanically. It 
is also of vital importance to note that firms do change, evolve, or develop over time, but they do not change 
because of time (Pitariu and Ployhart 2010). For example, although children grow into adults over time, it is not 
the time that makes them adults; although time is highly related to physical growth, genes and hormones and the 
physical, mental, and emotional processes relating to growing are responsible for turning children into adults. 
Likewise, it is not time that causes firms’ increased level of competitive advantage, but the strategic resources, 
competitive environment, and the firm’s ability to utilize those resources (Ployhart and Vandenberg 2010). Firms’ 
change process may be more easily and conveniently measured by time (Bollen and Curran 2006; Singer et al. 
2003), but this is not always a reliable measurement of this process (Rutherford et al. 2003). Therefore, following 
previous literature, we believe RETA can identify a firms’ life-cycle stage, not only because it captures the 




considering the drawbacks of using cash flow or age to identify the firm’s stage in its life cycle.1 
Moderating variables 
In line with prior literature, we measure absorbed slack resources using the industry adjusted ratio of 
employee costs to total sales (Bradley et al. 2011; Paeleman and Vanacker 2015), a measure that has been found 
to be a good indicator of firms’ absorbed slack resources (Vanacker et al. 2013). A dummy variable of absorbed 
slack resources is created to indicate whether a firm has abundant absorbed slack resources. When the firm’s 
industry adjusted absorbed slack resources are above the industry’s mean level, the firm is coded as 1, and 0 
otherwise (Paeleman and Vanacker 2015). To measure unabsorbed slack resources, we use the industry adjusted 
ratio of the firm’s cash flow to total assets (Kim and Bettis 2014; Vanacker et al. 2013), a common measure of 
companies’ unabsorbed slack. This measure is further created as a dummy: a firm whose unabsorbed slack is 
above the industry mean is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise (Paeleman and Vanacker 2015). 
Control variables 
We control for firm size, which is measured as the natural logarithm of the total asset (Marquis and Qian 
2014; Pan et al. 2014). Firm age is measured by subtracting the companies’ initial public offering (IPO) year 
from our observation year (Wang and Qian 2011; Wang et al. 2008). We control for leverage and access to outside 
 
1 We justify our use of RETA in this study as follows. First, DeAngelo et al. (2006) argue that RETA is a good reflection of 
firms’ internal-financing capability because this variable measures how much available internal earnings are left after the 
firm satisfies all related stakeholders—a higher level of firm retained earnings indicates a higher level of firm accumulated 
performance (Ball et al. 2019). To some extent, performance relates to firms’ comprehensive microlevel capabilities (Abell 
et al. 2008). Thus, we consider firms’ accumulated earnings to represent their capability. Second, the variable retained 
earnings also reflects the firm’s predicted future earnings growth. As Ball et al. (2019) demonstrate, retained earnings is an 
indicator of future earnings yield capability. Third, retained earnings can effectively “average out” the accounting effect 
through accumulation because accounting accrual estimates will reverse in subsequent periods (Ball et al. 2016), providing 
a more accurate measurement of firms’ composite dynamic capabilities to improve their financial performance (Wilden et 




finance by measuring the firm’s debt using the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (Waddock and Graves 
1997; Wang and Qian 2011). Further, we include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets to control for brand 
strength and R&D capability (McWilliams and Siegel 2000), as well as the fixed asset ratio (fixed assets divided 
by total assets) to measure the firm’s capital intensity (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006). The amount of sales 
expenses, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) scaled by total revenue is used to control the firm’s 
level of advertising intensity and visibility (Wang and Qian 2011). Firms’ absorbed slack and unabsorbed slack 
dummies are also included as controls. In addition, the dummy variable of state control is included as a control 
variable, with firms controlled by government coded as 1 and 0 otherwise (Wang et al. 2008). We also control 
for the level of industry donation to reflect the industry’s average tendency for philanthropy. We use the market-
development level represented by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (i.e., the province’s GDP divided by 
its population) in each province (Marquis and Qian 2014). The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is also added to control 
self-selection bias. All these control variables are included in both the first and second stage of Heckman two-
step model, except for IMR and industry-level donation. IMR is used only in the second stage for selection-bias 
control and industry-level donation is used only in the first stage for a reasonable instrumental variable (Wang 
and Qian 2011). Finally, year effects and industry effects are also controlled to reflect the year and industry 
differences. 
Estimation methods and data analysis 
To estimate different life-cycle stages, we use the panel threshold model suggested by Hansen (1999) to 




by the panel threshold model, allowing the different life-cycle stages to be determined.2 Since we find two 
threshold points and considering the characteristics of our sampled firms as Chinese publicly listed firms, we 
consider three life-cycle-stage intervals in our study from the development stage, to the initial maturity stage as 
the transition between development and maturity stage, lastly the later maturity stage. 
From the threshold points of the above panel threshold model, we generate a life-cycle-stage dummy to 
reflect the effects of different life-cycle stages on the relationship between CP and CFP. Specifically, according 
to the threshold value, we set the initial maturity life-cycle-interval dummy as 1 when RETA is larger than the 
first threshold point and smaller than the second threshold point, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the later maturity 
life-cycle-stage-interval dummy is 1, when RETA is larger than the second threshold point, and 0 otherwise. We 
 
2 We first construct the single-threshold model and then extend it from a single-threshold form to a multiple-threshold form. We 
begin with a single-threshold model defined as 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 · 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 · 𝐼𝐼(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝛾𝛾) + 𝛽𝛽2 · 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 · 𝐼𝐼(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜃𝜃 · 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. I(∙) 
is the index regression function between independent variable and dependent variable when conditions in parenthesis are satisfied. 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are different regression coefficients for regressions under corresponding conditions indicated in parenthesis. θ is the vector of 
control variables and γ is the threshold point identified by panel threshold model. 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is threshold variable. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
We then test for the null hypothesis H0: 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝛽𝛽2 and the alternative H1: 𝛽𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽𝛽2. Following Hansen (1999), the distribution of 
𝐹𝐹1 is used to determine whether the null hypothesis of one threshold value is confirmed or rejected, and is calculated as follows: 
𝐹𝐹1 = 𝑠𝑠0 − 𝑠𝑠1(𝛾𝛾�)/𝜎𝜎2 ; where, 𝑠𝑠0 is the sum of squared error at the null hypothesis and 𝑠𝑠1 is the sum of squared error at the 
alternative hypothesis. Given that the F statistic is not standardized, we use the bootstrap method to obtain its asymptotic distribution 
and obtain the empirical p-value. We also test whether the actual threshold value is equal to the estimated value γ� = γ. To do so, 
we calculate the likelihood-ratio statistics by constructing the nonrejection region as suggested by Hansen (1999). With these two 
tests, we check both the significance of threshold and the value of the threshold. After we confirmed one-threshold point scenario, 
we then extend the one-threshold model to a two-threshold model, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 · 𝐼𝐼(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝛾𝛾1) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 · 𝐼𝐼(𝛾𝛾1 < 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ≤
𝛾𝛾2) + 𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 · 𝐼𝐼(𝛾𝛾2 < 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) + 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 and test the null hypothesis as we did with the one-threshold model. In above equation, 
𝛾𝛾1 and 𝛾𝛾2 are the two threshold values that separate our observations into three parts: the group that is smaller than 𝛾𝛾1, the group 
that is between 𝛾𝛾1 and 𝛾𝛾2, and the group that is larger than 𝛾𝛾2. The assumption of a single-threshold and a multiple-threshold 
model is the same. In the multiple-threshold model, we further check the null hypothesis of two threshold values versus the one 
threshold value and the corresponding 𝐹𝐹2 statistic, which is calculated as, 𝐹𝐹2 = （𝑠𝑠1(𝛾𝛾1� ) − 𝑠𝑠2（𝛾𝛾2�））/𝜎𝜎2. We further extend 
the two-threshold model to a three-threshold model, and calculate 𝐹𝐹3, but we could not reject the null of two threshold values and 
thus, it is only appropriate to retain the two-threshold model with the three life-cycle-stage model (two threshold points divide the 
overall observation into three intervals). The threshold number test and value of threshold can be found in appendix table 




then generate each donation coefficient in the life-cycle stage by using the life-cycle dummy described above. 
Specifically, given the reference coefficient (the original regression coefficient), we generate the coefficient of 
donation in second and the third life-cycle stage by multiplying the second and third life-cycle stage dummy 
with the original regression coefficient (the reference group that is viewed as the first life-cycle stage), 
respectively 3 . Thus, we have three life-cycle stages with different slopes, representing the three different 
relationships between CP and CFP in different life-cycle stages.  
Before we run the regression, we make several sample comparisons to get a general understanding of our 
sample. Table 1-2 presents the comparison of firms’ ROA, donations, cash flow, size, age, and slack resources 
within different life-cycle stages. According to our method of dividing the life cycle, firms in the development 
stage of the life cycle have a lower ROA than they do in the maturity life-cycle stages. Firms’ level of donation 
is also the lowest in this stage. However, we do not find any significant trends in three cash-flows (operating, 
financing, and investing) patterns, age, and firm size. It can also be found that firms’ unabsorbed slack resources 
increase as firms move from growth to maturity life-cycle stage. We further test the difference of ROA in the 
different life-cycle stages for firms against different levels of donation.  
[Insert Table 1-2 about here] 
In Table 1-3, we first sort firms into five groups according to their donation level, with column (6) equaling 
the highest donation / ROA in a specific life-cycle stage, and column (1) equaling the lowest donation / ROA in 
a specific life-cycle stage. Then the firm’s ROA is calculated by quartiles of the firm donations in each sample 
 
3 The original regression coefficient is considered as the coefficient of donation in first life-cycle stage, the interaction term of the 
original coefficient and the second life-cycle stage dummy is the coefficient of donation in second life-cycle stage; similarly, the 




firm. In column (7), we find that the average amount of donation is the highest in the firms in the later maturity 
stage (8.141) and lowest for firms in the development stage (2.48). Additionally, the dispersion of ROA between 
the highest-donation firms and the lowest-donation firms is highest in the firms in the later maturity life-cycle 
stage. For example, in column (9), in which the ROA spread is calculated as the difference between the highest-
donation firms (6) and the lowest-donation firms (2), the difference between the highest- and the lowest-donation 
firms’ ROA is 2.502 (12.536 – 10.034) (p < 0.001) for later maturity life-cycle-stage firms but only 1.384 (-2.287 
- (-3.671)) (p > 0.1) for the development life-cycle-stage firms. This seems to suggest that the ROA in later 
maturity life-cycle-stage firms is more sensitive to firm donations than it is in development life-cycle-stages 
firms. Given that the highest level of donation is approximately the same in both the initial maturity (15.838) 
and later maturity (15.939) life-cycle stages (the lowest donation is zero for these two groups), the ROA reacts 
more sensitively to donation in the later maturity stage than in the initial maturity life-cycle stages (ROA spread 
= 2.502, p < 0.001). Therefore, we believe that if controlling other factors, the higher the level of a firm’s maturity, 
the more sensitive of a firm’s ROA to its donation. 
[Insert Table 1-3 about here] 
Model specification 
After we identified life-cycle stage through the panel threshold model, we then use the Generalized 
Estimating Equation (GEE) model to estimate the CP–CFP relationship, which is an appropriate method for our 
study because it helps estimate a robust and consistent time-invariant variable (in our model, the state-control 




ensure our results are robust and reasonable.4 
The model we use to test the effect of donation on ROA during different life-cycle stages is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽11𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽15𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 +∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖            Eq (1) 
Where 𝛽𝛽0 is the time-invariant intercept; 𝛽𝛽1 to 𝛽𝛽15 are the slope coefficients of various control and independent 
variables. We also add industry and year dummy variables to control for industry fixed effects and changing economic 
conditions. Given that our main hypothesis predicts that firms’ CP–CFP relationship changes from negative to positive 
as they go through from the development life-cycle stage to the maturity life-cycle stage, in Eq (1), we expect 𝛽𝛽2 to 
be negative and statistically significant; 𝛽𝛽3  to be positive and statistically significant; 𝛽𝛽4  to be positive and 
statistically significant, and the absolute value of 𝛽𝛽4 and 𝛽𝛽3 to be larger than the absolute value of 𝛽𝛽2. 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 and 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 
are year industry fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 refers to the error term, and all firms are coded 
as i in year t.  
 
4 To eliminate any first-order autocorrelation issues (Arellano and Bond 1991), we create a dynamic model by adding 
a lagged dependent variable following Greene (2003). To minimize the problem of heteroskedasticity, we provide a 
Huber–White–Sandwich robust standard error (Wooldridge 2010). Further, we treat outliers in our database by 
replacing the extreme values at 1% and 99% (Deb et al. 2017). With respect to endogeneity, we use the Heckman two-
stage model (Certo et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2008; Wang and Qian 2011). Heckman (1979) suggests using a control 
variable with predictive power toward one part of the estimated equation. We choose here “industry-level donation” 
as our instrumental control variable because peer-industry behavior has been found to influence philanthropic behavior 
(Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991), but not firm-level financial performance (Wang and Qian, 2011). We first use a Probit 
model to estimate the probability of making donation; we then calculate the IMR and add it in our second-stage 
Heckman regression. In further robustness tests, we use a fixed-effects model to compare with the results of the GEE 
model. We further use a 2SLS model to help mitigate the problem of endogeneity caused by omitted variables. Finally, 






Table 1-4 presents the variables used in the Heckman first-stage model. The descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix are presented in this table. As expected, we find firm size, age, and debt ratio are all positively 
associated with firms’ choice of making charitable donations, which indicates that the larger and the older the 
firm, the higher the probability of engaging in philanthropy, and the higher the level of debt ratio, the higher the 
probability of engaging in philanthropy. In addition, we can find that the state-control dummy has a positive 
association with firms’ engaging in philanthropy, indicating that state ownership has a positive influence on CP. 
All these results are comparable to those of Wang and Qian (2011), who used a similar Chinese sample. We also 
find that firms’ ROA is positively associated with the choice of engagement in CP, which illustrates that a firm’s 
financial condition or profitability plays an important role in determining its engagement in socially responsible 
behavior (Campbell 2007; Clarkson et al. 2011; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). We check the problem of 
multicollinearity by testing variance inflation factors (VIF) for each independent variable. The results (VIF mean 
level of 1.23) indicate no problem of multicollinearity in our model. 
Table 1-5 presents the results from the Probit model of the Heckman first-stage regression. The dependent 
variable—firms’ binary choice of charitable donation—suggests whether a firm engages in philanthropic 
activities. Model (1) shows that basic firm-level variables, for example, firm visibility, state ownership, and age, 
positively affect CP, indicating that if the firm is more visible, older, and controlled by the government, it is more 
like to engage in CP. When unabsorbed slack resources and absorbed slack resources are added to the model 
(Model (2)), it can be observed that only absorbed slack has a significant, positive effect on CP, whereas 
unobserved slack resources yield insignificant results. Further, when ROA is added (Model (3)), we see that it 




and Siegel 2001). Finally, a consistent and positive effect is found in Models (2) and (3) for industry-level 
donation, indicating that peer behavior has an important effect on a firm’s philanthropic behavior (Galaskiewicz 
and Burt 1991). 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
We then move on to the Heckman second-stage model and test the CP–CFP relationship in different life-
cycle stages. Table 1-6 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in the 
Heckman second-stage model. We see that charitable donation is positively associated with ROA, which 
provides evidence that engaging in CP will usually promote firms’ financial performance (Orlitzky et al. 2003). 
Indeed, in a meta-analysis, Margolis et al. (2007) demonstrated that 50% of past empirical studies find a positive 
relationship between CP and CFP. We also find that the variables GDP per capita, unabsorbed slack resources, 
and lagged ROA are positively associated with ROA, which shows that macroeconomic conditions, a firm’s free 
cash availability, and the firm’s previous year’s financial condition have positive effects on firm ROA (Wang 
and Qian 2011). Intangible assets are also positively associated with ROA, suggesting the importance of 
intangible assets to firm financial performance (Surroca et al. 2010). However, we find that a firm’s absorbed 
slack is negatively correlated with ROA, suggesting that having more absorbed slack is detrimental to a firm’s 
financial performance. 
[Insert Table 1-6 about here] 
Table 1-7 presents the results of the Heckman second–stage regression model based on the GEE model 
after controlling for the IMR (self-selection bias) generated from the Heckman first-stage model. The table 
shows the relationship between CP and CFP in different life-cycle stages and the moderating effect of unabsorbed 




In the GEE model, that is, in Model (1) of Table 1-7, we reveal that CP (the development life-cycle stage 
[first life-cycle stage], main relationship) is negatively associated with firms’ ROA (coefficient = -0.247, 
p < 0.01), but the relationship is positively moderated by the life-cycle dummy (second and third life-cycle 
dummy). We further observe that the second life-cycle dummy positively moderates the main relationship, with 
the moderating effect being stronger than the main effect of CP (coefficient = 0.269, p < 0.001) (CP–CFP 
relationship in initial maturity life-cycle stage [second life-cycle stage] is -0.247 + 0.269 = 0.022). Similarly, in 
model (1) the third life-cycle dummy also positively moderates the main relationship, with the moderating effect 
being stronger than the main effect of CP (coefficient = 0.294, p < 0.001) (CP–CFP relationship in the later 
maturity life-cycle stage [third life-cycle stage] is -0.247 + 0.294 = 0.047). It is thus observed that while the 
relationship between CP and CFP is negative in the development life-cycle stage (coefficient = -0.247, 
P < 0.001), it becomes positive and progressively stronger in the maturity life-cycle stages (coefficient = 0.269 
for the initial life-cycle stage and 0.294 for the later maturity life-cycle stage). This result provides full support 
for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, which predict that the relationship between CP and CFP will be negative in 
the development life-cycle stage and become positive in the maturity life-cycle stage. As seen in Figure 1-2, the 
relationship between CP and CFP is negative in the development stage and changes to being positive in the initial 
and later maturity stages. 
We add the interaction term of absorbed slack resources and each life-cycle stage dummy (as can be 
observed in Models (2), (3), and (4)). As shown in Model (2), the moderating effect of absorbed slack resources 
on the CP–CFP relationship is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.065, p < 0.01), denoting that in the 
development life-cycle stage, the higher the firm’s absorbed slack resources, the higher the firms’ ROA. As firms 




resources continue to positively moderate the CP–CFP relationship (coefficient = 0.1, p < 0.001). In the later 
maturity life-cycle stage (Model (4)), the moderating effect of absorbed slack resources on the CP–CFP 
relationship is significantly negative (coefficient = 0.098, p < 0.01). Because the moderating effect of absorbed 
slack resources changes from positive to negative as firms move from the growth to the maturity life-cycle stage 
(shown in figures 1-3 to 1-5), our findings partially support Hypothesis 3, which predicts that absorbed slack 
resources should have consistent negative moderating effects in both the development and maturity life-cycle 
stages.  
[Insert Table 1-7 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1-2 about here] 
 [Insert Figures 1-3 to 1-5 about here] 
In Table 1-7, Models (5) to (7) present the moderating effects of unabsorbed slack resources on the CP–
CFP relationship in each life-cycle stage. We find that in the development life-cycle stage (Model (5)), 
unabsorbed slack resources have an insignificant moderating effect on the CP–CFP relationship (coefficient = -
0.016, p > 0.1). However, as firms transit from the development life-cycle stage to the initial mature life-cycle 
stage, the moderating effect of unabsorbed slack resources becomes significantly negative (coefficient = -0.04, 
p < 0.05) (Model (6)). Finally, in the later maturity life-cycle stage, the moderating effect of unabsorbed slack 
changes to significantly positive (coefficient = 0.066, p < 0.05) (Model (7)). These results do not support 
Hypothesis 4a, which predicts a negative moderating effect of unabsorbed slack in the development life-cycle 
stage. But we find a negative moderating effect of unabsorbed slack in the initial maturity stage, and a positive 
moderating effect in the later maturity stage. These moderating effects are presented in Figures 1-6 and 1-7.  




In a robustness check,5 we find that the relationship between CP and CFP in the different life-cycle stages 
holds in a fixed-effects model; however, unlike in Table 1-7 of Model (7), the moderating effect of unabsorbed 
slack in the maturity life-cycle stage is insignificant. We also try to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using the 
2SLS model and use the predicted values of philanthropy from the first-stage regression and find only one 
threshold point (two life-cycle stages). The overall relationship between CP and CFP changes from negative to 
positive as firms move from the first life-cycle stage to the second life-cycle stage (under the scenario of the 
2SLS model). Finally, we use PSM to obtain a matched sample for firms engaged and not engaged in CP. We 
then use this matched new sample to obtain one threshold point, and the CP–CFP relationship also changes from 
positive to negative from the first life-cycle stage to the second life-cycle stage (under the scenario of PSM 
method). The moderating effect of absorbed slack resources are consistently negative under the GEE model, 
thus fully supporting Hypothesis 3, while we still partially support Hypothesis 4 in terms of moderating effect 
of unabsorbed slack on CP–CFP relationship in both GEE and fixed-effect model. Overall, we find that the CP–
CFP relationship over life-cycle stages is robust under different models, and the moderating effects are partially 
supported by different models. 
Robustness Checks 
In order to confirm the validity of our results of the stage-like relationship between CP and CFP, we run 
additional robustness tests. These tests use different methods to guarantee that the coefficient is unbiased by 
controlling the endogeneity problem. First, we use the Hausman test to determine the fixed effect model (FE 
model) over the random effect model (RE model) and find consistent results in the fixed-effect model. Second, 
 




we use two-stage Least Square (2sls) (Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013) model to predict Donation (using instrumental 
variables and control variables) in the first stage and use the predicted value of Donation as a new independent 
variable in second-stage ROA regression. Based on the new predicted Donation, we re-estimate the threshold 
from Panel Threshold Model. We further use Propensity Score Matching (PSM), a commonly used method to 
cope with endogeneity in firms’ non-market strategy literature (Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2014; Haveman, Jia, Shi, & 
Wang, 2017; Zhang, Marquis, & Qiao, 2016) to mitigate endogeneity concerns by matching firms receiving 
treatment (have philanthropic behavior) with those control groups. According to the propensity score (the 
predicted likelihood of receiving treatment), a sample of observations with and without treatment is formed.6 
Based on this matched sample, we further implement the FE model and the GEE model and find consistent 
results. 
First, in table 1-8, we perform an FE model by controlling all factors that vary across individuals but are 
constant over time, and for all factors that vary over time but are constant across individuals (Wooldridge, 2010). 
We notice that in model (1), firms’ CP (1st life-cycle stage, main relationship) is negatively correlated with ROA, 
and the second and third lifecycle Dummy positively moderate the 1st lifecycle stage with the effects being 
stronger than 1st stage coefficient (coefficient in 1st stage is -0.242, p < 0.05; coefficient in 2nd stage is 0.257, 
p < 0.05; coefficient in 3rd stage is 0.257, p <0.01). Model (2) to model (7) display the moderating effects of 
absorbed slack and unabsorbed slack. 
 
6 To ensure the matching quality, we require the maximum difference between propensity score of Donation firms 
and propensity score of potential controls does not exceed 0.025 in absolute value. Therefore, under the nearest 
neighbor matching method, any propensity score distance above 0.025 between two observations will be automatically 
dropped. Given this control, after pooling those observations with treatment (philanthropic behavior) and those 




[Insert Table 1-8 about here] 
Second, in table 1-9, based the original threshold value, we use OLS (model (1) to model (3)) to test CP–
CFP relationship, we notice that CP–CFP relationship changes from negative to positive as firms move from 
development life-cycle stage to mature life-cycle stage, consistent with our previous results. We perform an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation using 2sls regression from model (4) to model (7). In model (4), we regress 
the Donation on two instrumentals and control variables. We use lagged Donation and score of corporate social 
responsibility as two instrumental variables. From the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (weak identification), we 
reject the null hypothesis that instrumental variables are weak. From the Sagan test (overidentification test), we 
accept the null hypothesis that instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term in second stage 
regression. Therefore, we believe our selection of instrumental variables is rational. In model (5), we regress 
ROA on predicted Donation estimated from the first stage and other controls. In determining the threshold point 
that indicates life-cycle dummies, we re-estimate the threshold value based on the predicted value of Donation 
estimated from the first stage. Different from the previous two-threshold model, we only find one-threshold point 
and two life-cycle stages.7 Different from table 1-7, here, we find one threshold point (-0.0124, p < 0.001) that 
divides two lifecycle stages. We notice that in model (5), CP (first life-cycle stage, main relationship) is 
negatively associated with ROA and positively moderated by second life-cycle stage dummy (coefficient = 1.193, 
p < 0.001) with the moderating effect being stronger than 1st life-cycle stage coefficient (coefficient = -1.003, p 
< 0.001). Although we have two life-cycle stages here, the fact that the relationship between CP and CFP changes 
from negative to positive remains consistent, reinforcing our hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. In model (6), we 
 
7 The threshold number test and value of threshold can be found in appendix table 1-3 and appendix table 1-4 and 




use three instrumental variables: Lagged Donation, CSR, and Lagged CSR (the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 
and Sagan statistic all show that they are valid) to estimate the predicted value of Donation and then in model 
(7), we find that relationship between CP and CFP changes from negative to positive. According to Log-
likelihood, we choose the model (6) with larger log-likelihood indicating a better model fit and based on 
predicted Donation in this model, we further run second-stage regression and moderating effects of slack. As in 
model (8), (9), (10), and (11), we find that the moderating effect of absorbed slack is the insignificant and 
moderating effect of unabsorbed slack is only positively significant in development life-cycle stage.  
[Insert Table 1-9 about here] 
Third, in table 1-10, we employ the PSM method proposed by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983). We first 
estimate a probit model where we regress the Donation dummy on firm-level variables and industry and year 
controls. Following Faccio & Hsu (2017), we use the firm’s ROA, sales growth ratio, size, and industry and year 
indicators as matching dimensions and regress the dummy of Donation on those variables. Then, firms with 
treatment will be matched to those without treatment according to the nearest propensity scores. After we pool 
those matched samples (both with treatment and without treatment) together, firms with Donation will be 
regarded as exogenous. The endogeneity issue is largely ameliorated. The matching quality is good because we 
find that t-tests of differences between two groups and most industry and year indicators were insignificant (p > 
0.05). In this new matched sample, we re-estimate threshold point and find that only one threshold point exists 
(two-stage life-cycle model), 8  model (1) shows that CP (first life-cycle stage, main relationship) is first 
negatively associated with ROA (coefficient = -0.005, p < 0.1), then positively moderated by second life-cycle 
 
8 The threshold number test and value of threshold can be found in appendix table 1-5 and appendix table 1-6 and 




dummy with the effect being stronger than first lifecycle stage coefficient (coefficient = 0.013, p < 0.001). In 
model (2) and model (3), we find significant moderating effects of absorbed slack and fully support hypothesis 
3, which states that absorbed slack has a consistent negative moderating effect throughout the firm life-cycle 
stage. From model (4) to model (6), we find no significant moderating effects of unabsorbed slack. In FE model, 
CP–CFP relationship also changes from negative to positive (coefficient =-0.0237, p < 0.05; coefficient =0.102, 
p < 0.05). Model (7) to model (10) show the moderating effects of both kinds of slack, with absorbed slack has 
a significant moderating effect in the mature stage and no significant moderating effects can be found for 
unabsorbed slack. Overall, we consistently find that firms’ CP–CFP relationship changes from negative to 
positive throughout the life-cycle stage. 
[Insert Table 1-10 about here] 
Finally, we use the alternative measures of financial performance to reinforce our results are robust. As 
can be seen in Table 1-11, we use EBITDA ratio as the dependent variable to indicate the firm’s financial 
performance and find only one threshold point which divides the life-cycle stage into two sub subsamples. We 
find that the the moderating effect of maturity life-cycle stage dummy (coefficient = 0.0054, p <0.01) is 
stronger than the first-stage CP-CFP relationship (coefficient = -0.0047, p <0.01), thus fully support hypothesis 
1. However, the moderating effect of absorbed slack is positive in the maturity stage and the moderating effect 
of both unabsorbed slack is insignificant in both development and maturity life-cycle stage. We could not 
support hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. In table 1-12, we further use the fixed-effect model to confirm the 
results found in the GEE model. These results are consistent in supporting hypothesis 1. 






This study investigated the relationship between CP and CFP while incorporating capability heterogeneities 
across life-cycle stages. The results demonstrate that incorporating the dynamic nature of firms’ capability of 
engaging in CP is important for enriching knowledge of the financial effects of firms engaging in philanthropy. 
We find that the CP–CFP relationship can both be positive and negative in firms’ different life-cycle stages; 
specifically, we argue that a low capacity to utilize resources in the development life-cycle stage makes firms 
unable to generate sufficient benefits to cover the costs related with CP. However, the increased level of firms’ 
capacity to utilize resources that comes in the maturity life-cycle stage, the CP–CFP relationship becomes 
positive. In sum, our findings suggest that firms in the development life-cycle stage cannot effectively allocate 
resources and use their resources to manage stakeholders’ needs. Throughout the learning process associated 
with gaining maturity, firms in the maturity stage gain trust and legitimacy from stakeholders and become more 
capable of managing and allocating resources to meet stakeholders’ needs.  
The findings of this study have several important implications for CP literature. First, the CP literature is 
marked by long-standing conflicting empirical results on the CP–CFP relationship. This study helps reconcile 
previous debates and mixed findings (Friedman 1970; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Waddock and Graves 1997). More 
importantly, most current studies focus on the effect of the amount of CP, largely overlooking the firm capacity 
to utilize resources when engaging in CP. In this paper, we address this important omission by incorporating the 
concept of the firm life cycle with firm capability development, and finding that in different life-cycle stages, 
the CP–CFP relationship varies in accordance with these stages. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on slack resources by incorporating firm capacity to utilize slack 




between slack resources and firm performance (Daniel et al. 2004; George 2005; Paeleman and Vanacker 2015). 
Research has long ignored whether and how a firm’s capability of utilizing slack resources makes a difference 
to firm financial performance. This study fills this gap by showing that in different life-cycle stages, firms’ slack 
resources (absorbed and unabsorbed) differently moderate the CP–CFP relationship, indicating that capacity to 
utilize slack resources determines the benefits firms can achieve. In addition, most studies on slack resources 
consider slack resources as a separate concept. Very little research attention is paid to whether slack resources 
can be analyzed in combination with other activities of firms such as CP, which is a resource-using behavior. We 
fill this gap by examining CP behavior in combination with different types of slack resources within different 
life-cycle stages; our results demonstrate that the value created by CP, which we expect to be affected by the 
capacity to utilize slack resources to engage in CP, differ significantly in different life-cycle stages.  
Third, our study also suggests that firms should consider when and how to engage in CP, particularly when 
they face resource constraints and a lack of capabilities because not all CP will be beneficial to firms’ CFP. Firms 
that want to extract positive results from CP need to be qualified to engage in such activities and must not simply 
dismiss CP as costly behavior that is detrimental to the firms’ valuation (Friedman 1970). Developing the 
corresponding capability of utilizing resources and managing stakeholders’ expectations would be of critical 
importance in increasing both firm value and social welfare, which is also known as “doing well by doing good” 
(Waddock and Smith, 2000).  
Fourth, we also contribute to the methodology of dividing samples. Unlike previous literature that manually 
separates full samples into subsamples, we use a more innovative method of the panel threshold model to obtain 
the threshold points from the overall model fit given the control variables and dependent variables used. This 




the dataset, largely overcoming the potential bias that results from the inaccurate method of sample division.  
Limitations and future research 
Our paper is not without limitations. Although our paper focuses on capability development of using 
resources to engage CP, we only look at one aspect of socially responsible behavior–CP. It is also important to 
consider the role of capability in other aspects of socially responsible behavior such as environmental behavior 
and corporate governance behavior or in other countries other than China. Future research can extend this line 
of research in several directions. First, future research should investigate whether the issue of capability matter 
in other socially responsible behavior of firms such as environmental activities. Second, research on the CP–
CFP relationship should be extended beyond the Chinese market. It would be interesting to investigate whether 
the benefits of capability development are more valuable in developed institutional environments such as in the 
United States. Third, future studies should also examine whether the capability development of engaging in 
socially responsible behavior results from the motivation gained from the positive feedback related to good 
performance or other positive rewards. It is highly possible that firms’ capability development may be hampered 
if they are not rewarded. 
Conclusions  
The benefits achieved from CP depend on firms’ capability of engaging in CP. Thus, the benefits of 
engaging in CP in the development life-cycle stage may largely deteriorate because of the firm’s lack of 
capability in allocating resources and managing stakeholders’ needs and expectations effectively. However, the 
benefits of CP in the maturity life-cycle stage are more positive and pronounced. Hence, simply engaging in CP 
may have limited effects on enhancing economic return for firms. Rather, firms can improve expected returns 




decisions about their engagement in CP. We believe including the concept of firm capability concerning engaging 
CP will help future research better understand different firm-level outcomes of engaging in CP, which include 






Table 1-1: Sample Description by Year and Industry 
Year N % Cum. (%) CSRC industry code Two-digit code N Percentage Cum. (%) Industry name 
2008 356 12.5 12.5 A 01-03 35 1.23 1.23  Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
2009 356 12.5 25 B 06-09 156 5.48 6.71  Mineral industries 
2010 356 12.5 37.5 C 13-41 1,600 56.14 62.89  Manufacturing 
2011 356 12.5 50 D 44-46 163 5.76 68.61  Electricity, heat, and natural gas supplies 
2012 356 12.5 62.5 E 47-48 67 2.37 70.96  Construction industries 
2013 356 12.5 75 F 51-52 115 4.06 75.00  Wholesale and retail trade 
2014 356 12.5 87.5 G 54-58 81 2.86 77.84  Transportation communications 
2015 356 12.5 100 I 63-65 74 2.61 80.44  Information communications 
Total 2,848 100  K 70 239 8.23 88.48  Real estate 
    L 72 27 0.95 89.43  Lease services 
    N 78 22 0.78 90.20  Environmental and water supplies 
    R 85-86 213 7.52 98.02  Software, internet, and technology services 
    S 90 56 1.98 100 Other  
    Total  2,848 100   
Note: This table presents the year and industry—classification is based on the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry code with two-digit 
specification—distributions for the 2,848 industry-year observations between 2008 and 2015 that comprise the sample. 
 
Table 1-2: Comparison of Firm’s Characteristics Between Different Life-cycle Stages 









Development Stage -1.378 2.178 18.901 17.740  18.721 22.017 12.036 0.300  0.282 
Initial Maturity Stage 4.567 6.060  20.465 18.808 20.483 23.464 11.026 0.247 0.277 
Later Maturity Stage 10.303 6.868 20.084 18.345 18.996 22.534 12.320  0.299 0.426 
Average 5.320  6.049 20.343 18.633 20.296 23.249 11.287 0.258 0.303 
Note: Development stage is treated as a dummy variable, coded as 1 when retained earnings to total assets (RETA) is smaller than the first threshold value (-
0.0124), and 0 otherwise. The Initial Maturity stage is treated as a dummy variable, coded as 1 when RETA is larger than the first threshold value (-0.0124) and 
smaller than the second threshold value (0.2796), and 0 otherwise. The Later Maturity stage is treated as a dummy variable, coded as 1 when RETA is larger than 
the second threshold value (0.2796), and 0 otherwise. The number of observations for the development stage, the initial maturity stage, and the later maturity stage 






Table 1-3: Comparison of Firms’ donation and ROA in each life-cycle stage 
 













test (t-stats) p-value  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
All firms’  
donation 2,848 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.591 15.772 5.873 15.772 
 -117.815 0.000 
All firms’  
ROA 
 4.933 4.900 5.189 5.712 5.870 5.321  0.937 -3.137 0.002 
Development-stage 
firms’ donation 110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.398 2.480 12.398 
 -6.940 0.000 
Development-stage 
firms’ ROA 
 -3.671 -3.839 0.683 1.499 -2.287 -1.523  1.384 -0.582 0.564 
Initial maturity-stage 
firms’ donation 2,250 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.654 15.838 5.899 15.838 
 -105.134 0.000 
Initial maturity-stage 
firms’ ROA 
 4.573 4.503 4.547 4.667 4.546 4.567  -0.027 0.108 0.914 
Later maturity-stage 
firms’ donation 488 0.000 0.000 11.002 13.763 15.939 8.141 15.939 
 -56.625 0.000 
Later maturity -stage 
firms’ ROA 
 10.034 9.550 9.010 10.388 12.536 10.304  2.502 -3.261 0.001 
Note: This table reports the average difference of return on assets (ROA) for all firms, firms in the development life-cycle stage, initial maturity life-cycle stage, 
and later maturity life-cycle stage. The observations are sorted into five classes according to firms’ donation (2 = lowest, 6 = highest). Average donation/ROA is 
the average arithmetic value of the donation and ROA for the full sample, development life-cycle stage sample, initial maturity life-cycle stage sample, and later 
maturity-stage sample. “ROA spread (6)-(2)” is the ROA difference between the highest-donation firms (6 = high) and the lowest-donation firms (2 = low) in each 
group (all firms, firms in the development life-cycle stage, initial maturity life-cycle stage, and later maturity life-cycle stage). “Donation spread (6)-(2)” is the 
donation difference between the highest-donation firms and the lowest-donation firms in each group (all firms, firms in the development life-cycle stage, initial 







Table 1-4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the First Stage of Heckman Second-stage Regression 
  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Donation dummy 0.231  0.421         
2 ROA 0.045  0.056  0.074***       
3 Debt ratio 0.050  0.090  0.107*** -0.071***      
4 Unabsorbed slack 0.376  0.484  -0.063*** 0.154*** -0.167***     
5 State dummy 0.408  0.492  0.183*** -0.059*** 0.211*** -0.093***    
6 Absorbed slack 0.312  0.463  -0.025*** -0.137*** -0.083*** 0.004 -0.029***   
7 Selling expense ratio 0.076  0.263  0.023*** -0.008 -0.047*** 0.009 -0.061*** 0.061***  
8 Fixed asset ratio 0.231  0.177  0.005 -0.092*** 0.259*** -0.243*** 0.194*** 0.024*** -0.082*** 
9 Intangible asset ratio 0.049  0.069  -0.012 -0.026*** 0.032*** -0.107*** 0.045*** 0.042*** -0.030*** 
10 Size 21.876  1.497  0.436*** 0.042*** 0.301*** -0.137*** 0.301*** -0.146*** -0.001 
11 Age 9.072  6.311  0.127*** -0.145*** 0.209*** -0.214*** 0.358*** 0.001 -0.017**  
12 Industry-level donation 13.125  3.592  0.059*** 0.019** 0.021*** -0.011 0.033*** -0.053*** 0.018**  
 
  Mean s.d. 8 9 10 11 
8 Fixed asset ratio 0.231  0.177      
9 Intangible asset ratio 0.049  0.069  0.062***    
10 Size 21.876  1.497  0.036*** -0.059***   
11 Age 9.072  6.311  0.080*** 0.053*** 0.177***  
12 Industry-level donation 13.125  3.592  -0.055*** -0.017** 0.143*** 0.055*** 






Table 1-5: Probit Estimates for Heckman First-stage Model: Giving Choice Regressed on Firm, Subnational, 
and Industry Controls 
 Probit Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Debt ratio -0.612* -0.408* -0.258 
 (-4.598) (-2.533) (-1.596)  
State dummy 0.169* 0.199* 0.221* 
 (6.607) (7.086) (7.815) 
Selling expense ratio 0.111** 0.046 0.05 
 (3.266) (1.051) (1.145) 
GDP -0.049* 0.071* 0.059* 
 (-2.058) (2.435) (2.039) 
Fixed asset ratio -0.096 -0.223* -0.168 
 (-1.410) (-2.348) (-1.755)  
Intangible asset ratio 0.134 -0.232 -0.208 
 (0.816) (-1.191) (-1.060)  
Size 0.445* 0.520* 0.508* 
 (46.348) (42.245) (41.111) 
Age 0.006** 0.006** 0.008* 
 (2.865) (2.664) (3.330) 
Industry-level donation -0.003 0.011* 0.011* 
 (-1.069) (2.398) (2.288) 
Unabsorbed slack  -0.02 -0.046 
  (-0.743) (-1.693)  
Absorbed slack  0.146* 0.175* 
  (5.165) (6.145) 
ROA   2.697* 
   (10.391) 
Industry fixed effects no yes yes 
Year fixed effects no yes yes 
Intercept -10.085* -13.602* -13.393* 
 (-30.768) (-31.743) (-31.146)  
    
N 17,504 17,504 17,504 
Pseudo R square 0.184 0.225 0.231 
LR chi2 3,514.517 4,315.105 4,426.048 
Log likelihood -7810.96 -7410.66 -7355.19 
Incremental χ2 of (2) to (1)  800.59***  
Incremental χ2 of (3) to (2)   911.53*** 




Table 1-6: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Heckman Second-Stage Regression 
 Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 ROA 5.320  4.913         
2 Lagged ROA 5.873  5.171  0.649***       
3 Donation 6.049  7.221  0.063*** 0.062***      
4 Initial Maturity stage dummy 0.790  0.407  -0.297*** -0.318*** 0.003     
5 Later Maturity stage dummy 0.171  0.377  0.461*** 0.460*** 0.052*** -0.882***    
6 Age 11.287  5.227  -0.068*** -0.053*** -0.012 -0.097*** 0.090***   
7 GDP per capita 10.740  0.506  0.124*** 0.076*** 0.029 0.078*** -0.051*** -0.246***  
8 State dummy 0.587  0.492  -0.076*** -0.049*** -0.028 0.032* -0.046** 0.193*** -0.058*** 
9 Unabsorbed slack 0.303  0.460  0.137*** 0.161*** -0.014 -0.108*** 0.122*** -0.066*** -0.004 
10 Absorbed slack 0.258  0.438  -0.142*** -0.078*** -0.021 -0.049*** 0.043** -0.018 -0.063*** 
11 Selling expense ratio 0.081  0.121  -0.016 -0.041** 0.127*** -0.029 0.056*** -0.038** 0.006 
12 Fixed asset ratio 0.245  0.192  -0.039** -0.014 -0.096*** -0.042** 0.001 -0.008 -0.158*** 
13 Intangible asset ratio 0.050  0.086  0.091*** 0.094*** 0.002 -0.077*** 0.087*** -0.022 -0.056*** 
14 Debt ratio 0.082  0.108  -0.099*** -0.094*** -0.077*** 0.222*** -0.232*** 0.061*** -0.049*** 
15 Size 23.249  1.830  -0.203*** -0.204*** 0.310*** 0.228*** -0.178*** 0.058*** 0.120*** 
16 Inverse Mills ratio 1.012  0.546  0.001 0.051*** -0.320*** -0.093*** 0.027 -0.285*** 0.033*   
  Mean s.d. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
8 State dummy 0.587  0.492          
9 Unabsorbed slack 0.303  0.460  -0.02        
10 Absorbed slack 0.258  0.438  -0.027 0.023       
11 Selling expense ratio 0.081  0.121  -0.282*** -0.017 0.150***      
12 Fixed asset ratio 0.245  0.192  0.210*** -0.159*** -0.002 -0.311***     
13 Intangible asset ratio 0.050  0.086  0.176*** -0.054*** -0.031* -0.154*** 0.026    
14 Debt ratio 0.082  0.108  0.200*** -0.105*** -0.152*** -0.302*** 0.296*** 0.015   
15 Size 23.249  1.830  0.097*** -0.103*** -0.096*** 0.226*** -0.156*** -0.056*** 0.118***  
16 Inverse Mills ratio 1.012  0.546  -0.233*** 0.101*** 0.042** -0.179*** 0.107*** -0.02 -0.095*** -0.804*** 






Table 1-7: Estimates for Heckman Second-stage Models:  
Regression of ROA on Donation with Different Life-cycle Dummies, and Firm, Subnational, and Industry-level Controls 
 Generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged ROA 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.155*** 
 (6.713) (6.802) (6.724) (6.637) (6.684) (6.674) (6.737) 
Development stage (main regression): donation (H1) -0.247** -0.267*** -0.245** -0.249**  -0.242** -0.248** -0.247**  
 (-3.170) (-3.509) (-3.102) (-3.194) (-3.120) (-3.166) (-3.179) 
Initial Maturity stage: donation*second life-cycle 
dummy (H2) 0.269*** 0.275*** 0.245** 0.271*** 0.269*** 0.281*** 0.269*** 
 (3.435) (3.577) (3.085) (3.468) (3.446) (3.565) (3.440) 
Later Maturity stage: donation*third life-cycle 
dummy (H2) 0.294*** 0.296*** 0.290*** 0.321*** 0.295*** 0.293*** 0.266**  
 (3.658) (3.753) (3.579) (3.919) (3.684) (3.641) (3.248) 
Age -0.236*** -0.238*** -0.236*** -0.233*** -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.236*** 
 (-8.886) (-8.904) (-8.893) (-8.802) (-8.885) (-8.883) (-8.880) 
GDP per capita 0.591* 0.601* 0.610* 0.595*   0.585* 0.590* 0.617*   
 (2.261) (2.292) (2.324) (2.275) (2.236) (2.265) (2.358) 
State dummy -3.677*** -3.673*** -3.670*** -3.670*** -3.679*** -3.689*** -3.690*** 
 (-10.370) (-10.434) (-10.490) (-10.385) (-10.387) (-10.443) (-10.421) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.610*** 0.632*** 0.632*** 0.601**  0.698** 0.780*** 0.526**  
 (3.310) (3.431) (3.441) (3.275) (3.190) (3.689) (2.792) 
Absorbed slack -3.646*** -4.047*** -4.132*** -3.526*** -3.650*** -3.655*** -3.640*** 
 (-12.409) (-13.424) (-14.325) (-11.814) (-12.433) (-12.471) (-12.424) 
Selling expense ratio -0.770  -0.741  -0.761  -0.860  -0.810  -0.872  -0.771  
 (-0.405) (-0.395) (-0.412) (-0.455) (-0.425) (-0.460) (-0.408) 
Fixed asset ratio 2.355*** 2.370*** 2.385*** 2.334*** 2.355*** 2.391*** 2.406*** 
 (3.487) (3.519) (3.558) (3.466) (3.486) (3.531) (3.579) 
Intangible asset ratio 2.775* 2.944* 2.957* 2.680*   2.778* 2.820* 2.839*   
 (2.170) (2.297) (2.319) (2.113) (2.175) (2.203) (2.211) 




 (1.018) (1.040) (0.995) (0.989) (1.032) (1.026) (0.991) 
Size -7.386*** -7.424*** -7.432*** -7.372*** -7.393*** -7.405*** -7.388*** 
 (-12.260) (-12.525) (-12.660) (-12.273) (-12.270) (-12.300) (-12.272) 
Inverse Mills ratio -23.080*** -23.191*** -23.216*** -23.041*** -23.098*** -23.125*** -23.077*** 
 (-13.573) (-13.870) (-14.016) (-13.580) (-13.590) (-13.624) (-13.578) 
MEAS in Develop stage (H3)  0.065**      
  (2.778)      
MEAS in Initial Maturity stage (H3)   0.100***     
   (3.888)     
MEAS in Later Maturity stage(H3)    -0.098**     
    (-3.224)    
MEUAS in Develop stage (H4a)     -0.016   
     (-0.875)   
MEUAS in Initial Maturity stage (H4b)      -0.040*  
      (-2.092)  
MEUAS in Later Maturity stage (H4b)       0.066*   
       (2.115) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 204.608*** 205.652*** 205.762*** 204.137*** 204.836*** 205.042*** 204.356*** 
 (11.750) (11.990) (12.105) (11.754) (11.761) (11.783) (11.736) 
N 2,848 2,848 2,848 2,848 2,848 2,848 2,848 
Note: Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. MEAS = moderating effect of absorbed slack; MEUAS = 




Table 1-8: Estimates for Heckman Second-Stage Models:  
Regression of ROA on Donation with Different Lifecycle Dummy, and Firm, Sub-national, and Industry-level Controls 
 Fixed Effect Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged ROA 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 
 (6.178) (6.234) (6.155) (6.108) (6.173) (6.181) (6.200) 
Development stage (main regression): donation (H1) -0.242* -0.259** -0.238* -0.241*   -0.238* -0.243* -0.242*   
 (-2.395) (-2.625) (-2.335) (-2.397)    (-2.355) (-2.403) (-2.399)    
Initial Maturity stage: donation*second life-cycle 
dummy (H2) 0.257* 0.262** 0.232* 0.258*   0.257* 0.268** 0.257*   
 (2.540) (2.627) (2.259) (2.553) (2.540) (2.650) (2.541) 
Later Maturity stage: donation*third life-cycle 
dummy (H2) 0.275** 0.277** 0.270* 0.312**  0.276** 0.274** 0.249*   
 (2.650) (2.700) (2.580) (2.965) (2.662) (2.646) (2.373) 
age -0.560*** -0.542*** -0.540*** -0.575*** -0.561*** -0.559*** -0.553*** 
 (-3.404) (-3.342) (-3.352) (-3.498)    (-3.411) (-3.392) (-3.355)    
GDP Per Capita 3.279* 3.408* 3.418* 3.171*   3.273* 3.293* 3.327*   
 (2.217) (2.319) (2.336) (2.145) (2.213) (2.228) (2.242) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.627** 0.640** 0.638** 0.612**  0.692** 0.774** 0.552**  
 (3.041) (3.113) (3.106) (2.990) (2.859) (3.219) (2.660) 
Absorbed slack -3.018*** -3.351*** -3.500*** -2.844*** -3.019*** -3.021*** -3.020*** 
 (-7.162) (-7.585) (-8.059) (-6.749)    (-7.153) (-7.148) (-7.175)    
Selling expense ratio -4.764 -4.628 -4.715 -5.115 -4.819 -4.914 -4.756 
 (-1.470) (-1.450) (-1.505) (-1.582)    (-1.488) (-1.525) (-1.473)    
Fixed asset ratio 3.253** 3.208** 3.193** 3.216**  3.251** 3.290** 3.311**  
 (2.695) (2.655) (2.662) (2.685) (2.693) (2.719) (2.735) 
Intangible asset ratio 1.704 1.863 2.026 1.708 1.69 1.695 1.769 
 (0.554) (0.604) (0.659) (0.566) (0.549) (0.551) (0.575) 
Debt ratio -0.799 -0.792 -0.811 -0.793 -0.787 -0.778 -0.814 
 (-0.534) (-0.529) (-0.544) (-0.532)    (-0.527) (-0.521) (-0.545)    




 (-7.310) (-7.348) (-7.384) (-7.332)    (-7.286) (-7.322) (-7.350)    
Inverse Mills Ratio -16.281*** -16.334*** -16.379*** -16.293*** -16.292*** -16.325*** -16.295*** 
 (-9.922) (-9.943) (-9.981) (-9.971)    (-9.917) (-9.963) (-9.941)    
MEAS in the development stage (H3)  0.053*                  
  -2.137                  
MEAS in the initial maturity stage (H3)   0.098***                 
   -3.622                 
MEAS in the later maturity stage (H3)    -0.140**     
    (-3.056)       
MEUAS in the development stage (H4a)     -0.012               
     (-0.623)               
MEUAS in the initial maturity stage (H4a)      -0.035+              
      (-1.732)              
MEUAS in the later maturity stage (H4b)       0.061 
       -1.625 
Year Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect - - - - - - - 
Intercept 102.056*** 101.083*** 101.325*** 103.396*** 102.332*** 102.668*** 101.784*** 
 -4.505 -4.462 -4.479 -4.595 -4.5 -4.519 -4.494 
N 2848 2848 2848 2848 2848 2848 2848 
R Square 0.466 0.468 0.471 0.469 0.466 0.467 0.467 
Adjusted R Square 0.462 0.464 0.467 0.465 0.462 0.463 0.463 
rho 0.734 0.733 0.733 0.737 0.735 0.736 0.734 
Log likelihood -6597.39 -6592.56 -6583.25 -6587.92 -6597.1 -6595.26 -6594.86 
Note: Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. MEAS represents the moderating effect of absorbed slack; 












 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage Moderating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Lagged ROA 0.491*** 0.425*** 0.155***    0.660*** 0.660*** 0.660*** 0.657*** 0.657*** 
 (16.034) (15.091) (5.440)    (17.855) (17.826) (17.843) (17.880) (17.914) 
Development stage (main regression): donation (H1) -0.411** -0.398** -0.266*                      
(-2.919) (-3.180) (-2.209)                     
Initial Maturity stage: donation*second life-cycle dummy (H2) 0.409** 0.401** 0.269*                      
(2.914) (3.207) (2.237)                     
Later Maturity stage: donation*third life-cycle dummy (H2) 0.568*** 0.542*** 0.315*                     
 (4.015) (4.309) (2.573)                     
Development stage [Main regression]: DonationHet1 (H1)     -1.003***                   
     (-5.394)                   
Maturity stage: Main regression DonationHet1*2nd life-cycle Dummy (H2)      1.193***                   
     (6.517)                   
Development stage [Main regression]: DonationHet2 (H1)       -0.565* -0.559* -0.564* -0.591* -0.555*   
       (-2.438) (-2.413) (-2.442) (-2.561) (-2.389)    
Maturity stage: Main regression DonationHet2*2nd life-cycle Dummy (H2)        0.616** 0.617** 0.617** 0.622** 0.587*   
       (2.697) (2.697) (2.690) (2.733) (2.541) 
Lagged Donation    0.261***  0.274***                  
    (11.617)  (10.786)                  
CSR    0.060***  0.089***                  
    (4.530)  (3.356)                  
Lagged CSR      -0.029                  
      (-1.048)                  
State Dummy -0.465** -1.291*** -3.442***  -0.788***  -0.382* -0.382* -0.382* -0.371* -0.376*   
 (-2.727) (-7.121) (-3.750)  (-3.444)  (-2.069) (-2.065) (-2.067) (-2.000) (-2.030)    
Age 0.003 -0.083***  -0.061+ 0.0350  -0.077* 0.0100  0.0100  0.0100  0.0100  0.0100  
 (0.157) (-4.995)  (-1.852) (1.559) (-2.115) (0.593) (0.596) (0.594) (0.575) (0.554) 
GDP Per Capita 0.642*** 0.582*** 3.414** 0.252 0.820*** 0.638+ 0.473* 0.467* 0.471* 0.474* 0.481*   




Unabsorbed slack 0.105 0.155  0.126 0.501* 0.223 -0.026 0.167 0.02 -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.656) (0.998)  (0.360) (2.163) (0.555) (-0.149) (0.381) (0.044) (-0.194) (-0.190)    
Absorbed slack -1.262*** -1.491***  -0.556 -1.961*** -0.47 -1.085*** -1.084*** -1.085*** -1.728*** -1.715*** 
 (-7.625) (-9.285)  (-1.625) (-9.062) (-1.234) (-5.936) (-5.932) (-5.932) (-3.828) (-3.434)    
Selling expense ratio 3.499*** 0.398  1.426 5.961*** 1.03 1.492+ 1.514+ 1.497+ 1.500+ 1.540+   
 (4.453) (0.479)  (0.852) (4.970) (0.578) (1.776) (1.789) (1.769) (1.780) (1.824) 
Fixed asset ratio -2.141*** -1.394**  -0.53 -3.026*** 0.024 -1.254* -1.257* -1.255* -1.280* -1.272*   
 (-3.978) (-2.833)  (-0.486) (-4.068) (0.019) (-2.144) (-2.147) (-2.141) (-2.187) (-2.173)    
Intangible asset ratio -0.784 -0.634  1.565 -2.241* 2.584 -0.732 -0.737 -0.733 -0.752 -0.745 
 (-0.954) (-0.833)  (0.715) (-2.162) (1.040) (-1.012) (-1.019) (-1.013) (-1.037) (-1.027)    
Debt ratio -1.737* -3.048***  -5.853** -2.955** -6.116** -0.923 -0.892 -0.915 -0.977 -0.983 
 (-1.969) (-3.731)  (-3.043) (-2.623) (-2.840) (-0.855) (-0.815) (-0.836) (-0.907) (-0.913)    
size -0.144* -1.468***  0.740*** -0.504*** 0.724*** -0.224** -0.226** -0.224** -0.241** -0.242**  
 (-2.525) (-12.445)  (6.061) (-5.585) (5.189) (-3.033) (-3.062) (-3.048) (-3.251) (-3.261)    
Inverse Mills Ratio  -5.375*** -10.856***                     
  (-11.914) (-14.205)                     
MEAS in Development Stage        -0.024                
        (-0.524)                
MEAS in maturity Stage         -0.006               
         (-0.120)               
MEUAS in Development Stage          0.083+              
          (1.877)              
MEUAS in maturity Stage           0.083 
           (1.631) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -2.041 36.683*** -20.383 -22.046*** 7.431* -18.434*** 1.76 1.791 1.767 2.187 2.12 
 (-0.955) (10.535) (-1.628) (-5.110) (2.355) (-3.824) (0.660) (0.675) (0.666) (0.842) (0.811) 
N 2832 2832 2832 1990 1990 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 
R Square 0.5 0.55 0.7 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
Log Likelihood -7553.74 -7388.89 -6822.01 -6498.01 -5524.84 -5322.88 -4007.83 -4007.7 -4007.82 -4005.93 -4005.82 




Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments)     
0.229 
p=0.6324 
 0.839  
p=0.6572 
    
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:     
8.091  
p=0.0044 
 5.267  
p=0.0217 
    
Note: Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. MEAS represents the moderating effect of absorbed slack; 













Table 1-10: Regression of ROA on Donation with Different Lifecycle Dummy, and Firm, Sub-national, and Industry-level Controls by Propensity Score 
Matching  
 Generalized Estimate Equation (GEE) Fixed Effect Model (FE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lagged ROA 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.254*** 0.251*** 0.248*** 0.254*** 0.259*** 
 (7.068) (7.076) (7.077) (7.074) (7.257) (5.636) (5.619) (5.471) (5.676) (5.860) 
Development stage [Main regression]: 
Donation (H1) -0.005+ -0.003 -0.004+ -0.004 -0.005+ -0.037* -0.025+ -0.036* -0.036* -0.038*   
 (-1.804) (-1.091) (-1.690) (-1.283) (-1.798) (-2.483) (-1.670) (-2.378) (-2.059) (-2.532)    
Maturity stage: Donation*second life-cycle 
Dummy (H2) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.010* 0.102* 0.105* 0.139** 0.103* 0.061 
 (3.443) (3.485) (4.230) (3.509) (2.323) (2.432) (2.487) (2.905) (2.394) (1.112) 
age -0.016+ -0.016+ -0.012 -0.016+ -0.018* 0.251 0.237 0.23 0.251 0.269 
 (-1.944) (-1.863) (-1.306) (-1.915) (-2.169) (1.009) (0.952) (0.927) (1.008) (1.076) 
GDP Per Capita -0.187 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 -0.192 5.223+ 5.138+ 5.000+ 5.220+ 5.387+   
 (-1.198) (-1.082) (-1.068) (-1.216) (-1.239) (1.873) (1.846) (1.799) (1.868) (1.926) 
Unabsorbed Slack 0.115** 0.115** 0.118** 0.134* 0.083 0.577 0.579 0.571 0.601 0.399 
 (2.626) (2.634) (2.593) (2.109) (1.588) (1.540) (1.539) (1.516) (1.413) (1.142) 








0.414*** -2.030*** -1.622** -1.797*** -2.030*** -2.081*** 
 (-6.116) (-4.426) (-5.265) (-6.083) (-6.214) (-4.085) (-2.954) (-3.764) (-4.081) (-4.161)    
Selling expense ratio -0.920* -0.999* -1.300** -0.943* -0.884+ -11.293* -11.651* -11.947** -11.325* -11.061*   
 (-2.011) (-2.143) (-2.597) (-2.049) (-1.958) (-2.544) (-2.615) (-2.648) (-2.567) (-2.548)    
Fixed asset ratio 0.667* 0.679* 0.715* 0.668* 0.668* 3.552 3.619 3.641 3.546 3.71 
 (2.327) (2.370) (2.513) (2.317) (2.350) (1.290) (1.317) (1.318) (1.285) (1.333) 
Intangible asset ratio 0.281 0.24 0.308 0.269 0.304 3.179 3.073 2.949 3.162 3.465 
 (0.697) (0.595) (0.783) (0.671) (0.744) (0.857) (0.829) (0.833) (0.847) (0.904) 
Debt ratio -0.337 -0.352 -0.241 -0.340 -0.339 1.349 1.431 1.469 1.348 1.336 









0.330*** -2.845*** -2.840*** -2.845*** -2.849*** -2.870*** 
 (-6.103) (-6.524) (-6.960) (-6.109) (-6.167) (-3.922) (-3.917) (-3.915) (-3.959) (-3.910)    



























 (-5.445) (-5.672) (-5.934) (-5.504) (-5.388) (-4.564) (-4.582) (-4.563) (-4.560) (-4.559)    
MEAS in Development stage (H3)  -0.010+     -0.051                
  (-1.870)     (-1.465)                
MEAS in maturity stage (H3)   -0.026**     -0.158**               
   (-3.064)     (-3.173)               
MEUAS in Development stage (H4a)    -0.002     -0.003              
    (-0.381)     (-0.083)              
MEUAS in maturity stage (H4b)     0.005     0.095 
     (0.989)     (1.390) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 









* 20.488 21.424 23.137 20.603 19.125 
 (6.252) (6.259) (6.862) (6.258) (6.363) (0.558) (0.582) (0.631) (0.559) (0.524) 
           
N 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 
R Square      0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 
Adjusted R Square      0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
rho      0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Log-Likelihood      -1820.74 -1819.04 -1815.54 -1820.73 -1817.5 
Note: Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. MEAS represents the moderating effect of absorbed slack; 





Table 1-11: Estimates for Heckman Second-stage Models:  
Regression of EBITDA Ratio on Donation with Different Life-cycle Dummies, and Firm, Subnational, and Industry-Level Controls 
 Generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged EBITDA ratio 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (19.697) (19.701) (19.468) (19.516) (19.110) 
Development stage [Main regression]: Donation (H1) -0.0047*** -0.0050*** -0.0045*** -0.0044*** -0.0046*** 
 (-3.812) (-4.203) (-3.675)    (-3.641) (-3.771) 
Maturity stage: Donation*second stage life-cycle dummy (H1) 0.0054*** 0.0055*** 0.0048*** 0.0054*** 0.0056*** 
 (4.369) (4.458) (3.851) (4.407) (4.454) 
Age -0.0038* -0.0039* -0.0038*   -0.0038* -0.0038* 
 (-2.419) (-2.444) (-2.439)    (-2.415) (-2.414) 
GDP per capita 0.0127 0.0131 0.0131 0.0123 0.0122 
 (0.786) (0.809) (0.805) (0.754) (0.751) 
State dummy -0.0504** -0.0502** -0.0504**  -0.0504** -0.0505** 
 (-3.082) (-3.075) (-3.086)    (-3.086) (-3.087) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.0057 0.0061 0.0062 0.0112 0.0116 
 (0.585) (0.624) (0.630) (1.051) (1.111) 
Absorbed slack -0.0606*** -0.0680*** -0.0702*** -0.0608*** -0.0609*** 
 (-4.966) (-4.710) (-4.936)    (-4.991) (-5.000) 
Selling expense ratio -0.0605 -0.0592 -0.0572 -0.0633 -0.0636 
 (-0.509) (-0.501) (-0.486)    (-0.533) (-0.536) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.0178 0.0178 0.0186 0.0178 0.0182 
 (0.471) (0.468) (0.491) (0.470) (0.481) 
Intangible asset ratio 0.106 0.1094 0.1106 0.1058 0.1059 
 (0.959) (0.983) (0.994) (0.956) (0.957) 
Debt ratio 0.1716* 0.1723* 0.1721*   0.1720** 0.1718** 
 (2.572) (2.568) (2.568) (2.580) (2.577) 
Size -0.1093*** -0.1099*** -0.1103*** -0.1098*** -0.1100*** 
 (-5.089) (-5.150) (-5.174)    (-5.125) (-5.137) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.3857*** -0.3878*** -0.3887*** -0.3870*** -0.3873*** 
 (-6.134) (-6.206) (-6.236)    (-6.166) (-6.175) 
MEAS in Develop stage  0.0012                
  (1.294)                




   (1.862)   
MEUAS in Develop stage    -0.001  
    (-1.343)  
MEUAS in Maturity stage     -0.0011 
     (-1.482) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 3.0824*** 3.0992*** 3.1088*** 3.0998*** 3.1040*** 
 (4.926) (4.985) (5.011) (4.957) (4.968) 
N 2848 2848 2848 2848 2848 
Note: Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. MEAS represents the moderating effect of absorbed slack; 
MEUAS represents the moderating effect of unabsorbed slack. EBIDTA ratio represents the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, 





Table 1-12: Estimates for Heckman Second-Stage Models:  
Regression of EBITDA Ratio on Donation With Different Lifecycle Dummy, and Firm, Sub-national Controls 
 Fixed effect model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged EBITDA rate 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (19.210) (19.221) (19.074) (19.001) (18.511) 
Development stage [Main regression]: Donation (H1) -0.0045*** -0.0049*** -0.0044*** -0.0043*** -0.0044*** 
 (-3.729) (-4.108) (-3.618)    (-3.602) (-3.708) 
Maturity stage: Donation*second stage life-cycle dummy (H1) 0.0051*** 0.0052*** 0.0047*** 0.0052*** 0.0054*** 
 (4.216) (4.311) (3.755) (4.243) (4.255) 
Age -0.004 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0041 
 (-0.599) (-0.551) (-0.550)    (-0.613) (-0.616) 
GDP per capita 0.1225+ 0.1248* 0.1247*   0.1217+ 0.1216+ 
 (1.963) (1.991) (1.995) (1.947) (1.946) 
Unabsorbed slack 0.0079 0.0081 0.0082 0.013 0.0132 
 (0.777) (0.801) (0.804) (1.188) (1.225) 
Absorbed slack -0.0548*** -0.0610*** -0.0631*** -0.0548*** -0.0548*** 
 (-4.349) (-4.211) (-4.421)    (-4.344) (-4.346) 
Selling expense ratio -0.0936 -0.0908 -0.0887 -0.0975 -0.0975 
 (-0.548) (-0.535) (-0.525)    (-0.572) (-0.572) 
Fixed asset ratio 0.058 0.057 0.0577 0.0579 0.0584 
 (1.253) (1.231) (1.238) (1.250) (1.264) 
Intangible asset ratio -0.0409 -0.038 -0.0377 -0.0421 -0.0421 
 (-0.300) (-0.278) (-0.276)    (-0.309) (-0.309) 
Debt ratio 0.1265 0.1267 0.1264 0.1272 0.1271 
 (1.635) (1.631) (1.626) (1.644) (1.643) 
Size -0.0379+ -0.0382+ -0.0383+   -0.0387+ -0.0387+ 
 (-1.799) (-1.817) (-1.824)    (-1.833) (-1.836) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.2764*** -0.2773*** -0.2775*** -0.2774*** -0.2777*** 
 (-6.001) (-6.038) (-6.054)    (-6.011) (-6.014) 
MEAS in Develop stage  0.001                




MEAS in Maturity stage   0.0015   
   (1.604)   
MEUAS in Develop stage    -0.0009  
    (-1.214)  
MEUAS in Maturity stage     -0.001 
     (-1.282) 
Industry fixed effect      
Year fixed effect      
Intercept 0.1258 0.1068 0.1114 0.1533 0.1561 
 (0.142) (0.120) (0.125) (0.171) (0.175) 
N 2848 2848 2848 2848 2848 
R Square 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Adjusted R Square 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
rho 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Log Likelihood 2693.41 2694.55 2695.86 2694.63 2694.81 
Note: Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. MEAS represents the moderating effect of absorbed slack; 
MEUAS represents the moderating effect of unabsorbed slack. EBIDTA ratio represents the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, 




Moderating effect of Slack 
 



















































Figure 1-3: Interaction Effect of Absorbed Slack and CP on CFP in Development Life-cycle Stage 
 





Figure 1-5: Interaction effect of Absorbed Slack and CP on CFP in Initial Maturity (Later Maturity) Life-cycle Stage 
 









Appendix: Identification of the number of Thresholds, Calculation of Threshold Value, and Figure of LR Statistics (threshold point is where LR 
statistics reach zero) 
Appendix table 1-1: Test the Number of Thresholds 
Test from threshold effects  (bootstrap=1000 1000 1000):  
   
Test for single threshold   
F1  31.28 
P-value  0.000 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (12.1792 14.7734 19.5305) 
   
Test for double threshold   
F2  15.11 
P-value  0.0850 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)   (14.4020 19.7757 34.8518) 
   
Test for triple threshold   
F3  3.20 
P-value  0.8550 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)   (16.3430 20.8409 29.9912) 
 
Appendix table 1-2: Calculation of Threshold Value 
Threshold estimates (level = 95%):  
 Estimate 95% confidence interval 
γˆ1 -0.0124   [-0.0419       0.0029] 
   













Appendix table 1-3: Test the number of Thresholds in 2sls Regression 
Test from threshold effects  (bootstrap=1000 1000):  
   
Test for single threshold   
F1  35.28 
P-value  0.000 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (13.5045 17.1123 24.3496) 
   
Test for double threshold   
F2  4.92 
P-value  0.6570 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)   (14.9327 20.4055 33.4951) 
 
Appendix table 1-4: Calculation of Threshold Value in 2sls Regression 
Threshold estimates (level = 95%):  
 Estimate 95% confidence interval 
γˆ1 -0.0124   [-0.0419       0.0029] 
 





Appendix table 1-5: Test the Number of Thresholds in PSM Sample 
Test from threshold effects  (bootstrap=1000 1000):  
   
Test for single threshold   
F1  34.64 
P-value  0.000 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (14.1099 16.9992 24.7100) 
   
Test for double threshold   
F2  11.69 
P-value  0.1980 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)   (16.6857 23.7137 35.3188) 
 
Appendix table 1-6: Calculation of Threshold Value in PSM Sample 
Threshold estimates (level = 95%):  
 Estimate 95% confidence interval 
γˆ1 -0.0124   [-0.0419       0.0029] 









This study investigates how companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects their investment behavior. 
Different from prior studies that mainly focus on the firms’ financial factors, we focus on the importance of the 
potential investment opportunities granted from investment targets on firms’ investment expenditure. Based on 
information asymmetry and stakeholder perspective, we argue that through engaging in CSR activities, firms 
can increase information disclosure and information accuracy, which could build up a trustful relationship with 
potential investment targets, so that firms can secure more investment opportunities leading to more investment 
expenditure. Further, accepting that information asymmetry level varies under different industries, we also 
examine how information asymmetry affects CSR–investment relationship. Using generalized estimating 
equation (GEE) modeling on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2015, we indeed find a significant 
positive relationship between CSR and investment through the mediating effect of investment opportunities. We 
also find a positive moderating effect of information asymmetry level on this relationship. Our results are robust 
under different models after controlling for endogeneity. 





Corporate investment has become a key component of economic growth (Gulen and Ion 2015) and 
one of the most significant factors that contribute to firm valuation (Chen, Xie, and Zhang 2017). Concerns 
about the firm’s investment behavior have grown to become a critical issue over the past several decades 
since the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen (1988), who demonstrate that it is the financial status 
that determines firm-level investment. Following this study, scholars find various channels that improve 
investment through affecting firm’s financial constraints, such as firm’s asset tangibility (Almeida and 
Campello 2007), financial structure flexibility (Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek 2014), or external analysts’ 
forecasting (Chen et al., 2017). However, we should notice that investment behavior involves two parties, 
investors and investment targets, which both determine a successful investment project, that lacking any of 
one party will lead to a failed investment or a more extended period of deal completion (Deng, Kang, and 
Low 2013; Hawn 2016). It is thus not only the investors’ financial status but also the investment targets’ 
willingness to accept potential investors that determine a successful investment (Deng, Kang, and Low 
2013; Samuelson 1985). Different from prior literature that takes a passive attitude toward investment 
targets, we posit that investment targets will also determine the investment by selecting appropriate 
cooperators (investors). Facing with a sound investment project, many potential investors will compete for 
the same investment opportunity (Flammer 2018), making the investment targets a significant role in 
choosing potential investors and granting investment opportunities to them.  
Facing with unknown potential investors who want to bid for the same investment opportunity, 
investment targets may become tentative in choosing appropriate investors or even feel suspicious to those 




investment (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Hawn 2016; Li, Li, and Wang 2019; McDonald and Siegel 1986). 
Indeed, investors’ information asymmetry may come from information incomprehensiveness and the lack 
of information accuracy (Healy and Palepu 2001; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007). For example, some 
investors may deliberately hide information to keep organizational flexibility or prevent information 
leakage and public scrutiny (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Besides, some information intermediaries such as 
financial auditing firms may provide overly optimistic information or provide biased information that is 
influenced by their own experiences and capabilities (Brown, Foster, and Noreen 1985; Jacob, Lys, and 
Neale 1999). Even some investors hide their private information for the sake of maintaining their 
competitive advantages in the market (Darrough 1993) or pursuing their private interests (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007). All the above mechanisms will significantly 
deteriorate the information environment and impede the active information exchange between investment 
targets and investors (Lambert et al. 2007). As the information exchange between investors and investment 
targets becomes difficult, investment targets may negatively evaluate potential investors, which in turn 
affects the relationship between investment targets and investors (Cohen and Dean 2005). 
Given that a trustful relationship between investment targets and investors is an essential factor for 
investors to get successful investment opportunities from investment targets (Jones 1995), how to build a 
strengthened relationship between them is of great importance. CSR, a trustful signal to reduce information 
asymmetry through improving information disclosure and information accuracy, will help investors reduce 
their information asymmetry and build a better relationship with investment targets (Deng et al. 2013; 
Flammer 2018; Su, Peng, Tan, and Cheung 2016). Therefore, we argue that engaging in CSR activities 




firm’s investment expenditure (Hayashi 1982; Tobin 1969). 
We further examine our proposed mechanism for firms in industries with different levels of 
information asymmetry as we argued that CSR activities alleviate the information asymmetry between 
investors and investment targets and help investors achieve more investment opportunities from investment 
targets, which further promote the level of investment expenditure. We can predict that in industries with a 
lower level of information asymmetry, investment targets can get more information with a higher level of 
accuracy and comprehensiveness, the effect of engaging in CSR activities for reducing information 
asymmetry will thus reduce. In order to better depict this mechanism, we investigate the moderating effect 
of the industry information-asymmetry level. 
 [Insert Figure 2-1 about here] 
To investigate the impact of CSR on investment expenditure through the mechanisms of gaining 
investment opportunities benefited from the reduced level of information asymmetry, we use a panel dataset 
from CSMAR for Chinese publicly listed companies from 2009-2015 in both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchange. We believe Chinese market is an appropriate context for our study, as information asymmetry 
issue ubiquitously exists in the emerging Chinese market, which has significant impacts on firm’s various 
aspects (Mok and Hui 1998; Su and Fleisher 2005), including the investment. Besides, the recent fast 
growth in the Chinese economy, especially in firm investment behavior, also makes the investigation of 
firm investment behavior very relevant. 
We make several contributions to current literature. First, we broaden the previous literature in 
corporate investment by taking an information asymmetry perspective and showing that a firm’s investment 




by the investment targets’ willingness to accept the investors. Facing the open-bidding competition with 
other firms, attitudes toward potential investors seems of paramount importance in winning the investment 
opportunities (Samuelson 1985). It is thus clear that the ability to get investment opportunities from 
investment targets plays a vital role in a firm’s investment behavior. Besides, by incorporating the 
information asymmetry into CSR–investment relationship, we empirically add to the traditional view of 
investment opportunity–investment expenditure relationship by showing that CSR is an antecedent of 
achieving more investment opportunities, which in turn, help firm achieve a higher level of investment 
expenditures. Second, we take an integrated information asymmetry and stakeholder perspective by 
showing that engaging in CSR activities can attenuate the information asymmetry issue between the firms 
(investors) and stakeholders (investment targets), which is an essential factor in improving investment 
expenditures through grasping more investment opportunities from stakeholders (investment targets). Third, 
we are the first to incorporate information asymmetry into CSR–investment literature empirically. Different 
from previous studies, which assume that a firm’s investment behavior will be affected by information 
asymmetry (Benlemlih and Bitar 2018; Chen et al. 2017), we empirically measure the information 
asymmetry and test the moderating effect of information asymmetry on CSR–investment relationship. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first briefly review investment literature in 
previous studies. We continue our discussion by developing the critical theoretical underpinnings that 
formed the basis for our hypotheses. We then present the methodological considerations, along with the 
analysis of the data used to test the hypotheses. A description of the study findings and their interpretation 
follow, along with a discussion of our contribution to theory and practice. 




Information asymmetry between investor and investment target  
Prior studies have mainly focused on financial constraints and investigated how firms’ internal factors 
such as asset tangibility (Almeida and Campello 2007), asset re-deployability (Kim and Kung 2016), and 
hedging method (Doshi, Kumar, and Yerramilli 2017) help firms increase their investment expenditure. 
Different from a previous internal-focused perspective, external acceptance, such as investment targets’ 
attitude toward external investors, is also an essential factor in determining a successful transaction between 
investment parties (Choi, Petra, and Guar 2015; Deng, Kang, and Low 2013; Hawn 2013).   
The relationship between investment targets and investors will seriously deteriorate if the information 
could not fully exchange between them (Myllykangas, Kujala, and Lehtimäki 2010). As noted by Flammer 
(2018), the level of information asymmetry impedes effective communication between investment parties, 
which finally undermine the probability of successful transactions. Within an investment relationship, the 
lack of information about investors negatively impacts the trustworthiness that can be felt by the investment 
targets. In some extreme situations, investment targets may be cautious or even skeptical toward the 
tendency or motivation of investors due to the issue of information asymmetry (Li et al. 2019), which 
eventually leads to transaction costs caused by incomplete contracting (Williamson 1985). Such incomplete 
contracting may also hinder investment target the process of negotiation with investors (Bajari, Houghton, 
and Tadelis 2014).  
Indeed, Li, Nan, and Zhao (2018) highlight the importance of information in helping acquirer to 
achieve acquisition efficiency. Similarly, more information held by the bidder will more likely lead to 
acquisition return that benefits the acquirer in the acquisition process (Dionne, La Haye, & Bergerès, 2015). 




and value-enhancing, which will likely help bidder overcome asymmetric uncertainty in terms of target 
firms’ information and eventually promote the acquisition efficiency (Raman, Shivakumar, & Tamayo, 
2013). In other words, how to get to know investment parties, to some extent, determines whether a 
successful investment relationship can be successfully attained (Jones 1995).  
The extent to which a trustful relationship can be built also depends on how much authentic and 
transparent information shares between parties (Myllykangas et al. 2010). Within an investment relationship, 
the lack of information accuracy of investors negatively impacts the cost of capital (Lambert et al. 2011). 
Therefore, how to reduce the information asymmetry through lowering information inaccuracy becomes a 
critical issue in reaching a successful investment relationship. 
The extent to which a trustful relationship may build between investment targets and investors also 
depends on how much authentic and transparent information shares between parties (Myllykangas et al. 
2010). Within an investment relationship, the lack of information accuracy of investors negatively impacts 
the cost of capital (Lambert et al. 2011). Therefore, how to reduce the information asymmetry through 
lowering information inaccuracy becomes a critical issue in reaching a successful investment relationship. 
The inefficient financial intermediary agency  
Information asymmetry, on the one hand, caused by inefficient financial intermediaries, lead to 
information inaccuracy and information incomprehensiveness (Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2011). 
Acting as the financial information disclosure agencies, financial intermediaries such as auditing firms and 
financial analysts play an essential role in reducing market information asymmetry through disclosing firms’ 
comprehensive information (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb 2009; Healy and Palepu 2001; Wang, Cao, and Ye 




targets, investment targets will make timely judgments about potential investors who want to bid for a 
project, and investment efficiency will attain. 
However, the inefficiencies of auditing firms may sometimes report biased information, which is in 
line with their managers’ interests. As a result, they may misguide outside information users, for example, 
investment targets (Watts and Zimmerman 1981). At the same time, auditing firms may even lobby for 
reducing the standards of financial reporting for their private interests even though such reduction may at 
the risk of increasing the information uncertainties and inaccuracies (Healy and Palepu 2001). Besides, 
financial analysts, acting as another group of financial intermediaries, also have the drawbacks of providing 
overly optimistic information9 due to their innate capability or experience insufficiency.10 Therefore, 
information comprehensiveness and accuracy will likely undermine. 
The intentional information-hiding behavior  
Information asymmetry can also be caused by information-hiding behavior (Healy and Palepu 2001) 
that leads to symbolic information reporting or the paucity of information. Compared with investment 
targets, investors who take charge of the projects are at the best understanding of the project’s intrinsic 
valuation. On the one hand, investors do not want to fully disclose their core information due to the concern 
of losing a competitive position within the market (Anand and Rosen 2008; Gigler, 1994; Sutton and 
Callahan 1987). More importantly, under the imperfect auditing and accounting environments with 
inefficient financial intermediaries, it becomes easier for investors to conceal information by making 
 
9 For example, the analysts’ recommendations always tend to be “buys” suggestions (Brown et al. 1985). 
10 As Jacob et al. (1999) suggest, analysts’ innate ability, company assignments, brokerage affiliation, and industry 




symbolic reporting (Sims and Brinkmann 2003). Because of these “junk” information, investment targets 
may be confused and could not distinguish the right investors from bad ones. Since the information 
provided by those “bad” investors under ambiguous information environment tries to claim themselves as 
qualified as those “good” investors (Akerlof 1970), investment targets will find it even more challenging 
to make an unbiased selection. Failure to access accurate information of potential investors from investors’ 
reported information makes investment targets extremely difficult to understand investors. Such 
information paucity concerning investors will, in turn, cause investment targets to take a suspicious 
attitude toward all investors in the market and delay their decision making. As a result, for those qualified 
investors, they are thus likely to be, unfortunately, “squeezed out” even though they are qualified to do so 
(Fazzari et al. 1988). 
After investment targets launch an investment project, they do not play an active role in supervising 
or controlling project progression, which makes investors who hold more critical information about projects 
easier to exploit the value from investment targets (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Considering the above two 
factors, investment targets which are at information disadvantageous position are less likely to publish 
project-biding information and more likely to delay the bidding process (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; 
McDonald and Siegel 1986) until they sufficiently believe that potential investors are “trustful enough” to 
take the objective project. 
Investors’ information hiding behavior not only impact investment targets’ attitude toward investors 
but also prevent investors from making sufficient investment due to the difficulty of raising sufficient capital 
from outside capital holders (Fazzari et al. 1988; Myers and Majluf 1984). Due to the severe ambiguity of 




providing capital, or they may overly increase their required rate of return to compensate the perceive 
potential risks (Myers and Majluf 1984). Therefore, the difficulty of raising funding from outside capital 
holders may also force investment targets to forego many meaningful investment projects reluctantly.   
According to the above arguments, information asymmetry caused by inefficient financial 
intermediaries and information hiding behavior will not only lead to information inaccuracy but also 
information incomprehensiveness. Given the information asymmetry problems identified above, we argue 
that CSR, acting as a way to signal the firms’ integrity and sincerity (Carroll 1979; Cuypers, Koh, and Wang 
2015; Jones 1995), will lower the potential information inaccuracy and mitigate firms’ information-hiding 
behavior through cultivating a more ethical-oriented sense of doing business (Kim, Park, and Wier 2012). 
CSR as the role of reducing information asymmetry  
CSR is viewed as the firm’s voluntary activities to serve employees, environments, and communities 
in ways that go beyond financial, technical, or legal requirements (Mcwilliams and Siegel 2001). Firms 
with CSR activities are more likely to act honestly, trustworthy, and ethically (Carroll 1979; Jones 1995; 
Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, and Siegel 2016). Besides, CSR also helps promote non-financial information 
disclosure, which helps more stakeholders know more about a firm and make rational decisions (Dhaliwal, 
Li, Tsang, and Yang 2014). Here, we specifically argue two mechanisms of CSR in solving firms’ 
information asymmetry: improving information accuracy (Kim et al. 2012) and information disclosure (Cui, 
Jo, and Na 2018). 
CSR and information disclosure  
CSR will lower the level of information asymmetry between investment targets and investors through 




stakeholders (i.e., investors and investment targets) (Freeman 1984). As we argued before, CSR reporting, 
such as environmental protection, employee welfare, and charitable donation, are firms’ non-financial 
information that is not required in the financial statement. However, this information contains the critical 
implications for investment targets to make inferences about potential investors (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, 
Tsang, Yang 2012). For example, CSR activities may disclose much information regarding firms’ several 
aspects, such as corporate governance, investor relations, creditor relations, and employee relations. 
Therefore, it becomes easier for outsiders such as investment targets to approximately gauge the firms’ 
effectiveness of internal governance or authenticity of the state of operation from information contained in 
CSR reports such as customers’ satisfaction and supplier collaboration relationship (Wang et al. 2018). 
Moreover, CSR activities can also promote frequent interactions between investment targets and 
investors, a way in which investment targets could get more information from potential investors and solve 
the possible conflicts between them (Freeman 1984; Jo and Harjoto 2011, 2012). As CSR activities may 
link investment targets with investors through some third-party social activities, investment targets may 
garner some private information of potential investors, which may not be available in formal disclosure.11 
These socially interactive activities will help investment targets discover more information about investors 
and reinforce the trustful relationship between them, which will benefit their future collaboration (Flammer, 
2018). 
 
11 For example, LOTTO, Germany’s biggest lottery, the main sponsor of Rheingau Musik Festival, one of Germany’s 
major classical music festivals, displays their firms’ logos prominently on all festival publications and at concert 
locations. LOTTO, therefore, markets itself through such socially responsible behavior in the music festival. Other 
hotel companies offer guests rooms free of charge in a way that may also promote their services and brand names in 




CSR and information accuracy  
Firms’ CSR activities send a signal to investors that they are “good citizens” with a higher level of 
ethical concern and reputation (Albinger and Freeman 2000; Greening and Turban 2000; Turban and 
Greening 1997). Being known as socially responsible actors helps stakeholders positively evaluate firms as 
non-opportunistic business collaborators with long-term orientation (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; 
Caroline Flammer and Bansal 2017). According to Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (2003), the socially 
responsible firms should obey the principle of doing the “right things” and contribute to society by doing 
what is “ethically correct.” Also, firms’ CSR activity is the reciprocal behavior that aims at benefiting 
society in which they depend on (Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld 1999; Wood 1991). Such reciprocal nature 
of CSR makes managers feel that it is a moral imperative to be “honest, trust, and ethical” (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995; Jones 1995). Hence, investors under this moral requirement should report more accurate 
information and constrain earnings management in order to keep high information quality (Chih, Shen, and 
Kang 2008; Kim et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2018). In this vein, CSR is an efficient information tool to signal 
their information quality and disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Lambert et al. 2007) in the eyes of 
investment targets.   
CSR reporting also serves as a supervisory function to guarantee the firms’ information accuracy. 
Managers under different situations12 CSR reporting also serves as a supervisory function to guarantee the 
firms’ information accuracy. Managers under different situations want to disguise financial reporting to 
 
12 Some managers illegally manage earnings to boost their private compensation by shifting earnings to raise stock 
prices during or before stock option exercising periods (Efendi et al, 2007); or they manage earnings to avoid violating 




maintain or improve their private interests (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi 
et al. 2007). As we argued before, CSR will disclose much information that is available for investment 
targets to make appropriate inferences (Wang et al. 2018). Therefore, the increased availability of 
information from CSR will constrain the investors’ tendency to manipulate and disguise information.13 
CSR activities provide firms with a higher level of reputation (Albinger and Freeman 2000; Brammer 
and Pavelin 2006; Elfenbein, Fisman, and McManus 2012; Turban and Greening 1997) which guarantee 
the firm information quality (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Ioannou and Serafeim 2015; Luo, Wang, Raithel, 
and Zheng 2015). On the one hand, enjoying a higher level of reputation improves firms’ social image and 
publicity (Brown and Dacin 1997). Such social image and reputation will not only help firms increase their 
publicity and social disclosure but also become a driving factor for firms to disclose more precise 
information. That is, firms will be more vigilant to maintain their social image because it is costly for those 
firms to ruin previously accumulated intangible assets (Cui et al. 2018). 
On the other hand, according to stakeholder theory-based-CSR-information asymmetry nexus, CSR-
related reputation will help the firm maintain a higher level of information accuracy through third-party 
monitoring mechanisms such as analyst following (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009), recommendation (Ioannou 
and Serafeim 2015; Luo et al. 2015), and analyst forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and 
Yang 2012). all of which will be promotive in building an environment with higher information quality, 
especially for firms that need intensive monitoring (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Halov and Heider 2011). In this 
 
13 Because under the completely transparent information environment, it becomes significantly difficult for managers 
to report false information without being detected by investment targets (Richardson, Welker, and Hutchinson 1999; 




vein, we conjecture that firms with a higher level of CSR-related reputation are likely to keep and promote 
a higher level of information accuracy.  
In sum, investment targets will regard those investors with a higher level of CSR as having a lower 
level of information asymmetry because CSR activities are indicative of high information accuracy and 
more information disclosure. As such, they will form a trustful relationship. Compared with those firms 
that do not have CSR engagement, firms with a higher level of CSR are more likely to successfully bid for 
investment projects from many other competitive counterparts due to the lower level of information 
asymmetry between investors and investment targets. We, therefore, believe that CSR help firm build a 
trustful relationship with investment targets and such relationship will, in turn, make investment targets 
more likely to collaborate with focal investors and eventually help them achieve more investment 
opportunities and eventually promote their investment expenditure. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Engaging in CSR activity has positive effects on firm investment expenditure. 
Hypothesis 2: Investment opportunities mediated the positive relationship between CSR and investment 
expenditure. 
The moderating effect of information asymmetry 
As we argued before, CSR activities help firms alleviate the information asymmetry between 
investment targets and investors, which helps them achieve more investment opportunities and lead to a 
higher level of investment expenditure. In order to further reinforce our argument that CSR improves 
investment through lowering information asymmetry, we thus examine the moderating effect of information 
asymmetry under different industry contexts on CSR–investment relationship. 




information will be more easily accessible to investment targets (Andrade and Chhaochharia 2010). As 
financial analysts publish analyst reporting, it will be more convenient for investment targets to get direct 
information about potential investors, and outside stakeholders (investment targets) can use this information 
to evaluate focal firms (investors). When investment targets compare different investors’ situations based 
on analysts’ reporting, they are more likely to get a more deepened and insightful picture of their internal 
situation, which further lowers the dependence on investors’ information disclosure. Plus, with the help of 
financial analysts, investors’ moral hazard could largely be mitigated due to the efficient information 
transfer and abundant information availability (Leland and Pyle 1977). For instance, information 
intermediaries will likely compile the upcoming vital issues in the market, package information from 
multiple resources, and summarize essential concepts in the form of an article for market participants to 
make decisions (Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm 2010). This summarizing behavior of information 
intermediaries will improve the information available for investors to make appropriate decisions based on 
their inference, results in a higher level of successful trading behavior (Chae, 2005). In other words, it is 
the increased level of information available from financial intermediaries that leads to reduced information 
asymmetry, which finally promotes increased successful investment behavior.   
Second, in an environment with high-quality financial intermediaries (such as more oversea auditing 
firms and Big Four auditing firms (Li et al. 2019)), information asymmetry level will likely decrease with 
the help of more accurate information. Financial intermediaries coming from the oversea market or Big 
four are more professional agencies than other financial intermediaries. Therefore, they are less likely 
impacted by forecast herding behavior due to the observation of other analysts, both of which will provide 




1998). Benefiting from increased information accuracy provided by international auditing intermediaries, 
investment targets will thus make an appropriate judgment about potential investors (Bushee, Core, Guay, 
and Hamm 2010). As we mentioned before, the process of compiling and summarizing information will not 
only increase information availability but also generate filtered, reflected, and processed information, which 
makes the information understandability easier and lead to a lower level of information misunderstanding 
(Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens 1998). Given the above argument, the information accuracy will likely 
improve to a large extent, and investment targets will more likely distinguish “good” investors from “bad” 
ones (Healy and Palepu 2001). Therefore, investment targets will more effectively use that accurate 
information to evaluate and make prompt investment decisions, resulting in a lower level of information 
dependence on investors’ CSR disclosure to evaluate potential investors. 
Overall, given the above mechanisms, in a more developed-information environment where firms’ 
information will be more accessible to investment targets with lower costs, higher comprehensiveness, and 
accuracy. They, therefore, do not necessarily need to depend on CSR as their primary source to judge a firm. 
The effectiveness of CSR on improving information quality will thus be largely mitigated. In contrast, in 
less-abundant-information environments, accessing firms’ information will be more painful and expensive, 
CSR will be of great importance in effectively helping firms getting and evaluating information (Sanders 
and Boivie 2004). We thus hypothesize that   
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between CSR and investment expenditure will be weaker in a 
stronger asymmetric environment. 
Hypothesis 4: Investment opportunity mediates the interactive effects of CSR and information asymmetry 
on investment expenditure. 




Data and sample  
In the current study, we use the population of Chinese listed companies from 2009-2015 to construct 
our panel dataset. The data is drawn from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. Information from the China Statistical Yearbook and WIND database are further employed to 
obtain information regarding regional development and firm characteristics of our sample. The main 
database-CSRMAR-provides firm-level donation information and key accounting data for all firms in our 
sample. While our sample focuses on those firms with socially responsible activities, to avoid sampling 
biases, we employ Heckman two-stage model (Heckman 1979) as suggested by previous literature too (Du, 
Bai, and Chen 2019; Wang, Choi, and Li 2008; Wang and Qian 2011). After merging the three databases 
and dropping missing values of key variables and excluding financial industries (Deb, David, and O'Brien 
2017; Kim and Bettis 2014; O'Brien and Folta 2009), we ended up with 3079 firm-year observations. Table 
2-1 presents the sample composition by year, region, and industry. The sample distribution by industry is 
based on the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry code with the two-digit 
specification. Table 2-1 shows that manufacturing industries have 1778 observations and account for about 
60% of our final sample. Other industries such as constructions, real estate, wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation, Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure, and Software & service account for more than 20%. The 
sample distribution by year shows that the number of observations increases annually from 2009 to 2015. 
We can also find that observation distribution by region shows firms concentrate on the capital city (Beijing) 
and eastern cities such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Shandong. 





Dependent variable  
In line with previous literature, we measure the investment expenditure as the firm’s capital 
expenditure (CAPX)14 deflated by beginning total asset (Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Wang 2017; Chen, 
Sun, Tang, and Wu 2011; Gulen and Ion 2015; McLean, Zhang, and Zhao 2012)15.  
Independent variable  
The level of CSR efforts. We measure the invested efforts in CSR provided by Rankins CSR Rating 
(RKS) database. RKS is an independent third-party of the CSR rating agency. It evaluates firms’ corporate 
social behavior from three main dimensions within 63 sub-items, which reflect the efforts companies invest 
in their CSR activities. We use the score of CSR from this database as the measurement of investment of 
CSR, which is an accredited representation of CSR effort invested by a firm (Marquis and Qian 2014). 
Moderating variables  
The level of information asymmetry. We use environmental asymmetry as the moderating variable of 
CSR–investment relationship. Following Anderson et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2018), we regard analyst 
coverage as the measurement of information asymmetry. In specific, we use the average number of firm 
analyst attention, measured as the industry mean level of the firm’s number of analyst attention, to measure 
information asymmetry. Then, we sort this variable and code those values smaller than twenty-quantile 
value as 1, otherwise 0. We also use the average number of firm analysts reporting, measured as the industry 
mean level of the number of firm analyst reporting, to measure information asymmetry. Then, we sort this 
 
14 Firms’ yearly growth in property, plant, equipment, and other long-term assets. 
15 As the measurement of investment and cash flow is critical in our paper. We also provide alternative measurement 




variable and code those values smaller than twenty-quantile value as 1, otherwise 0. We also follow Li et 
al. (2019) and use the number of firms with Big 4, measured as the industry total number of firms with Big 
4, to measure information asymmetry. Then, we sort this variable and code those values smaller than 
twenty-quantile value as 1, otherwise 0. Besides, we use the number of firms with oversea auditing agency, 
measured as industry total number of firms with oversea auditing agency, to measure information 
asymmetry. Similarly, the value smaller than the twenty-quantile value as 1, otherwise 0. For the above four 
dummy variables coded as 1 indicate the higher information asymmetry. 
Mediating variable  
We use the firm’s Tobin’s Q16 as the measure of investment opportunity (growth opportunity). This is 
calculated as the market value of equity, the book value of non-tradable shares and liabilities, divided by 
book value of total assets (Bhandari and Javakhadze 2017; Chen et al. 2011; Gulen and Ion 2015; McLean 
et al. 2012). 
Control variables  
Financial performance. We use earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
(Paeleman & Vanacker, 2015) instead of net income to minimize the effect of non-cash flow accounting 
numbers (e.g., depreciation and tax treatments) on our results. We use total assets to standardized EBITDA 
and make it comparable for firms of different sizes (Brav 2009). Debt financing. We measure the firm’s 
 
16 According to Tobin (1969), marginal q predicts investment. However, marginal q is unobservable and many studies 
use average q as a substitute for marginal q (Blanchard, Rhee, & Summers, 1993; Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988; 
Hayashi, 1982; McLean, Zhang, & Zhao, 2012; Rauh, 2006). As noted by Hayashi (1982), interchangeably using 
average q with marginal q should base on average profit strongly correlates with marginal profit. Other studies also 
regard average q as investment opportunities (Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Wang 2017) or growth opportunities 




debt financing as the yearly change of debt issuance scaled by beginning total assets. Equity financing. We 
measure the firm’s equity financing as the yearly change in book equity value minus the change in retained 
earnings, all scaled by beginning assets (McLean et al. 2012). Size. We measure firm size as the log of the 
number of firm employees. State ownership. We measure firm state ownership as a dummy that is equal to 
1 if the firm is controlled by the state, and 0 otherwise. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita. We measure 
GDP Per Capita as the GDP in each province scaled by the total province population. We also control the 
year and industry level fixed effects by adding year and industry dummy variables. 
The above variable descriptions can be found in appendix table 2-1. 
Model specification 
We use the model suggested below to test the effect of CSR on investment: 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽13𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 4𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +
∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 +∑𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                                      Eq (1) 
Where 𝛽𝛽0 is the time-invariant intercept; 𝛽𝛽1 to 𝛽𝛽10 are slope coefficients of independent variable and 
control variables. 𝛽𝛽11 to 𝛽𝛽16 are slope coefficients of moderating effects of information transparency 
(𝛽𝛽11  to 𝛽𝛽14  are four dummy variable to represent the information asymmetry; 𝛽𝛽15  and 𝛽𝛽16  are 
coefficients of information transparency generated by principal component analysis). 𝛽𝛽j  and 𝛽𝛽k  are 
coefficients of industry and year dummy variables to control for industry fixed effects and changing 




represents social responsibility scores. CFP is the firm’s financial performance. FAC1 represents the 
predicted score from principal component analysis of the first two information asymmetry variables (analyst 
attention and analyst reporting). Similarly, FAC2 represents the predicted score from principal component 
analysis of the last two information transparency variables (Oversea auditing firm and Big four).  
We follow the generalized estimating equation (GEE) modeling developed by Liang and Zeger (1986) 
to analyze our hypotheses. Compared to the fixed-and-random-effects model, the GEE model estimates 
more robust and consistent coefficients when a non-independence issue presents (Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 
2011). The GEE approach allows for an unrestricted correlation structure and is widely used in economics, 
political sciences, and other fields in social sciences and business studies to analyze correlated data 
(Paeleman and Vanacker 2015). We also use two-stage least square (2sls) regression to confirm that our 
results are robust and consistent. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of Heckman first-stage regression are provided in table 2-
2. We find that the firm’s debt financing, financial performance, age, size, and industry-level CSR score 
positively correlate with CSR choice. Also, the positive sign of GDP Per Capita indicates that the higher 
the regional development (GDP Per Capita), the higher the likelihood of CSR choice. We can find that when 
the state controls a firm, it will more likely engage in CSR. The above findings are in line with what has 
been found in previous studies (Mcwilliams and Siegel 2001). Table 2-3 shows the correlation coefficients 
and descriptive statistics for Heckman second-stage regression. The investment opportunity (Tobin’s Q) 
positively correlates with investment expenditure, supporting the argument of (Hayashi 1982; Tobin 1969) 




investment expenditure. Other significant correlations are found between size and investment opportunity 
(-0.316) and size and CSR (0.402). The significant correlation can be found between FAC1 and its two 
components (analyst attention and analyst reporting). The reason that there is a significant correlation 
between FAC1 and its two components is that FAC1 is the principle component result of analyst attention 
and analyst reporting. We can also find that Big 4 and Oversea auditing firms both have significant 
correlations with FAC2. Also, analyst attention and analyst reporting positively correlated (0.978); Oversea 
auditing firm and Big 4 are also positively correlated (0.996). The above issues will not lead to 
multicollinearity because they are moderating variables and will not be added in the same model 
simultaneously. In order to ensure that our study is not bear the problem of multicollinearity, we further 
compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs). The largest number of VIF of our regressors is 1.07, with an 
average of 1.03, which indicates that there is no problem of multicollinearity in our results. 
[Insert Tables 2-2 and 2-3 about here] 
Table 2-4 provides the Heckman first- and second-stage regression. In model (1), we run the firm’s 
CSR dummy against firm-level control variables. In model (2), we add industry and year fixed effects. In 
model (3), we further use the industry-level CSR score as a valid instrumental variable (Wang and Qian 
2011). In model (4), we use the alternative measurement of Cash Flow17 and find a consistent result. After 
estimating the additional control, LAMEDA, from the first stage, we further add it into Heckman second-
stage to predict the CSR–Investment relationship. In model (7), CSR has significantly positive effect 
(coefficient = 0.005, p < 0.05) on firm’s Investment, fully supporting our hypothesis 1. In model (8) to 
 




model (10), we use alternative measurements of Investment opportunity and Cash Flow to reconfirm our 
hypotheses are consistent under different measurements. As can be found in the model (8), we use 
alternative Cash Flow and find consistent results (coefficient = 0.005, p < 0.05). In model (9), we use 
alternative Investment18 and original measurement of Cash Flow and find consistent results (coefficient = 
0.003, p < 0.05). In model (10), we use both alternative Investment and Cash Flow and get consistent result 
(coefficient = 0.002, p < 0.1). Based on the regression results of the model (3) and model (7), we further 
test the mediating effect of Investment opportunity on CSR–Investment relationship. 
[Insert Tables 2-4 about here] 
To test hypothesis 2 and to assess the presence of the mediating effect of Investment opportunity on 
CSR–Investment relationship, we follow the procedure suggested by (Baron and Kenny 1986). Three steps 
should satisfy before we can confirm that there is a mediating effect. First, the independent variable (CSR) 
should be significantly associated with the mediating variable (Investment opportunity). Second, the 
independent variable should be significantly associated with the dependent variable (Investment). Third, 
after adding a mediating variable (Investment opportunity) in the second step, the original significant 
relationship between the independent variable (CSR) and dependent variable (Investment) becomes less 
(partial mediation) or non-significant (full mediation). 
In table 2-5, model (1) shows the CSR–Investment relationship (first step) (coefficient = 0.0049, P < 
0.05), the same model shown in table 2-4 model (7). Model (2) exams the relationship between CSR and 
Investment opportunity (second step). We find that CSR positively associates with Investment opportunity 
 





( coefficient = 0.0039, P < 0.1). In model (3), we further add Investment opportunity (third step) and find 
that CSR is significant, but its coefficient becomes smaller than the original coefficient (coefficient = 0.0045, 
P < 0.05). Therefore, according to the mediating identification procedure, we confirm that Investment 
opportunity partially mediates CSR–Investment relationship. The findings above fully support hypothesis 
2, which states that the Investment opportunity appears to mediate CSR–Investment relationship. 
[Insert Tables 2-5 about here] 
In table 2-6, we test the moderating effects of information asymmetry on CSR–Investment relationship. 
In order to incorporate different levels of information asymmetry, we first sort the information asymmetry 
variable and generate a dummy variable (if corresponding variable < value of 20 percentile) to indicate the 
high level of information asymmetry. In model (1), the below 20-percentile dummy of industry mean-level 
analysts’ following positively moderates CSR-Investment relationship, indicating that the higher the 
information asymmetry, the stronger the positive effect of CSR on Investment. In model (2) and (3), we 
find the same positive moderating effect of information asymmetry dummy measured as industry-level 
analyst reporting and the total number of oversea auditing firms. We do not find a significant moderating 
effect of information asymmetry dummy of the industry-level total number of firms with Big 4 auditing 
firms (model (4)). Last, in the model (5) and model (6), we use principal component analysis to predict 
FAC1 for both Analyst attention and Analyst reporting and FAC2 for both Overseas auditing firms and Big 
4. As indicated in the model (5), the moderating effect of FAC1 has a non-significant moderating effect on 
CSR–Investment relationship while FAC2 significantly moderates effect on the relationship between CSR 
and Investment. As FAC1 and FAC2 are principal component analysis result, the higher the value of the 




complies with our previous statement in hypothesis 3, which states that CSR–Investment relationship 
becomes stronger in a more asymmetric environment. In sum, the above moderating effects reinforce our 
argument that CSR acts as a vehicle to reduce information asymmetry between investment targets and 
investors and improves firm-level investment, which fully supports hypothesis 3. The moderating effects 
of those information asymmetry variables can be found in figure 2-2 to figure 2-5. 
[Insert Tables 2-6 about here] 
[Insert Figure 2-2 to 2-5 about here] 
In table 2-7 Panel A to Panel B, we further show the mediated moderation analysis of the effect of 
CSR impacted by information asymmetry on investment through the path of investment opportunity. 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) and Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005), four steps should be fulfilled 
in order to demonstrate the mediated moderation process. First, the interaction term of the independent 
variable and moderator should significantly predict the dependent variable; second, the independent 
variable should significantly predict the mediator; third, after adding interaction term of independent 
variable and moderator, the mediator should significantly predict the dependent variable. Last, the original 
interaction term of independent variable and moderator should be insignificant (full mediation) or 
significant with the absolute value being smaller than the original interaction term.  
In model 2 of Table 2-7 Panel A, we find the significant coefficient of CSR*Analyst attention 
(coefficient = 0.009, p < 0.1). Model 3 and Model 4 are used to test the mediated moderation effect. The 
interaction term of CSR and Analyst attention is significant in model 3 (coefficient = 0.005, p < 0.05). 
Model 4 shows that the investment opportunity is significant (coefficient = 0.274, p < 0.01), with the 




mediating effect. In sum, the effect of CSR on investment opportunity depends on information asymmetry 
and the effect of an investment opportunity on investment is significantly different from zero. Therefore, 
the above results suggest that the moderating role of information asymmetry is mediated through investment 
opportunity. In other words, the effect of CSR impacted by the information asymmetry on investment 
follows the path of investment opportunity. On the right side of table 2-7 Panel A, we also find the partially 
mediated moderation effect of CSR on investment for information asymmetry measured by industry-level 
analyst reporting. However, we could not find a mediated moderation effect for information asymmetry 
measured by oversea auditing firms and Big Four auditing firms. Therefore, we partially support the 
hypothesis 4. 
[Insert Tables 2-7 about here] 
Robustness checks 
In order to ensure that our results are valid, we further run additional robustness tests to confirm the 
positive relationship between CSR and investment expenditure and the mediating effect of investment 
opportunity. We use an alternative model to address the problem of endogeneity, which may arise from 
omitted variables. 
Two-stage Least Square (2sls) estimator  
To mitigate the concerns of estimation bias caused by endogeneity. We perform an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation procedure consisting of two-step estimation. We first regress CSR scores against 
two instrumental variables and control variables and predict a new value of CSR from this stage. We then 
use the predicted value of CSR as the new independent variable to test whether original CSR–Investment 




and city green area per capita are chosen as instrumental variables. As can be seen in Table 2-8, the 
dependent variable in models (2), (4), (6), (7) is Investment. From the endogeneity test in model (2), (4), 
and (6), the p-value is smaller than 0.001 in each of three models, indicating that our independent variable 
CSR is endogenous. Using city-green area, city-green-park area, and green-area per capita as instrumental 
variables, we perform 2sls regression and find that the choice of the above instruments is valid in model 
(1), (3), and (5). From the Cragg and Donald (1993) instrument relevance test, the p-value is less than 0.001, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. From Sargan (1958) overidentification test, the 
exogeneity of the instrumental variables is confirmed in the previous two models (i.e., accept the null 
hypothesis of no significant correlations between the instrumental variables and the error terms in the CSR-
Investment regression) but reject the null hypothesis in model (5). We thus reject model (5) and chose one 
model from either model (1) or model (3) as the first-stage regression. Due to the larger loglikelihood ratio 
statistics of model (1), we choose model (1) as the baseline model to estimate the predicted value of CSR. 
Based on the predicted value of CSR in model (1), we further estimate the second CSR–Investment 
relationship in model (2) and confirm our previous findings are robust and consistent (coefficient = 0.051, 
p < 0.01). We further add LAMEDA in model (7) to control endogenous issue caused by sample selection 
and reinforce previous findings (coefficient = 0.056, p < 0.01). Therefore, the robustness check from 2sls 
fully supports our previous hypothesis of CSR can improve firm investment expenditure after we control 
endogeneity. 
[Insert Tables 2-8 about here] 
In table 2-9, we use the predicted value of CSR from model (1) as the new independent variable to test 




the coefficient of CSR in model (3) (0.038, p < 0.01), supporting the partial mediating effect of Investment 
opportunity. We further test the moderating effect of information asymmetry on direct CSR–Investment 
relationship and confirm our previous results of the positive moderating effect of four industry-level- 
asymmetry dummies (below 20 percentile value of the mean level of industry-level analysts’ attention, 
analysts’ reporting, and the sum of industry-level firms’ oversea auditing firms, Big 4 auditing firms) in 
Table 2-10. In sum, we fully support our hypothesis 3 and find consistent results with previous findings 
shown in Table 2-6. For FAC1 and FAC2, we find the same significant moderating effects as we found in 
table 2-6. 
[Insert Tables 2-9 and 2-10 about here] 
DISCUSSION 
We investigate the relationship between CSR and investment expenditure under the perspective of 
information asymmetry. The results show that CSR is an enabling factor in improving the firm’s investment 
expenditure. In specific, we find that CSR will promote firm-level investment expenditure and this 
relationship is mediated through investment opportunities. Given the fact that CSR activities can improve 
the information environment, we specifically find that in a less transparent environment, CSR has a stronger 
effect on investment expenditure than in a more transparent environment. We argue that because 
stakeholders can get information cheaper and easier in a more transparent environment than those in a less 
transparent environment, the information disclosure function of CSR will be largely diluted. The impact of 
CSR on investment will be weaker. 
Conversely, given the information barriers between investment targets and investors are severe in a 




positive impact of CSR on investment and corresponding moderating effects of information transparency 
on CSR–investment relationship. In sum, we argue that CSR activities help promote information exchange 
between investment targets and investors and, thus, help them build mutual trust, which further increases 
the level of investment expenditure through getting more investment opportunities. 
The findings of this paper have several important implications for CSR literature. First, the CSR 
literature mainly focuses on how firms’ CSR can improve a firm’s financial performance (Kim, Kim, and 
Qian 2018; Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001; Wang and Qian 2011), relatively litter focus is given to firm-level 
investment behavior. This study helps to enrich CSR literature from an investment perspective. More 
importantly, current literature that links CSR to investment generally assume information is a detrimental 
factor that negatively impedes firms’ investment, but few studies empirically uncover information 
asymmetry black box and combine it with CSR–information relationship. In this paper, we are the first to 
address this omission by using industry-level information asymmetry as a moderator to show how CSR-
investment relationship will be affected by different levels of information transparency. 
Second, we contribute to the literature of investment from an investment acceptance perspective. 
Different from the long-believed perspective that firm-level investment is solely determined by investment 
opportunity (Hayashi 1982; Tobin 1969), we challenge this perspective and argue that not all firms could 
get enough investment opportunities even though they have enough funding to support their investment. 
Therefore, our research enriches the investment literature by showing that it is not only important to increase 
its internal funding but also to keep information exchange and build up a trustful relationship with the 
investment target. We empirically find that after controlling debt, equity, and cash flow, CSR can still 




financing is not a sole factor that affects the firm’s investment, but how firms use CSR to signal their 
information is of also critical importance.  
Limitations and future research directions 
Given that this paper builds on information perspective and investigate CSR-investment relationship, 
it is natural to discern that how to measure information asymmetry is very important. Thus, the measurement 
of information asymmetry can be improved in future studies. We use analysts’ following (Anderson et al. 
2009; Wang et al. 2018) and character of audit firms (Big 4 or oversea) (Li et al. 2019) suggested by 
previous literature as the measurement of information transparency within each industry. It is interesting to 
check whether the level of information asymmetry will be different in different countries and how do these 
differences may impact on CSR-investment relationship. The cross-country study may be more interesting 
and illustrative to indicate information asymmetry as it is natural to predict that information asymmetry 
levels will be different between emerging and developed economies (McLean et al. 2012).  
It is also interesting to check the impact of information by incorporating the impact of a specific event 
on the CSR-investment relationship. Using event study method and Propensity Score Matching may be 
more demonstrative in showing the importance of information disclosure on social acceptance in terms of 
investment and investment opportunities.  
Conclusions 
By empirically analyzing data on CSR and investment of publicly listed Chinese firms from 2009 to 
2017, we show that CSR can improve investment by overcoming information asymmetry between 
investment targets and investors. We believe this research provides an angle to analyze how CSR promotes 




study may be an important step to understand how CSR impact on investment behavior from information 
asymmetry perspective. Other studies could broaden information asymmetry or CSR by checking other 





Table 2-1: Sample Description by Industry, Year, and Region 
CSRC Industry code two-digit code Industry Name Freq. Cum. 
% 
Year Freq. Cum. % Region Code region Freq. Cum. % 
A 01-05 Agriculture forestry and fisheries 43 1.4 2009 249 8.09 11 Beijing 412 13.38 
B 06-11 Mineral industries 148 6.2 2010 359 19.75 12 Tianjin 79 15.95 
C 13-42 Manufacturing 1,778 63.95 2011 378 32.02 13 Hebei 50 17.57 
D 44-46 Electricity, Heat, gas, and Water Supplies 183 69.89 2012 434 46.12 14 Shanxi 59 19.49 
E 47-50 Constructions 86 72.69 2013 513 62.78 15 Inner Mongol 22 20.2 
F 51-52 wholesale/retail trade 170 78.21 2014 558 80.9 21 Liaoning 72 22.54 
G 53-59 Transportation 215 85.19 2015 588 100 22 Jilin 44 23.97 
H 61-62 Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure 7 85.42 Total 3079  23 Heilongjiang 22 24.68 
I 63-65 Software & Service 119 89.28    31 Shanghai 272 33.52 
K 70 Real Estate 209 96.07    32 Jiangsu 168 38.97 
L 71-72 Lease & and Commercial Services 24 96.85    33 Zhejiang 257 47.32 
M 73-75 Science & Technology Services 1 96.88    34 Anhui 112 50.96 
N 77-78 Water, Environment, and Public Utilities 20 97.53    35 Fujian 238 58.69 
O 79 81 Residential & other Services 1 97.56    36 Jiangxi 48 60.25 
Q 83 Hygienism & social Services 6 97.76    37 Shandong 185 66.26 
R 85-87 Culture, physical, and entertainment Services 22 98.47    41 Henan 131 70.51 
S 90 Other 47 100    42 Hubei 79 73.08 
Total    3,079     43 Hunan 52 74.76 
        44 Guangdong 371 86.81 
        45 Guangxi 34 87.92 
        46 Hainan 24 88.7 
        50 Chongqing 27 89.57 
        51 Sichuan 83 92.27 
        52 Guizhou 35 93.41 
        53 Yunnan 65 95.52 
        54 Tibet 12 95.91 
        61 Shanxi 32 96.95 
        62 Gansu 5 97.11 
        63 Qinghai 26 97.95 




        65 Sinkiang 51 100 
        Total  3079  
Note: This table presents the region, year, and industry (Classification is based on the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry code 




Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Heckman first stage regression 
  Mean S.d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CSR Dummy 0.317 0.465          
2 Cash Flow 0.209 11.863 -0.006         
3 Equity financing 0.032 0.105 -0.014 -0.001        
4 Debt financing 0.086 0.147 0.047*** -0.069*** 0.123***       
5 CFP 0.178 0.225 0.071*** 0.002 0.027*** -0.018*      
6 Age 15.255 4.813 0.018* 0.003 -0.036*** -0.047*** 0.018*     
7 GDP Per Capita 10.759 0.483 0.036*** 0.012 -0.027*** -0.026** 0.003 0.164***    
8 Size 22.062 1.262 0.454*** -0.024** -0.013 0.185*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.095***   
9 Industry CSR 36.308 2.510 0.089*** 0.009 0.002 0.034*** 0.069*** -0.110*** -0.016 0.209***  
10 State Dummy 0.482 0.500 0.206*** 0.015 -0.053*** -0.006 0.019* 0.023** -0.121*** 0.325*** 0.140*** 
Note: The dependent variable is measured for year t; the independent variable, for t – 1. Number of observations is 9719. Significance level: * p < 0.1, ** 
















Table 2-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations in Heckman Second Stage regression 
 Variables Mean s.d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Investment  -3.365  1.137          
2 Investment opportunity 1.527  1.550  0.045**        
3 CSR 36.780  12.012  0.063*** -0.095***       
4 CFP 0.195  0.259  0.024 -0.030* -0.016      
5 GDP Per Capita 10.877  0.461  -0.170*** 0.031* 0.224*** -0.01     
6 Debt financing 0.087  0.151  0.087*** -0.128*** -0.014 -0.031* -0.059***    
7 Equity financing 0.032  0.103  0.058*** 0.068*** -0.013 0.012 -0.007 0.101***   
8 Size 8.438  1.389  0.256*** -0.316*** 0.402*** -0.128*** -0.017 0.054*** -0.056***  
9 Cash Flow 0.226  12.393  0.036** 0.03 -0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.101*** 0.005 -0.026 
10 Age 16.387  4.805  -0.169*** -0.002 0.023 0.002 0.135*** -0.035** -0.01 -0.114*** 
11 State Dummy 0.632  0.482  -0.016 -0.212*** 0.087*** 0.046** -0.005 -0.030* -0.073*** 0.141*** 
12 Analysts attention 9.479  1.504  0.188*** 0.141*** 0.120*** -0.103*** -0.015 -0.011 0.041**  0.248*** 
13 Analyst reporting 18.591  3.503  0.121*** 0.149*** 0.098*** -0.096*** 0.012 0.007 0.042**  0.197*** 
14 Oversea auditing firms 206.125  141.397  0.199*** 0.116*** -0.072*** -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.089*** 0.041**  0.124*** 
15 Big 4 401.803  274.700  0.163*** 0.119*** -0.084*** -0.184*** -0.158*** -0.079*** 0.042**  0.105*** 
16 FAC1 -0.027  1.472  0.156*** 0.146*** 0.110*** -0.100*** -0.001 -0.002 0.042**  0.225*** 
17 FAC2 -0.120  1.406  0.181*** 0.117*** -0.078*** -0.176*** -0.163*** -0.084*** 0.042**  0.114*** 
18 LAMBDA 0.892  0.457  0.032* 0.508*** -0.349*** -0.087*** -0.133*** -0.024 0.143*** -0.647*** 
 
  Mean s.d 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
10 Age 16.387  4.805  -0.032*         
11 State Dummy 0.632  0.482  0.013 -0.107***        
12 Analysts attention 9.479  1.504  0.016 -0.184*** 0.008       




206.125  141.397  0.011 -0.091*** -0.131*** 0.015 -0.060***     
15 Big 4 401.803  274.700  0.009 -0.069*** -0.148*** -0.013 -0.078*** 0.996***    
16 FAC1 -0.027  1.472  0.015 -0.165*** -0.002 0.995*** 0.994*** -0.022 -0.045**    
17 FAC2 -0.120  1.406  0.01 -0.080*** -0.140*** 0.001 -0.069*** 0.999*** 0.999*** -0.034*  
18 LAMBDA 0.892  0.457  0.026 0.024 -0.400*** -0.01 0.007 0.118*** 0.133*** -0.001 0.125*** 




if the industry-level mean of the firm number of analysts’ attention is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. REPOR is 
a dummy variable if the industry-level mean of the firm number of analysts’ reporting is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, 
otherwise 0. OVERS is a dummy variable if the industry-level sum of firms with oversea auditing firms is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we 
code it as 1, otherwise 0. Big 4 is a dummy variable if the industry-level mean of firms with Big 4 auditing firms is smaller than twenty-quantile of this 




Table 2-4: Probit Estimates for Heckman First-Stage Model and Generalized Estimate Equation Model for Heckman Second-Stage Regression 
 
Basic model Heckman  first stage 
Alternative CF Heckman  
second stage 
Alternative DV and Cash Flow 
Variables CF1 CF1&DV CF&DV1 CF1&DV1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CSR t     0.005** 0.005** 0.003** 0.002* 
     (2.25) (2.10) (2.15) (1.66) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.007 0.011* 0.011*      
 (1.34) (1.92) (1.87)      
Cash Flow1 t-1    0.845***     
    (4.82)     
Equity financing t-1 -0.561*** -0.051 -0.053 -0.030     
 (-4.66) (-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.20)     
Debt financing t-1 -0.140 -0.345*** -0.347*** -0.291***     
 (-1.58) (-3.37) (-3.39) (-2.66)     
CFP t-1 0.193*** 0.270*** 0.268*** 0.237***     
 (3.65) (4.20) (4.16) (3.52)     
Age t-1 -0.013*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001     
 (-4.74) (-0.04) (0.12) (-0.17)     
GDP Per Capita t-1 -0.023 0.079** 0.081** 0.083**     
 (-0.86) (2.21) (2.24) (2.20)     
Size t-1 0.401*** 0.565*** 0.563*** 0.563***     
 (34.84) (36.83) (36.45) (34.00)     
State Dummy 0.192*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 0.198*** -0.096 -0.123* -0.069* -0.078** 
 (6.96) (6.60) (6.54) (5.86) (-1.40) (-1.81) (-1.92) (-2.18) 
CFP t     0.188** 0.184** 0.050 0.012 
     (2.16) (2.12) (0.47) (0.13) 
GDP Per Capita t     0.021 -0.011 0.071* 0.041 
     (0.30) (-0.16) (1.87) (1.05) 
Debt ratio t     0.511*** 0.546*** 0.400*** 0.407*** 
     (5.20) (5.08) (6.32) (6.02) 
Equity ratio t     -0.033 0.063 0.300*** 0.331*** 




Size t     0.210*** 0.182*** 0.033* 0.016 
     (6.44) (5.78) (1.84) (0.91) 
Cash Flow t     0.001  0.002  
     (0.70)  (1.42)  
Cash Flow1 t      0.795***  0.483*** 
      (3.59)  (4.05) 
Age t     -0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
     (-0.83) (-0.21) (0.17) (1.01) 
Industry-level CSR 
t-1 
  0.009 0.006     
   (1.28) (0.77)     
LAMBDA t      0.582*** 0.457*** 0.125** 0.046 
     (5.77) (4.59) (2.16) (0.78) 
Year Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INTERCEPT -9.269*** -14.501*** -14.847*** -14.649*** -5.432*** -4.785*** -2.858*** -2.382*** 
 (-26.91) (-27.89) (-25.31) (-24.33) (-5.64) (-5.09) (-5.67) (-4.66) 
N 12547 9722 9719 8403 3079 2834 3080 2835 
Loglikelihood -6078.39 -4880.58 -4879.53 -4337.23     
Wald statistic 1846.33 2381.98 2381.80 2069.32     
Note: The dependent variable from model (1) to (3) is a dummy variable of CSR choice (value for 1 when a firm has CSR engagement, otherwise 0). The 
dependent variable from model (4) to (6) is firm-level investment expenditure. In Heckman first-stage, the CSR dummy is measured for year t; firm and 
industry-level controls measured for year t – 1. In Heckman second-stage, firm-level investment expenditure is measured for year t + 1, firm and industry 
predictors measured for year t. Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. Significance level: † 0.1 * 0.05 ** 










Table 2-5: Mediating Effect of Investment Opportunity on CSR-Investment Relationship 
 DV: INV DV: INVOPP DV: INV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investment opportunity t   0.050*** 
   (2.88) 
CSR t 0.0049** 0.0039* 0.0045**  
 (2.25) (1.65) (2.07) 
CFP t 0.188** -0.518 0.167**  
 (2.16) (-0.942) (2.07) 
GDP Per Capita t 0.021 0.377*** 0.002 
 (0.30) (4.03) (0.03) 
Debt financing t 0.511*** -0.498*** 0.562*** 
 (5.20) (-5.386) (5.59) 
Equity financing t -0.033 -0.604*** -0.056 
 (-0.200) (-2.723) (-0.316)    
Size t 0.210*** -0.006 0.208*** 
 (6.45) (-0.094) (6.36) 
Cash Flow t 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.70) (-0.646) (0.74) 
Age t -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
 (-0.835) (-0.594) (-0.597)    
State Dummy -0.096 0.174 -0.109 
 (-1.401) (1.42) (-1.590)    
LAMEDA t 0.582*** 1.901*** 0.497*** 
 (5.77) (9.03) (4.80) 
Intercept -5.432*** -4.149*** -5.205*** 
 (-5.636) (-2.977) (-5.387)    
N 3079 3016 3024 
Note: The dependent variable in model (1) and (2) are CSR score. The dependent variable in model (3) is the 
firm-level investment opportunity. The dependent variable is measured for year t + 1; independent and firm 
control variables measured for year t. Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented 




Table 2-6: Moderating Effects of Transparency on CSR-Investment Relationship 






(<20%) FAC1 FAC2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR t 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.005** 0.004* 
 (0.89) (1.31) (1.58) (1.92) (2.17) (1.90) 
CFP t 0.196** 0.190** 0.195** 0.190** 0.202** 0.191** 
 (2.26) (2.19) (2.23) (2.18) (2.29) (2.20) 
GDP Per Capita t 0.030 0.023 0.029 0.019 0.023 0.021 
 (0.42) (0.32) (0.40) (0.26) (0.31) (0.29) 
Debt financing t 0.517*** 0.505*** 0.517*** 0.507*** 0.500*** 0.511*** 
 (5.29) (5.12) (5.26) (5.16) (5.05) (5.21) 
Equity financing t -0.042 -0.025 -0.041 -0.030 -0.034 -0.030 
 (-0.27) (-0.15) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.18) 
Size t 0.200*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.209*** 0.202*** 
 (6.55) (6.45) (6.39) (6.42) (6.62) (6.34) 
Cash Flow t 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.90) (0.91) (0.86) (0.85) (0.87) (0.89) 
Age t -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.57) (-0.88) (-0.69) (-0.77) (-0.65) (-0.76) 
State Dummy -0.100 -0.101 -0.106 -0.104 -0.098 -0.106 
 (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.56) (-1.53) (-1.43) (-1.56) 
LAMBDA t 0.550*** 0.560*** 0.554*** 0.563*** 0.574*** 0.552*** 
 (5.70) (5.65) (5.59) (5.63) (5.77) (5.48) 
ATTEN (< 20%) t -0.634***      
 (-3.20)      
ATTEN t (< 20%) *CSR 
t 
0.011**      
 (2.33)      
REPOR t (< 20%)  -0.344**     
  (-2.22)     
REPOR t (< 20%) *CSR 
t 
 0.008**     
  (2.28)     
OVERS t (< 20%)   -0.439*    
   (-1.81)    
OVERS t (< 20%) *CSR 
t 
  0.010*    
   (1.70)    
Big 4 t (< 20%)    -0.142   
    (-0.66)   
Big 4 t (< 20%) *CSR t    0.004   
    (0.85)   
FAC1 t     0.065  
     (1.22)  
FAC1 t *CSR t     -0.001  




FAC2 t      0.101* 
      (1.65) 
FAC2 t *CSR t      -0.003* 
      (-1.76) 
Year Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INTERCEPT -5.273*** -5.291*** -5.336*** -5.316*** -5.489*** -5.317*** 
 (-5.65) (-5.56) (-5.62) (-5.55) (-5.68) (-5.56) 
N 3079.000 3079.000 3079.000 3079.000 3079.000 3079.000 
Note: The dependent variable is investment, measured for year t + 1; independent and firm control variables for 
t. ATTEN is a dummy variable if the industry-level mean of the firm number of analysts’ attention is smaller 
than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. REPOR is a dummy variable if the industry-
level mean of the firm number of analysts’ reporting is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it 
as 1, otherwise 0. OVERS is a dummy variable if the industry-level sum of firms with oversea auditing firms is 
smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. Big 4 is a dummy variable if the 
industry-level mean of firms with Big 4 auditing firms is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code 
it as 1, otherwise 0. Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. 








Table 2-7 Panel A: Analysis of the Mediated Moderation: 
The Impact of CSR on Investment Through the Path of Investment Opportunity. 
 Information asymmetry-Analyst Attention Information asymmetry-Analyst report 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR t 0.005** 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.005** 0.004 -0.001 0.003 
 (2.251) (1.134) (-0.871) (1.084) (2.251) (1.518) (-0.460) (1.382) 
LAMEDA t 0.582*** 0.582*** 1.214*** 0.312*** 0.582*** 0.584*** 1.212*** 0.306*** 
 (5.774) (5.927) (19.037) (2.919) (5.774) (5.826) (18.903) (2.849) 
Analyst attention t  -0.491*** -0.277*** -0.411**     
  (-2.592) (-3.192) (-2.185)     
Analyst report t      -0.280* -0.131** -0.243 
      (-1.897) (-2.084) (-1.619) 
Analyst attention t *CSR t  0.009* 0.005*** 0.008     
  (1.936) (2.610) (1.636)     
Analyst report t *CSR t      0.006* 0.003* 0.005 
      (1.721) (1.870) (1.458) 
Investment opportunity t    0.274***    0.277*** 
    (6.916)    (7.079) 
Analyst attention t *Investment opportunity t    -0.084     
    (-1.184)     
Analyst report t *Investment opportunity t        -0.071 
        (-1.292) 
INDUSTRY, YEAR AND FIRM-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES ARE ADDED IN EACH MODEL. 
Intercept -5.432*** -5.421*** -3.845*** -4.541*** -5.432*** -5.373*** -3.807*** -4.440*** 
 (-5.636) (-5.756) (-6.028) (-4.730) (-5.636) (-5.631) (-5.965) (-4.585) 
N 3079 3079 3016 3024 3079 3079 3016 3024 
Note: The dependent variable is investment, measured for year t + 1; independent and firm control variables for t. Analyst attention is a dummy variable if 
the industry-level mean of the firm number of analysts’ attention is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. Significance 




Table 2-7 Panel B: Analysis of Mediated Moderation: 
The Impact of CSR on Investment Through the Path of Investment Opportunity. 
 Oversea Auditing firm Big 4 Auditing firm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR t 0.005** 0.004* -0.001 0.004* 0.005** 0.004** -0.001 0.004* 
 (2.251) (1.801) (-0.837) (1.672) (2.251) (2.012) (-0.447) (1.823) 
LAMEDA t 0.582*** 0.577*** 1.205*** 0.302*** 0.582*** 0.588*** 1.207*** 0.307*** 
 (5.774) (5.700) (19.074) (2.775) (5.774) (5.781) (19.021) (2.822) 
Oversea Auditing firm t  -0.285 -0.371*** -0.200     
  (-1.209) (-3.574) (-0.833)     
Big 4 Auditing firm t      -0.069 -0.193** -0.027 
      (-0.314) (-1.968) (-0.122) 
Oversea Auditing firm t *CSR t  0.007 0.008*** 0.005     
  (1.175) (3.446) (0.869)     
Big 4 Auditing firm*CSR t      0.003 0.004* 0.002 
      (0.596) (1.836) (0.424) 
Investment opportunity t    0.270***    0.275*** 
    (6.900)    (7.000) 
Oversea Auditing firm t *Investment opportunity t    -0.051     
    (-0.732)     
Big 4 Auditing firm t *Investment opportunity t        -0.058 
        (-0.839) 
INDUSTRY, YEAR AND FIRM-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES ARE ADDED IN EACH MODEL. 
Intercept -5.432*** -5.415*** -3.820*** -4.529*** -5.432*** -5.387*** -3.819*** -4.463*** 
 (-5.636) (-5.653) (-6.036) (-4.640) (-5.636) (-5.598) (-6.015) (-4.554) 
N 3079 3079 3016 3024 3079 3079 3016 3024 
Note: The dependent variable is investment, measured for year t + 1; independent and firm control variables for t. Analyst reporting is a dummy variable if 
the industry-level mean of the firm number of analysts’ reporting is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. Significance 




Table 2-8: 2sls Estimates for CSR-Investment Relationship 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
City Green Area t 0.019***    0.021***               
 (10.81)    (3.45)               
City Green Park Area t   0.109***  -0.015               
   (10.24)  (-0.40)               
Green Area Per Capita t -0.358***  -0.520***  -0.331***               
 (-5.09)  (-6.50)  (-3.41)               
CSRHet1 t  0.051***     0.056***             
  (6.10)     (6.52)             
CSRHet2 t    0.061***    
    (6.88)    
CSRHet3 t      0.050***  
      (5.96)  
CFP t 0.015 0.056 -0.043 0.054 0.025 0.056 0.16 
 (0.02) (0.49) (-0.06) (0.47) (0.03) (0.49) (1.54) 
GDP Per Capita t 2.091*** -0.116*** 2.250*** -0.142*** 2.075*** -0.112** -0.04 
 (4.75) (-2.64) (5.12) (-3.20) (4.70) (-2.56) (-0.88)    
Debt financing t 0.513 0.851*** 0.375 0.841*** 0.539 0.853*** 0.856*** 
 (0.43) (6.82) (0.31) (6.78) (0.45) (6.83) (6.77) 
Equity financing t 0.087 0.374** 0.059 0.375** 0.089 0.374** 0.246 
 (0.05) (2.09) (0.03) (2.09) (0.05) (2.09) (1.27) 
Size t 3.345*** -0.048 3.286*** -0.082*** 3.353*** -0.044 0.085*** 
 (23.68) (-1.60) (23.19) (-2.60) (23.49) (-1.46) (2.60) 
Cash Flow t 0.003 0.003** 0.004 0.003** 0.003 0.003** 0.002*   
 (0.23) (2.23) (0.26) (2.13) (0.23) (2.24) (1.87) 
Age t -0.243*** 0.004 -0.236*** 0.006 -0.243*** 0.004 0.011*** 
 (-5.91) (1.14) (-5.73) (1.51) (-5.90) (1.09) (2.83) 
State Dummy t  0.809** -0.251*** 0.811** -0.254*** 0.803** -0.251*** -0.068*   
 (2.08) (-7.08) (2.08) (-7.18) (2.06) (-7.06) (-1.72)    




       (10.30) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept t  -10.158** -2.763*** -9.694* -2.565*** -10.339** -2.788*** -5.803*** 
 (-2.04) (-5.95) (-1.94) (-5.51) (-2.07) (-6.00) (-10.28)    
N 3271 3270 3271 3270 3271 3270 3079 
Loglikelihood -12090.43 -4228.01 -12096.35 -4222.44 -12090.34 -4228.91 -3922.66 
R Square 0.34 0.4 0.34 0.4 0.34 0.4 0.42 
Adjusted R Square 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.4 0.33 0.39 0.41 
Weak identification test  




p<0.001  29.331 p<0.001   
Sargan statistic  







0.0014   
Endogeneity test of endogenous   27.602***  38.540***  27.520***  
Note: The dependent variable for model (1), (3), and (5) is the CSR score, measured at year t. The dependent variable for model (2), (4), (6), and (7) is the 
investment, measured for year t + 1; independent and firm control variables are measured for year t. CSRHet1 to CSRHet3 are predicted CSR value from 
the first stage of 2sls model. Robust t-statistics corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented in parentheses. Significance level: † 0.1 * 0.05 ** 






Table 2-9: Estimates of The Mediating Effect of the Investment Opportunity on CSR-Investment 
Relationship 
 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investment opportunity t   0.072*** 
   (5.40) 
CSRHet1 t 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 
 (6.68) (4.46) (6.19) 
CFP t 0.019 -0.089 -0.03 
 (0.15) (-0.21) (-0.22)    
GDP Per Capita t -0.127*** 0.031 -0.128*** 
 (-3.09) (0.48) (-3.11)    
Debt financing t  0.877*** -0.847*** 0.964*** 
 (7.14) (-6.60) (7.69) 
Equity financing t  0.332* 0.054 0.213 
 (1.87) (0.25) (1.12) 
Size t  0.001 -0.534*** 0.033 
 (0.04) (-13.79) (1.36) 
Cash flow t  0.003** 0.001 0.002**  
 (2.24) (0.05) (2.26) 
Age t  0.005 -0.005 0.005 
 (1.24) (-0.96) (1.34) 
Stage Dummy t  -0.248*** -0.322*** -0.234*** 
 (-7.05) (-5.66) (-6.70)    
Intercept -2.664*** 5.992*** -3.038*** 
 (-5.75) (8.31) (-6.46)    
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 3270.00  3202.00  3212.00  
Loglikelihood (4222.16) (5255.51) (4121.54) 
R Square 0.4 0.36 0.41 
Adjusted R Square 0.40  0.36  0.41  
Note: The dependent variable is investment, measured for year t +1; independent variable and control variables 
for year t. CSRHet1 are predicted CSR value from the first stage of the 2sls model. Robust t-statistics corrected 









Table 2-10: Estimates of The Moderating Effect of Information Transparency on CSR-Investment 
Relationship 






(<20%) FAC1 FAC2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSRHet1 t 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 
 (4.98) (5.52) (5.26) (5.75) (6.30) (5.74) 
CFP t 0.064 0.060 0.067 0.067 0.077 0.063 
 (0.55) (0.53) (0.58) (0.58) (0.66) (0.58) 
GDP Per Capita t -0.087* -0.108* -0.092* -0.101* -0.115** -0.095* 
 (-2.01) (-2.47) (-2.10) (-2.30) (-2.63) (-2.18) 
Debt financing t 0.897*** 0.845*** 0.881*** 0.866*** 0.832*** 0.902*** 
 (7.28) (6.77) (7.11) (6.91) (6.71) (7.24) 
Equity financing t 0.354* 0.377* 0.353* 0.360* 0.362* 0.369* 
 (1.98) (2.10) (1.97) (2.01) (2.02) (2.04) 
Size t -0.055+ -0.047 -0.047 -0.050+ -0.061* -0.055+ 
 (-1.85) (-1.57) (-1.54) (-1.66) (-1.99) (-1.81) 
Cash Flow t 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (2.36) (2.32) (2.19) (2.20) (2.13) (2.34) 
Age t 0.007+ 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006+ 0.006+ 
 (1.84) (1.07) (1.64) (1.47) (1.74) (1.74) 













 (-6.64) (-7.00) (-7.10) (-7.14) (-7.05) (-6.74) 
ATTEN t (< 20%) t 
-
1.469***      
 (-6.57)      
ATTEN t (< 20%) *CSR t 0.031***      
 (5.18)      
REPOR t (< 20%)  -0.631**     
  (-2.73)     
REPOR t (< 20%) *CSR t  0.016**     
  (2.63)     
OVERS t (< 20%)   
-
1.228***    
   (-4.51)    
OVERS t (< 20%) *CSR t   0.030***    
   (3.97)    
BIG4 t (< 20%)    -0.726**   
    (-2.80)   
BIG4 t (< 20%) *CSR t    0.015*   
    (2.28)   
FAC1 t     0.080  
     (1.29)  
FAC1 t *CSR t     -0.000  




FAC2 t      0.380*** 
      (5.69) 
FAC2 t *CSR t      
-
0.009*** 












 (-5.64) (-5.67) (-5.90) (-5.94) (-6.15) (-6.23) 
N 3270 3270 3270 3270 3270 3270 
Loglikelihood -4188.78 -4223.32 -4211.51 -4219.64 -4216.13 -4206.86 
R Square 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41 
Adjusted R Square 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Note: The dependent variable is the investment, measured for year t +1; independent variable and control 
variables for year t. CSRHet1 predicted value of CSR from the first stage of 2SLS regression. ATTEN is a 
dummy variable if the industry-level mean of the firm number of analysts’ attention is smaller than twenty-
quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. REPOR is a dummy variable if the industry-level mean of 
the firm number of analysts’ reporting is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 
0. OVERS is a dummy variable if the industry-level sum of firms with oversea auditing firms is smaller than 
twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 0. Big 4 is a dummy variable if the industry-level 
mean of firms with Big 4 auditing firms is smaller than twenty-quantile of this variable, we code it as 1, otherwise 
0. CSRHet1 are predicted CSR value from the first stage of the 2sls model. Robust t-statistics corrected for 




Figure 2-1: Theoretical Framework 
 
















Figure 2-3: Interaction Effect of Analysts Reporting and CSR on Investment 
 



















Appendix Table 2-1: Variables Description 
Variables Description Resource 
DV: Firm’s Investment  Cash payment (yearly growth) for fixed assets, 
intangible assets, and other long-term assets 
from the cash flow statement scaled by the 
beginning book value of total assets. We use the 
log of this value in our regression analyses. 
(McLean et al. 2012); (Gulen and 
Ion 2015); (Chen et al. 2011); (Chen 
et al. 2017) 
Data from CSMAR database 
Alternative Investment Cash payment (yearly growth) for fixed assets, 
intangible assets, and other long-term assets 
from the cash flow statement scaled by the 
beginning book value of net fixed assets.  
Data from CSMAR database 
IV: Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
The score of CSR investment. (Marquis and Qian 2014) 
Data from Rankins CSR Rating 
(RKS) database 
Moderating variables   
Analysts’ attention The industry-level mean of firm’s analysts’ 
attention 
(Wang, Cao, and Ye 2018) 
Data from CSMAR database 
Analysts’ reporting The industry-level mean of firm’s analysts’ 
reporting 
(Wang et al. 2018) 
Data from CSMAR database 
Big Four Dummy The industry-level sum of the firm’s auditing 
firm from Big 4 
(Li et al. 2019) 
Data from CSMAR database 
Oversea Audit Dummy The industry-level sum of the firm’s auditing 
firm from oversea  
(Li et al. 2019) 




The market value of equity, the book value of 
non-tradable shares and liabilities, divided by 
book value of total assets. 
(Chen et al. 2011);  
(McLean et al. 2012);  
(Bhandari and Javakhadze 2017); 
(Gulen and Ion 2015) 
Data from CSMAR database 
Control variables:   
Financial performance Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization scaled by total asset. 
(Paeleman and Vanacker 2015) 
Data from CSMAR database 
Debt financing Yearly change of debt issuance scaled by 
beginning total assets. 
(McLean et al. 2012); 
Data from CSMAR database 
Equity financing Yearly change in book equity minus the change 
in retained earnings, all scaled by beginning 
assets. 
(McLean et al. 2012); 
Data from CSMAR database 
Size  The log of the number of firm employees. Data from CSMAR database 
Cash flow Net income plus R&D and depreciation and 
amortization, all scaled by the beginning of the 
year’s book value of assets. 
(McLean et al. 2012); 
(Bhandari and Javakhadze 2017); 
(Chen et al. 2011); 
Data from CSMAR 
Alternative cash flow Net income plus R&D and depreciation and 
amortization, all scaled by the beginning of the 
year’s book value of fixed assets. 
Data from CSMAR 
Age  Observation year minus IPO year Data from CSMAR 
State Ownership A dummy variable: if State control 1; otherwise 
0. 
Data from CSMAR 
GDP Per Capita Total Gross Domestic Production divided by 
the total number of people in a certain province. 
Data from WIND 
 
Year effect and industry 
effect 
The dummy variable of year and industry 
(Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) industry code with two-digit 
Specification). 




CHAPTER3: Benefits of Walk the Talk: How CSR experience developed at home influence EM-
SOEs’ location portfolio of international investment 
 
ABSTRACT 
Building on the emerging importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to the overall strategy of 
firms, this paper explores the role of CSR in firm-level experience development and its reflection on the 
firm’s internationalization performance. In a dual of home-host setting, this study examines how CSR 
capability helps emerging market state-owned enterprises (EM-SOEs) to offset the legitimacy liabilities 
of investing abroad. Based on springboard viewpoint and absorptive capacity, we argue that in order to 
be able to enter into the developed host countries for asset and knowledge access, EM-SOEs need to 
engage in CSR activities at home to develop their managerial awareness and organizational capabilities 
in meeting the stringent expectations of the stakeholders in those developed economies. We further argue 
that EM-SOEs can more efficiently develop CSR experience through engaging in CSR activities at home 
in a manner with larger intervals and through focusing on limited dimensions of CSR activities; the 
developed CSR experience through CSR activities at home can be less useful when entering the host 
country with more considerable institutional distance. Nevertheless, EM-SOEs with stronger 
international experience can better utilize the CSR experience in adding host countries of high CSR 
requirements into their location portfolio. Based on a sample of all Chinese publicly listed SOEs between 
2009 and 2015, we found support for our arguments. 





Studies on foreign direct investment (FDI) have long argued that each country has economic, 
institutional, and cultural barriers (Johanson and Vahlne 2003). These barriers include information 
asymmetries and transaction costs, lack of access to local resources (Hymer 1976), distance impeding 
decision making (Kindleberger 1969), which will generate liabilities of foreignness for MNEs to restrain 
their entry into the host market (Nachum 2003; Zaheer 1995). Correspondingly, firms have to possess 
valuable resources and capabilities, such as technologies, brand names and other know-how knowledge 
in order to climb these market barriers (Dunning 1993; Johanson and Vahlne 1977; Tseng, Tansuhaj, 
Hallagan and McCullough 2007).  
Nowadays, MNEs face new legitimation challenges from social and environmental issues 
(Johanson and Vahlne 2009; Lundan 2010; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, and Eden 2006); for example, 
studies have proposed that firms need the “social-license-to-operate” (SLO) (e.g., Gunningham, Kagan 
and Thornton 2004). With the advent of an intergovernmental organization, the United national Guiding 
Principles (UNGP), SLO began to move beyond the scope of social and human rights and touch the 
border concept of CSR concerns (Buhmann 2016). As the adverse effect of transnational economic 
behavior from MNEs becomes salient in different countries, SLO has become an important issue that 
forms an agenda in governmental regulation which constitutes soft, hard, and mixed forms of 
enforcement (Buhmann 2016). The process of gradually incorporating a more regulated, enforced, and 
legal action into SLO indicates that global stakeholders have intensely perceived the social and human 
rights concept or, in a broader sense, CSR concept. MNEs, therefore, may face the increasing level of 
challenges in terms of social value evaluation or business conduct standards required by host-country 




and Narula 2011).  
Facing these non-market barriers of host countries, we believe that MNEs need to possess similar 
non-market experience in order to be able to overcome these barriers. It has been argued that firms are 
heterogeneous with regards to the non-market experience, result in making different strategic choices 
and achieving different levels of performance (Boubakri et al. 2013; Claessens et al. 2008; Faccio 2006; 
Faccio et al. 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer- Gee 2006). In order to be able to enter the host countries with 
higher non-market barriers, such as a higher level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) requirements, 
MNEs need to develop to some extent non-market experience, such as CSR experience, at home. 
Such tension is particularly salient for emerging market state-owned enterprises (EM-SOEs), as 
they face additional legitimation challenges to enter foreign markets from a weak legitimacy of “state 
ownership.” For example, they are more often perceived as less caring socially and environmentally 
responsible issues (Doh, Husted, and Yang 2016; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Marano, Tashman and 
Kostova 2017), obtaining unfair competitive advantage and potential threats to national security because 
of support from the home government (Cui and Jiang 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, and Zhang 2014). Besides, 
EM-MNEs generally lack experience and information in dealing with social and environmental issues, 
as the administrative requirements for CSR are often relatively lower in emerging markets (Lee 2011; 
Yang and Rivers 2009; Reiman, Rauer, and Kaufmann 2015), and they are latecomers in international 
markets (Coervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti 2014). Our study investigates how CSR experience as one 
crucial dimension of non-market experience developed at home influences EM-SOEs’ location choice. 
Given the institutional voids in emerging economic context (Khanna and Palepu 1997; Marano, 
Tashman, and Kostova 2017), EM-MNEs are likely to escape their institutional environment and use 




their capability void, which eventually increase their global competitiveness (Li, Li and Shapio 2012; 
Luo and Tuang 2007, 2018). However, the advanced technological capability and know-how experience 
in the developed institutional environment also requires a higher level of CSR standards (Baughn, Bodie, 
and McIntosh 2007). As such, Chinese firms may face a stringent legitimacy challenge from host 
countries due to their lack of experience and time in engaging CSR in their home country (Yang and 
Rivers, 2009; Reiman et al. 2015. We, therefore, suppose that faced with such legitimacy challenges in 
the eyes of more developed host-country stakeholders, firms in the emerging market need to engage in 
CSR activity to overcome host-country institutional requirements and pursue their strategic asset-
seeking and knowledge-seeking motivation in more developed economies (Gaffney, Karst, and Clampit 
2016; Gubbi and Elango 2016). 
Prior studies have highlighted the importance of CSR activities for MNE to overcome these 
legitimation challenges (e.g., Campbell, Eden and Miller 2012; Husted, Montiel, and Christmann 2016; 
Rathert 2016). However, all these studies emphasize the CSR activities in the host country but ignore 
the other part of the picture that EM-MNEs need to deal with legitimacy challenges in the eyes of 
international stakeholders in order to fulfill their motivation of entering host countries with high CSR 
requirements. We build the link between the CSR activities at home and CSR expectations of 
stakeholders at the host country by arguing that EM-MNEs like Chinese MNEs need to engage in CSR 
activities intensively to demonstrate their capability and motivation to live up to the expectations of 
developed host-country requirement. Furthermore, such capability is essential in overcoming global 
stakeholders’ legitimacy challenges before they invest in more developed foreign countries. Indeed, it 
is not rare that poorly perceived or implemented CSR activities can diminish stakeholders’ perceptions 




comprehend, and respond to the demands of local stakeholders (Gardberg and Fombrun 2006). On the 
one hand, CSR experience is path-dependent (Hart 1995; Hart and Dowell 2011) that “lack of investment 
in an area of expertise early on may foreclose the future development of a technical capability in that 
area” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990: 128). 
On the other hand, CSR is a global issue in nature that shows considerable varieties across locations 
(Rodriguez et al. 2006), not only in stakeholder expectations and government approaches (Kolk and 
Pinkse 2008) but also in the locus and scope of potentially significant, unpredictable impacts (Stern 
2006). MNEs from more different regulatory environments, especially for EM-SOEs, should, therefore, 
have less experience to comply with social requirements in the host country (Campbell, Eden and Miller 
2012). As a result, investment in countries with a higher level of CSR requirement requires firms’ 
stronger motivation and capability of engaging in CSR to successfully achieve legitimacy from 
stakeholders at the host market.  
In this study, we use EM-SOEs as the theoretical sample. We argue that in order to achieve 
legitimacy from stakeholders at the host country with a higher level of CSR requirements, EM-SOEs 
need to possess CSR capability to identify, meet and even exceed societal expectations concerning 
concerns about the social and environmental issues at the host countries. Based on a dynamic learning 
perspective (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997), CSR capability, as path-dependent and embedded 
capabilities, are socially complicated and specific to organizations so that EM-SOEs need to engage in 
CSR activities in advance at home to develop CSR experience before they go abroad. We argue that the 
more efforts invested in CSR activities at home, the more opportunities to go through the stakeholder 
expectations’ identification and delivery process, which leads to the stronger CSR capability developed 




to be able to enter the host country with a higher level of CSR requirements. 
We further argue that if firms conduct CSR activities more strategically, they can develop more 
CSR experience through engaging in the same intensity of CSR efforts in a focused and consistent 
manner. We also point out the constraining conditions of CSR experience developed at home 
institutional environments. Because of the context-specific nature of CSR issues (Campbell, Eden and 
Miller 2012), we find the effect of CSR experience developed based at CSR activities at home is less 
effective in the host country with more considerable institutional distance, as there might be higher 
possibilities the CSR requirements and expectations are different in the different institutional 
environment. However, such constraining effect because of context-specific challenges will reduce if 
EM-SOEs possess secure international experience so that they can better utilize their developed home-
based CSR experience in an international context.   
Our study has three main contributions to the CSR and internationalization of EM-SOEs literature. 
First, our study advances understanding of the location choice of EM-SOEs by exploring the impact of 
CSR experience. We present one of the first studies focusing on the non-market barriers at the host 
country and investigating the impact of CSR experience on firms’ entrance of the host countries with 
high non-market barriers. We argue that in order to achieve legitimacy from stakeholders to enter the 
host country with a higher level of CSR requirements, firms need to possess, to some extent, CSR 
experience to identify, meet and even exceed their expectations. Previous studies have considered the 
importance of firm-specific advantages to help firms overcome liabilities of foreignness (Eden and 
Miller 2004; Hymer 1960, 1976; Zaheer 2002); however, they mainly emphasize on market-based 
aspects, mostly based on the possession and use of certain intangible assets that arise from their 





Second, our study advances the learning perspective to CSR research by specifying how to develop 
CSR experience through engaging CSR activities at home (Hart1995; Hart and Dowell 2011). Through 
focusing on how to develop CSR capability, our study responds to the recent call to investigate how 
MNEs build up the learning process (Lundan and Li 2018). We argue that through engaging CSR 
activities at home, firms can develop managerial attention and awareness, and organizational capabilities 
in dealing with expectations of stakeholders. Moreover, we investigate how firms can efficiently develop 
CSR capability and explore under what conditions firms’ CSR capability developed at home can be 
applied in international markets. We also shed light on the measurement of CSR performance of host 
country by using the entry into markets with higher CSR requirements as the indicator. The measurement 
of host-country CSR is exceptionally relevant to international business development as more and more 
countries are adopting Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and institutionalizing sustainability 
concerns. 
Lastly, our study contributes to the recent research on the internationalization of EM-SOEs, 
especially on their legitimation challenges to enter foreign markets (e.g., Doh, Husted, and Yang 2016; 
Marano, Tashman and Kostova 2017). Prior studies emphasize on the CSR activities at the host market 
after EM-MNEs enter into the foreign markets. We switch the focus of CSR activities at the host country 
to the home country and focus on the pre-entry situation. Our study shows that engaging CSR activities 
at home are a crucial bridge to foreign markets with a higher level of requirements. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Knowledge and strategic asset-seeking motivation of EM-SOEs’ internationalization 




resources to enter the foreign market. However, the emergence of Chinese OFDI seems not to comply with 
the model of OLI due to the absence of world-class managerial resources and capabilities (Barnard 2010), 
leading to the missing element of O (Gammeltoft, Barnard, and Madhok 2010; Mathews 2006). For example, 
Chinese firms experience the technological disadvantages in manufacturing industries such as semiconductor 
and engine field and the lack of managerial capacities (Peng, 2012). Facing these competitive disadvantages, 
EM-MNEs need to advance their know-how experience from a more developed economy and combine them 
with their original knowledge to improve their global competitive advantages (Luo and Tung 2007 2018). 
Thus, studies have proposed the springboard perspective Luo and Tung (2007 2018) to illustrate the 
phenomenon of emerging market firm’s foreign investment from a knowledge-seeking motivation 
perspective, which is more appropriate for the Chinese market OFDI phenomenon that characterized as an 
aggressive nature (Kumar et al. 2019). 
Springboard perspective posits that due to the lack of international experience and being the later comers 
of the global market, emerging-market firms may not effectively compete with global players who have 
longer international trajectories (Contractor, Kumar, and Kundu 2007). As a result, they have a stronger 
tendency and motivation to acquire strategic assets and obtain know-how experience from more developed 
economies with longer institutional distance (Gaffney, Karst, and Clampit 2016; Gubbi and Elango 2016) 
and compensate their capability voids in home country (Luo and Tung 2018). It is not an easy task per se for 
firms to get confirmed from international stakeholders due to the liability of foreignness and liability of origin. 
Therefore, in the following part, we will argue that EM firms need to develop their CSR capability to satisfy 
the challenges of legitimation before moving into the global market to achieve their knowledge-seeking and 
strategic asset-seeking motivation.  




Most FDI theories assume that MNEs face the liabilities of foreignness that restrains their entry 
into the international market (Nachum 2003; Zaheer 1995). In more specific, the liability of foreignness 
includes the information asymmetries, transaction costs (Hymer 1976), distance impeding decision 
making (Kindleberger 1969), and lack of access to local resources (Hymer 1976). The sources of 
liabilities of foreignness identified so far are mainly from the market field. However, with the market 
complexities increasing, the global business landscape has changed so profoundly that MNEs face new 
legitimation challenges from social and environmental issues (Johanson and Vahlne 2009; Lundan 2010; 
Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, and Eden 2006).  
In today’s competitive business climate, the business faces increasing pressures from international 
stakeholders to take the initiative and recognize its social responsibilities (Carroll and Shabana 2010; 
Mohan 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2008; Thorne et al. 2011; Torugsa, O’Donohue, and Hecker 2012). 
Increasingly more and more countries and regions mandate or specify certain aspects of CSR for firms 
to operate in their territories (Wang, Tong, Takeuchi, and George 2016). Furthermore, the CSR 
requirements show considerable varieties across locations - not only in stakeholder expectations and 
government approaches (Kolk and Pinkse 2008) but also in the locus and scope of potentially significant, 
unpredictable impacts (Stern 2006). As firms enter foreign markets, they face increased litigation risk 
from violating (unfamiliar) societal and regulatory requirements (Attig, Boubakri, Ghoul, and Guedhami 
2016). 
The issue of social-license-to-operate (SLO) becomes a way to respond to institutional challenges 
in new institutional environments from natural resources industries (Prno and Slocombe 2012; Prno and 
Slocombe 2012). Firms in natural-resource industries like mining or oil need to obtain SLO from host 




2006). Due to the costs and potential risks incurred by EM-MNEs, the intergovernmental organization, 
UNGP, began to set formal standards towards CSR to solve the issue adverse effects of EM-MNEs 
activities (Buhmann 2016). In other words, the method UNGP uses to solve the adverse effects of EM-
MNEs become more formalized as CSR implementation begin to subject to both soft (voluntary) and 
hard (compulsory) forms of action (Kinley and Nolan 2007). For instance, the UNGP requires the public 
authorities to protect business’s SLO or CSR through smart, soft, and detailed guidance (Buhmann 2016), 
which forms the increased level of non-market challenges for EM-MNEs who want to search advanced 
host economies. 
 
 UNGP principle 3 and its commentary explain that states should not only enforce laws 
requiring companies to respect human rights. They should also ensure that corporate 
law and policies for setting up and operating businesses enable rather than constrain 
business respect for human rights. ... For example, states may provide guidance for 
companies on how to respect human rights and may complement this by encouraging 
or even requiring companies to communicate how they address their human rights 
impact. ... were adopted by both the EU for the 2011 Communication and the Danish 
government for its CSR communication requirements (2016: 711). 
 
These additional legitimation challenges from social and environmental issues are more salient for 
MNEs from emerging markets to enter into the foreign markets (Doh, Husted, and Yang 2016; Kostova 
and Zaheer 1999; Marano, Tashman and Kostova 2017; Pinkse and Kolk 2012; Ramachandran and Pant 
2010). In general, emerging economies are latecomers in dealing with social and environmental issues 
because the administrative requirements for CSR are often relatively lower in emerging markets than 
the ones in developed markets (Lee 2011; Yang and Rivers 2009; Reiman, Rauer, and Kaufmann 2015). 
As a result, the EM-MNEs often lack the essential information and experiences in conducting CSR 




protection, in both Europe and the US, since their home countries have high pollution emission but no 
binding reduction targets (Pinkse and Kolk 2012). Among EM-MNEs, SOEs face even stronger 
legitimation challenges because the state ownership has been considered as channels to obtain unfair 
competitive advantage and potential threats to national security because of support from the home 
government (Cui and Jiang 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, and Zhang 2014). 
As a result of facing these legitimation challenges for EM-SOEs, they encounter higher barriers to 
enter into the foreign markets, especially the host country with higher social and environmental 
requirements. Prior studies have introduced CSR activities as an essential way for firms to overcome 
these legitimation challenges (e.g., Campbell, Eden and Miller 2012; Husted, Montiel, and Christmann 
2016; Rathert 2016). However, previous studies emphasize the CSR activities in the host country and 
focus on the effect on firms after entering the host market. Promoted by developed market’s know-how 
and strategic asset purposes, we argue that possessing CSR capabilities becomes essential in entering 
into host countries with stringent entry barriers and high stakeholder expectations.  
CSR capability and Legitimacy  
In a four-factor model of organizational learning proposed by Daspit and D ’ Souza (2013), 
exploitation is the final stage following acquisition, assimilation, and transformation. In the 
internationalization literature, exploitation means firms would find the right destination for the firm-
specific advantages. 
Although legitimacy could be a goal to attain for MNEs, it is not an inactive status; instead, 
according to the two main perspectives on legitimacy, strategic and institutional, the legitimation 
dynamics involves organizational efforts and is a result of interactions between the organization and the 




how to strategically integrate, deploy, and orchestrate resources forms the basis of competitive 
advantage (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Barney 1991). Despite the gradually accumulating empirical 
evidence on the existence of CSR-related capabilities, such as shared vision, stakeholder management 
and strategic proactivity (Torugsa, O’Donohue and Hecker 2012), the current international business 
literature has mostly ignored the CSR capability. 
Legitimacy represents “an umbrella evaluation” that “transcends specific adverse acts or 
occurrences” (Suchman 1995: 574). Being aware of such acts or occurrences and, in particular, how to 
generate such social legitimacy could be one of the core capabilities that companies practicing CSR 
should acquire. Walking a fine line between theories and practices, the “social-license-to-operate” 
literature (e.g., Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2004) suggests that the collective expectations of 
stakeholders are the frontline of legitimacy. In the context of internationalization, to achieve legitimacy 
from stakeholders at the host country, it is arguable that EM-MNEs need to possess CSR capability to 
identify, meet and even exceed societal expectations for concerns about the social and environmental 
issues. However, EM-MNEs from more different regulatory environments usually have less capability 
to comply with social requirements in the host country (Campbell, Eden and Miller 2012). As a result, 
it is not always the case that EM-SOEs can successfully achieve legitimacy from stakeholders at the 
host market by merely following local CSR practices. 
Business norms and standards, and stakeholder demand for CSR can vary substantially across 
regions and lines of business as well as across countries (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, and Eden 2006). 
As a result, going international requires more experience in identifying and understanding the needs and 
expectations of stakeholders in the host country. At the same time, CSR requirements are also changing 




managerial attention and awareness of CSR issues.  
In addition to the experience of identifying the CSR requirements from local stakeholders, firms 
should also be able to deliver these requirements and meet the needs of stakeholders. For example, 
environmental protection requires the availability of physical and technological resources through 
redesigning their production process (Buchholz 1993). Human resource considerations are also highly 
involved in CSR practices (Husted and Allen 2006), as firms should cultivate employees’ participation 
and cooperation in CSR. In summary, the experience of engaging in CSR is a common set of cognitive 
and managerial abilities that firms gained through the learning process in dealing with CSR issues. 
The exploitation of CSR Capability 
Such CSR capability cannot be taken for granted, as the ability to conduct the right CSR activities 
is often “path-dependent” and is “embedded” in the company’s accumulated experience (Barney 1996; 
Hart 1995; Hart and Dowell 2011; Teece et al. 1997). The engagement in social, environmental, and 
governance issues are thus become a prerequisite to developing such CSR capability. Following this 
logic, we argue that through conducting CSR activities at home, EM-MNEs can develop their 
managerial attention and awareness, and organizational experience in dealing with expectations of 
stakeholders at the host country, which helps them obtain legitimacy to enter the host country.  
The characteristics of the home country of EM-MNEs provide a good avenue for them to develop 
their CSR capability needed to achieve legitimacy from international stakeholders through engaging in 
CSR activities. Firstly, engaging CSR at home can help EM-SOEs develop sensing experience to 
identify the needs and expectations of various stakeholders. Engaging CSR can allow EM-SOEs to put 
CSR in a place of strategic importance within the firm’s agenda and to align practices with stakeholder 




2012). In this case, a higher level of CSR investments at home means that the firm puts CSR at priority 
in its strategic agenda, which gives its managers a deeper understanding of a situation and a clearer 
picture of what they should do (Wright et al. 2013). The characteristics of emerging markets can also 
provide an avenue for firms to quickly and effectively develop their CSR capability when they engage 
in CSR activities. Chan, Makino, and Isobe (2010) argue that there are more considerable variations 
within countries at emerging markets, which makes firms face different institutions and requirements of 
CSR policies and priorities. Engaging CSR activities in such diverse institutional environments allows 
EM-SOEs to practice how to effectively manage different stakeholders and institutional pressures 
(Lundan and Li 2018). This experience developed in diverse institutional environments may also help 
the EM-SOEs realize the relative importance of diverse stakeholders’ expectations and practice their 
stakeholder expectations’ sensing capability in more developed host countries (Greenwood, Raynard, 
Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury 2011). 
It also has been argued that the institutional environment in the emerging market is far away from 
stable (Haveman et al. 2016). Facing this dynamic and complex environment, firms can practice their 
skills in interpreting CSR policy and developing programs based on their interpretation of salient 
stakeholders and the requirements of their CSR policy and strategy (Cantrell, Kyriazis, and Noble 2014). 
Such experience of engaging CSR at home can make EM-SOEs’ managers more sensitive to different 
stakeholder expectations, and by extension, able to detect and correctly interpret illegitimacy risks and 
take action to combat them (Marano, Tashman, and Kostova 2017). Due to dynamic changes, EM-SOEs 
can also have more opportunities to go through the stakeholder expectation sensing process more 
frequently. This process of sensing the stakeholder expectation is likely to foster organizational learning 




(Nelson and Winter 1982; Zhou and Guillen 2015) that in turn become the building blocks of the learning 
process (Lundan and Li 2018).  
Secondly, through engaging CSR at home, EM-SOEs develop the organizational capacity to deliver 
the needs and expectations of various stakeholders. Through engaging CSR activities at home, the top 
management team would emphasize its desire to all staff and provide them with suitable training (Hart 
1995; Shrivastava 1995). The process of training and firm-level emphasis will likely cultivate the 
knowledge about social and environmental issues (Ashford 1993), which will be potentially useful in 
foreign subsidiaries. The higher level of engagements in CSR also means possibly more CSR related 
training and practice opportunities for their employees at home, which increases employees’ abilities in 
understanding, planning, and implementing CSR activities. Through engaging in CSR activities, EM-
SOEs can develop deepened environmental knowledge, developed technologies, and improved 
competence in addressing environmental issues (Dean and Brown 1995; Groenwegen and Vergragt 
1991). Engaging in CSR activities consumes time and resources (Tang, Hull, and Rothenberg 2012), as 
firms from emerging markets typically lack resources and capabilities, failure of putting CSR in firms’ 
strategic agenda may hinder the organizational CSR learning process. 
Previous literature suggests that substantial CSR programs are not easy to implement. It might 
require expensive and risky investments in new equipment and processes (Bansal and Kistrick 2006), a 
high level of expertise and knowledge on the specifics of these practices, and, more importantly, how to 
design and implement these actions (Marano, Tashman, and Kostova 2017). Due to the path-dependence 
nature of organizational learning, the organizational experience in addressing CSR issues and 
requirements, firms need to invest and develop in such capability in advance. In this situation, the higher 




environmental related technologies. The availability of physical and technological resources will 
enhance manufacturers’ ability to prevent environmental pollution by redesigning their production 
process (Buchholz 1993). To satisfy the demand for CSR, firms have to devote resources and capability 
will be developed in this process. For instance, additional capital on pollution control equipment would 
help to achieve an environmental standard beyond that required by the law (McWilliams and Siegel 
2001). As a result, EM-SOEs can develop more organizational capacity to meet the higher expectations 
and requirements of stakeholders at the host market. 
In sum, engaging CSR activities at home can promote firms’ CSR experience, which equips EM-
SOEs with the skillset to achieve the legitimacy of international stakeholders by identifying and meeting 
their needs. For EM-SOEs, if they want to enter into host countries with higher levels of CSR 
requirements and standards, they need to develop more CSR capability at home through a higher level 
of engagements in CSR activities. 
Hypothesis1: The more efforts invested in CSR activities at home, the more likely EM-SOEs can enter 
the host countries with higher CSR requirements. 
The Development Process of CSR Capability at Home  
The development of a firm capability of CSR often involves long-term efforts, where the process 
of development becomes relevant. Previous studies in the international expansion area have identified 
temporal patterns that may result in different levels of economic performance (e.g., Vermeulen and 
Barkema 2002). The effectiveness of developing CSR experience could be affected not only by how 
much the firm spend on CSR by targeting environment and social performance, but also by the pattern 
of spending. Firms investing in CSR activities frequently face decisions on whether and how to spread 




Being aware of the many aspects of impacts a firm could have, the expectations of stakeholders on 
the firm are increasing. It is up to the firm to prioritize some area(s) of CSR and even create expertise 
in these areas. The strategic school of CSR argues that firms must align their CSR efforts with their core 
business and concentrate on specific vital themes instead of dispersing the money all over the place. As 
different dimensions of CSR differ significantly (Porter and Kramer 2002), simultaneously engaging in 
different dimensions makes EM-SOEs challenging to understand the requirements of the collection of 
operations and to respond to demands appropriately. Meyer and Scott (1983) argue that the diversity and 
inconsistency of an organization’s accounts will negatively affect how it is to function. Hence, the 
moderating effect of the scope of CSR activities on the relation between CSR investment and the 
likelihood of the firm entering a high-CSR-standard host country is negative. 
Hypothesis 2a: The positive relationship between CSR investments at home and the likelihood of EM-
SOEs entering host countries with higher CSR requirements is weaker if the firm disperses its CSR 
efforts in a wider scope of themes. 
Based on a dynamic capability perspective, to better develop the CSR experience from CSR 
engagement, MNEs need first to absorb the diverse knowledge and then to recombine it with their 
established knowledge base (Lundan and Li 2018), which usually takes time. A larger interval after 
intensive CSR engaging (instead of consistent CSR investments) can allow EM-MNEs to take time to 
digest and reflect what they have learned and developed. In contrast, a consistent investment manner 
may overstretch top managers’ absorptive capacity and push them to cognitive limits that inhibit efficient 
learning and capacity building (Vermeulen and Barkema 2002).  
Besides, due to the limitation of the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1994), even 




investment to experience. So that firms can better be focusing on absorbing and developing experience 
through some “off” time. To better leverage the CSR investment, such investments would appear to be 
irregular. Hence, we expect that the irregular temporal pattern of CSR investments would be a more 
effective way of capability building through CSR, in particular when the engagement level is high.  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive relationship between CSR investments at home and the likelihood of EM-
SOEs entering host countries with higher CSR requirements is stronger if the firm has taken a longer 
interval between CSR investments (that appears to be a more irregular temporal pattern or lack of 
rhythm).  
The utilization of CSR experience developed at home in internationalization  
Above, we have argued that how EM-SOEs efficiently develop CSR experience needed through 
engaging in CSR activities at home to enter into the host country with higher CSR requirements. 
However, CSR is a global issue in nature that shows considerable varieties across locations (Rodriguez 
et al. 2006), there might be dissimilar regulatory environments for social and environmental 
requirements in different countries (Campbell, Eden and Miller 2012). Based on RBV, a resource or 
capability that is valuable in a particular context might fail to have the same value in a different context 
(Collis and Montgomery 1995:120). We would argue that the extent to which a firm can benefit from its 
internationalization depends on the benefits they will perceive from previous experience. 
On the one hand, previously possessed international experience may help EM-SOEs better 
understand the host-country stakeholders’ needs and expectations due to the stronger sensing capacity 
of diverse needs from different stakeholders. On the other hand, previously developed CSR experience 
may have a dampening effect due to the decreased level of marginal return. 




legitimacy challenge view  
Institutions across countries vary in how they shape firms’ CSR practices that issue salience and 
stakeholder power could be very different in a given issue field (Rathert, 2016). Considering the path-
dependent nature of CSR experience (Hart 1995; Hart and Dowell 2011), CSR experience developed 
through engaging CSR activities back at the home country are mainly responding to the social, 
environmental, and governance issues based on home country institutional environment, so that we can 
argue CSR experience is context-specific. As prior international business literature argued, the 
knowledge generated in one context has less applicability when applied across borders (Delios and 
Beamish 2001; Madhok 1997), which also applies to CSR knowledge. In this situation, if EM-SOEs aim 
to enter the host country with more significant institutional distance, they may face significantly 
different CSR demands and preferences, where they find it will be more challenging to utilize their 
home-based CSR experience in the host country.  
Rodriguez and his colleagues (2006) have argued that business norms and standards, and 
stakeholder demand for CSR practices can vary substantially among countries with different institutional 
environments. Even though through engaging CSR activities at home, EM-SOEs have developed their 
managerial attention and awareness in dealing with expectations of stakeholders at the host country, 
their skills and experience in identifying stakeholders’ needs are based on their interpretation of salient 
stakeholders and requirements of CSR policies at the home institutional environment. The significantly 
different preferences and demands from stakeholders at the host country with more significant 
institutional distance may challenge firms’ abilities to interpret their needs, even though they have such 
awareness and motivations to do so. Besides, the organizational experience to deal with the expectations 




institutional environments. For example, the investment in new environmental technologies based on 
home institutional requirements may not be accepted by the host country stakeholders with more 
significant institutional distance.  
Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between the efforts invested in CSR activities at home and the 
likelihood to be able to enter the host countries with higher CSR requirements becomes weaker if the 
EM-SOEs are entering the host country with more significant institutional distance. 
The prompting effect of more significant institutional distance between home and host country: a 
springboard view  
However, from the CSR motivation aspect, the springboard perspective suggests that EM-MNEs 
are more likely to enter developed host countries with advanced technology and experience (Luo and 
Tung 2007, 2018). Because developed host economies may provide them with more advanced 
technology, branding strategy, international governance, and knowledge (Dau, 2013), EM-MNEs could 
combine this advanced knowledge with their original capability and more effectively compete with 
global competitors and overcome the drawback of latecomers (Kedia, Gaffney, and Clampit 2012; Li, 
Li, and Shapiro 2012). As the institutional development level difference such as economic freedom, 
social and technological development correlates with CSR requirement difference (Baughn et al. 2007), 
countries with advanced institutional development may also have a higher level of CSR requirement. 
The motivation of EM-MNEs’ CSR engagement in the home country is to increase their social 
legitimacy in the eyes of host-country stakeholders and enter the host country with higher CSR 
requirements. From this perspective, the longer the institutional distance, the more these EM-SOEs will 
feel that it is imperative to enter host countries with longer institutional distance with higher CSR 




requirement relationship will be stronger. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between the efforts invested in CSR activities at home and the 
likelihood to be able to enter the host countries with higher CSR requirements will be stronger if the 
EM-SOEs are entering the host country with more significant institutional distance. 
The facilitating effect of prior international experience: a legitimacy challenge view 
Prior international experience has been considered as an essential capability to help firms to adapt 
to the host market (e.g., Delios and Beamish 2001; Kostova 1999). We argue that prior international 
experience can help EM-SOEs better understand the host country situation, which allows EM-SOEs to 
better adapt their home-based CSR experience in the new context. Prior international exposure allows 
firms to develop an experience of dealing with different customers, political frameworks, institutions, 
rules and norms (Zhang, Li, and Zhou 2010), which helps them to develop an experience of adapting 
their established organizational routines into the new context (Corredoira and McDermott 2014). 
Following this argument, we believe that prior international experience can facilitate EM-SOEs to utilize 
better their home-country based CSR experience in the international market.  
Prior international entry experience allows EM-SOEs to experience the process of entry, which 
includes the process of obtaining the legitimacy and license of the stakeholders in the host country. Even 
though EM-SOEs may enter a different host country, prior experience of communicating and interacting 
with host stakeholders gives them knowledge of how to better understand and identify the needs of local 
stakeholders in the new market. Companies with more international experience tend to have managers 
who are more cognizant of cross-cultural differences (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). They are, therefore, 
more likely to have competence in developing and implementing appropriate CSR programs that fall 




condition, EM-SOEs can better apply their home-based CSR experience based on the new context. 
Besides, the successful entry experience may have pushed EM-SOEs to develop organizational 
capabilities in dealing with social and environmental requirements at international standards.  
Hypothesis 4a: The positive relationship between the efforts invested in CSR activities at home and the 
likelihood to be able to enter the host countries with higher CSR requirements becomes stronger if the 
EM-SOEs possess international experience. 
The constraining effect of prior international experience: a springboard view 
The view of international springboard suggests that due to the benefits of entering host counties 
with technological capabilities, know-how knowledge (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor 2010; 
Luo and Tung 2007, 2018), EM-MNEs will likely to be attracted into these economies. However, the 
more firms get involved in the global market with higher technological advantages, know-how 
experience, the fewer benefits they will receive from such internationalization because firms may be 
locked into the predetermined trajectories with dampened marginal benefits (Bruton, Oviatt, and White 
1994). This phenomenon prevails in a firm’s internationalization in terms of first-mover behavior and 
catch-up strategy (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgård, and Sharma 2000; Lorenzen and Mudambi 2012; 
Mueller 1997).  
Therefore, compared with firms with previous international experience, strongly institutional 
embedded firms may feel that it will be more imperative to engage in internationalization and learn new 
know-how experience in developed economies than those firms who have already been to those 
countries. We, therefore, argue that the previous international experience will likely have a dampening 
effect on firms’ tendency of internationalization and negatively impact the home CSR – host country 




choose the home country as their operating preferences instead of entering a host country with high CSR 
requirements. Therefore, the positive relationship between home-country CSR and host-country CSR 
requirement becomes weaker for firms with previous international experience. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4b: The positive relationship between the efforts invested in CSR activities at home and the 
likelihood to be able to enter the host countries with higher CSR requirements becomes weaker if the 
EM-SOEs possess previous international experience. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample and Data 
Our panel dataset comprises OFDI by publicly listed SOEs from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
market in China from 2010-2016. China is the third-largest country of OFDI after the United States and 
Japan since 2010 (Pan et al., 2014). At the same time, Chinese SOEs play an active role in the 
international arena (Benito, Rygh, and Lunnan 2016), which have attracted scholars’ attention (Cuervo-
Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, and Ramaswamy 2014). As Chinese SOEs face legitimacy challenges (Cui 
and Jiang 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, and Zhang 2014), it is thus interesting and appropriate to use Chinese 
SOEs to investigate how CSR may determine a firm’s foreign investment location choice in China 
context. 
We firstly focus on firms’ newly-established foreign subsidiaries in a particular year (Xia, Ma, Lu, 
and Yiu 2014). We collect this information from the firms’ annual reports. We then identify the location 
of the newly established foreign subsidiaries. We drop firms’ foreign subsidiaries with a destination of 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Caribbean tax havens (Bermuda, Virgin Island, and Cayman Island) because 




Among 926 newly established OFDI by SOEs between 2010 to 2016, we have 109 state-owned 
enterprises who do foreign investment projects in different years, and they also may have multiple 
OFDIs in different locations in one specific year. As shown in Table 3-1, 76 countries are destinations 
of Chinese SOEs, with the United States, Singapore, Australia, Germany, Canada ranked as the five top 
destinations of Chinese SOEs’ OFDI. Japan, France, for example, are followed.  
[Insert Table 3-1 about here] 
We integrate our dataset with data sources, including China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database as the primary data source, China Statistic Year Book, WIND database and Rankins 
CSR rating (RKS), an independent third-party agency that dedicated to the evaluation of corporate 
socially responsible behavior. From the Social Sustainability Index (SSI) database, we obtain the level 
of host-country CSR requirements. We also include host-country variables from the Global 
Competitiveness Index Historical (GCI) Dataset19.  
Our dataset comprises 926 firm-year observations from 76 countries, with 622 and 304 
observations for foreign investment projects in developed and developing countries, respectively. After 
screening out missing observations of SOEs who do not engage in CSR activities, our final dataset 
consists of 525 firm-year-location observations during 2010-2016. We lagged one year for all 
independent variables to avoid possible reverse causality issues or endogeneity.  
Measurements  
Dependent variable 
We use the Social Sustainability Index (SSI) database20 as the measure of a host country’s CSR 
 
19 The website can be obtained from Appendix Table 3-1. 




requirements. This index evaluates the host country’s social wellbeing from the human, environmental 
and economic aspects. For each aspect, it has several specific items to display the host country’s 
emphasis on the general socially responsible issue. In sum, the host-country social responsibility index 
constitutes a composite reflection of three aspects within 21 sub-items. We calculate the arithmetic mean 
value of these three prominent aspects to represent the host country’s CSR requirement level.  
Independent variables  
The level of CSR efforts. We measure the invested efforts in CSR activities at home based on the 
score of CSR ratings from the Rankins (RKS) database. RKS is an independent third-party of the CSR 
rating agency. It evaluates firms’ corporate social behavior from three main dimensions within 63 sub-
items, which reflect the efforts companies invest in their CSR activities. We use the score of CSR from 
this database as the measurement of investment of CSR effort of Chinese SOEs, which is an accredited 
representation of CSR effort invested by a firm (Marquis and Qian 2014). In the robustness check part, 
we perform Two-stage least square (2sls) regression analyses to guarantee endogeneity caused by 
omitted variables does not drive our results. In the first stage of 2sls, we re-estimate the predicted value 
of CSR as a function of the firm-, industry-level variables and selected instrumental variables (city green 
space percentage, green space per capita and industry-level CSR are instrumental variables for the CSR 
score prediction in the first stage of 2sls modeling). We then use this predicted CSR from the first stage 
of 2sls as the new independent variable in checking the relationship between home country CSR and 
host country CSR requirements in the second stage. 
Moderating variables 
CSR Scope  




uncorrelated parts of overall CSR rating in previous literature (Hull and Rothenberg 2008; Marquis and 
Qian 2014; Mcwilliams and Siegel 2000; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; Russo and Fouts 1997; 
Waddock and Graves 1997). Directly comparing cross-sectional firms fails to take into consideration 
the firm’s heterogeneity issue (Brav, 2009). For the issue of CSR, firms in different industries may have 
different tendencies and motivations to engage in CSR (Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014). Following the 
method from Paeleman and Vanacker (2015), we generate our measurement of CSR scope as a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 when the sum of its 12-item CSR engagement dummy is above the sub-industry 
mean values in a specific year, otherwise 0.  
CSR Rhythm  
This variable shows the level of systematic, consistent, and regular changes in terms of a firm’s 
CSR activity during a period. Following the work from Vermeulen and Barkema (2002), we measure 
the firm’s engagement pattern of CSR as the rhythm, which is the kurtosis of its CSR score within each 
observation panel (Tang, Hull, and Rothenberg 2012). The higher values of the rhythm of CSR indicate 
more irregular CSR investment patterns and lower values indicating more rhythmic investment patterns. 
In order to be more straightforward, we multiply (–1) to the original value of kurtosis of CSR investment, 
so that higher values indicate more rhythmic CSR investment patterns.  
 Institutional distance  
We capture the overall institutional difference or distance between China and the host country. We 
calculate the distance between China and other locations which have firm-level subsidiaries by firstly 
generating the mean level of all institutional distances of CSR from China and then choose those 
countries with the distance larger than the mean level as 1, otherwise 0. For those Chinese EM-SOEs 




capabilities. In contrast, those countries with shorter institutional distance with host countries will be 
more easily to adapt their CSR activities due to the smaller knowledge gap and more similar institutional 
environments.  
International experience  
This variable reflects the EM-SOEs’ international experience when they make newly-established 
foreign subsidiaries. The more the subsidiaries a firm establishes in prior years, the higher the probability 
that this firm has more experience in dealing with international issues when they invest in international 
markets. We measure the number of EM-SOEs’ total number of foreign subsidiaries in the prior year as 
the indicator of a firm’s international experience.  
Control variables 
We include control variables at different levels. Firstly, we control firm-level variables such as size, 
age, ROA, debt ratio, intangible and tangible asset ratio, and visibility. Firm size is measured as a natural 
log converted total amount of assets (Marquis and Qian 2014; Pan et al. 2014; Rodriguez-Fernandez 
2016) since larger firms tend to have more resources to invest abroad (Dunning and Lundan 2008). We 
measure a firm’s age as years since Initial Publishing Offering (IPO) year (Dunning and Lundan 2008; 
Wang, Choi, and Li 2008; Wang and Qian 2011). We also control for firms’ Return on Asset (ROA), 
which is net income divided by the average total asset. We control financial performance because it will 
impact not only OFDI (Yiu, Lau, and Bruton 2007) but also the firm’s tendency to do CSR (Campbell 
2007; Clarkson 1995; Mcwilliams and Siegel 2001). Debt ratio measured as total long-term debt to total 
asset is to reflect companies’ leverage and access to outside finance (Seifert, Morris, and Bartkus 2004; 
Waddock and Graves 1997; Wang and Qian 2011). We also include the ratio of intangible asset 




capability (Mcwilliams and Siegel 2000), and fixed asset ratio calculated as fixed assets divided by total 
assets, which indicates companies’ capital intensity (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006). The ratio of 
selling, general and administrative expenses is to control companies’ level of advertising intensity and 
visibility (Wang and Qian 2011). Secondly, in order to integrate subnational regional differences, we use 
the market development level represented by Gross Domestic Product per capita (province’ GDP divided 
by its population) in each province (Marquis and Qian 2014).  
All these home-country control variables are added in both the first- and second-stage model of 
Heckman two-stage model. We lag one period of independent variable against dependent variable in the 
first stage when predicting companies’ likelihood of engaging in CSR activities and also lag one period 
of independent variable against dependent variable in the second-stage model when analyzing how CSR 
will affect whether EM-SOEs will enter into host countries with higher CSR requirements. Thirdly, in 
Heckman second-stage regression equation, we also control host country characteristics such as host-
country GDP per capita and level of competition to represent host country market attractiveness 
(Holburn and Zelner 2010). Finally, in order to eliminate the time-varying and industry-varying effect, 
we also control the year and industry fixed effects. 
Method 
Endogeneity tends to be a critical issue in our results. Omitted variables, sample selection bias, or 
error variance can lead to the problem of endogeneity (Bascle 2008). In our paper, we solve the problem 
of self-selection bias by using the Heckman two-stage model (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and Semadeni 
2016; Wang et al. 2008; Wang and Qian 2011) in analyzing CSR-location choice relationship and 2sls 
model as a robustness check to guarantee there is no issue of omitted variables. First, in the Heckman 




Heckman (1979) suggests using an additional variable in the first stage, which strongly predicts the first-
stage dependent variable while do not have prediction power in the second-stage dependent variable. 
We choose here ‘industry-level donation’ as our control variable since peer-industry-behavior will 
influence CSR behavior (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991), but not likely impact the firm’s location choice. 
We then calculate the inverse mills ratio (IMR) from the first-stage probit model and use it into our 
second stage model. Because our data are embedded into region and industry level, we use multilevel 
regression method in the second stage to examine the relationship between CSR and location choice, 
which has been accredited as a valid way to analyze such data structure (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 
1981; Wang and Qian 2011). In order to control the effect of heterogeneity, we provide our results based 
on the Huber/White/sandwich robust method after adjusting the within-cluster correlations (Wooldridge 
2010). Second, although the Heckman two-stage regression may solve the issue of sample selection bias, 
it is highly possible that the results still suffer from endogeneity bias caused by unobservable omitted 
variables (Deng, Kang, and Low 2013). For example, firms with sound products or management teams 
will go to countries with higher CSR requirements and, at the same time, those firms investing more 
resources in CSR. We thus provide 2sls regression in estimating whether home-country firms’ CSR will 
affect their entrance into higher CSR-requirement countries after considering the potential issue of 
endogeneity caused by omitted variables.21 
 
21 We firstly use instrumental variables to predict the estimated CSR value in first stage. We choose 
city green space ratio, green space per capita, and industry-level CSR as instrumentals because a city 
that has higher level of green space or green space per capita shows its governments’ concern about 
social welfare and thus likely impact firm’s tendency of doing CSR. We find that the chosen 
instrumental variables are significantly associated with CSR, satisfying relevance requirement of 
instrumental variables. However, we argue that instrumental variables (green space per capita and 
industry-level CSR) may not directly impact firm’s entrance into host country with higher CSR 
requirements, complying with exclusion condition of instrumental variables. The empirical test and 





We use the model suggested below to test the effect of CSR on investment: 
𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖.𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷−1
+ 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷
+ 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷
+ 𝛽𝛽13𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷
+ 𝛽𝛽15𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆 𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠+ 𝜀𝜀𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷  
Where 𝛽𝛽0 is the time-invariant intercept; 𝛽𝛽1 to 𝛽𝛽10 are slope coefficients of independent variable and 
control variables. 𝛽𝛽11 to 𝛽𝛽14 are slope coefficients of moderating effects of CSR scope, CSR rhythm, 
institutional distance, international experience. 𝛽𝛽j and 𝛽𝛽k are coefficients of industry and year dummy 
variables to control for industry fixed effects and changing economic conditions. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
RESULTS 
Table 3-2 shows the host-country CSR requirements by quartiles of home CSR efforts for the full 
sample, low-level (below-median) CSR sample and high-level (above-median) CSR sample in the home 
country. In column (7), the average host-country CSR requirements are 5.201 in the full sample, 5.105 
in low-CSR firms, and 5.294 in high-CSR firms. We find that the average host country CSR 
requirements in low-CSR firms are approximately 3.7% 22  lower than those in high-CSR firms, 
indicating that firms with higher CSR activities in the home country tend to go to host countries with 






between the highest (column (6)) and lowest (column (2)) CSR efforts in full sample, high-CSR sample 
and low-CSR sample. In column (9), we find that the average differences for the three groups are 0.24 
in the full sample23, 0.032 in the low-CSR sample, and 0.403 in the high-CSR sample. From p-value 
(column (11)) of three two-sample t-tests, we find that in the low-CSR sample, the host-country CSR 
requirement in the highest CSR quantile is significantly higher than that in the lowest quantile (0.24 p < 
0.001) in the full sample. However, in low-CSR sample, this difference is insignificant (0.032 p > 0.1). 
In high-CSR sample, this value becomes significant (0.403 p < 0.001). The above results suggest that 
only for those firms in the high-CSR sample in the home country can they enter host countries with 
higher CSR requirements while for low-CSR firms in the home country, they cannot. 
[Insert Table 3-2 about here] 
Table 3-3 displays the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. We can observe that firm 
age, size, ROA, and debt ratio positively correlate with CSR choice. Table 3-5 presents descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix for the key variables used in the second-stage Heckman model. 
Consistent with results in table 3-2, home country CSR investment positively associates with EM-SOEs’ 
location choice of outward foreign direct investment, which complies with our expectation. We also find 
that ROA, size, intangible asset ratio, and visibility positively correlate with domestic SOEs’ CSR 
location choice, which suggests that firm-level financial factors can help firms enter countries with high 
CSR requirements. It is also interesting to find that host country GDP Per capita and competition level 
negatively correlate with their CSR requirements, indicating that economic factors in the host country 
will, to some extent, hinder the level of CSR requirement. However, there is no significant correlation 
 
23 This figure is calculated by using the highest home country CSR 5.37 minus the lowest home country 




between the home country’s GDP Per capita and the level of host country CSR requirement.  
In order to guarantee no severe multicollinearity problem in our model, we calculate VIF statistics 
in both the first- and second-stage model. We found that although there is a significant correlation 
between some variables, the average VIF is 1.2 in the first-stage regression model and 1.83 in the 
second-stage regression model, which indicate that no problem of multicollinearity in our results 
because they are lower than the cut-off value of 10 (Ryan,2008). 
[Insert Table 3-3 and 3-5 about here] 
First-Stage CSR Choice Estimate  
In Table 3-4, we show the results of the first-stage Heckman selection model using the probit 
regression of the choice of CSR on the factors that are thought to impact whether a firm will engage in 
CSR investment. CSR dummy is the dependent variable, showing that whether a firm engages in CSR 
activity. Model (1), the baseline model, shows how firm- and sub-national-level variables impact a firm’s 
CSR choice. It shows that firm size, intangible asset ratio, and debt ratio all positively relate to CSR 
choice. Besides, we also find that national-level control, GDP per capita, negatively relates to CSR 
choice. However, we do not find that financial performance, which measured as ROA, positively relates 
to CSR choice. In model (2), we add industry-level CSR investment as an additional control, which is a 
valid instrumental variable (Wang and Qian 2011). From the Likelihood Ratio test of model fit, we find 
that adding industry-level CSR will significantly improve the model explaining power (P < 0.01, the 
incremental χ2 shown in the bottom of model (2)); thus it is rational to add industry-level CSR 
investment. In model (3), we further add both industry and year effect, and we find that explaining power 
further improves significantly compared with the model (2) (P < 0.01, the incremental χ2 shown in the 




[Insert Table 3-4 about here] 
Second-stage Location Choice (Host Country CSR Requirement) Estimates 
In Table 3-6, we show the results of Heckman second-stage estimation using the inverse Mills ratio 
as an additional control for self-selection bias. We use a multi-level regression method (Wang and Qian 
2011) to analyze the relationship between SOEs’ CSR efforts and host country CSR requirements and 
different moderating effects. From the Likelihood Ratio test, we find consistent results of rejecting the 
null hypothesis of using Linear model (as shown LR test in the bottom of Table 3-6), which indicates 
that our dataset is more fitted by using a multi-level model with the region and industry as the different 
levels of hierarchies. 
Model (1) shows the main effect of the level of SOEs’ CSR efforts on host country CSR location 
choice after controlling firm, sub-national, host country, industry and year effects. We find that CSR 
efforts positively relate with host country CSR requirements at 1% (P < 0.01), which shows that CSR 
efforts will directly help Chinese SOEs offset legitimacy liabilities and go to countries with a higher 
level of CSR requirements.  
In model (2) and (3), we use CSR scope as the moderating variable. We find that in the model (3), 
the interaction term of CSR scope and CSR is insignificant, which means that the CSR scope does not 
have a significant moderating effect on our main relationship. We thus fail to support the hypothesis 2a, 
which states that a broader range of CSR activities hinder the CSR capability development and are less 
likely to enter host countries with higher CSR requirements.  
In model (4) and (5), we show the moderating effect of CSR rhythm on our main relationship. As 
we argue before, high CSR rhythm shows a more rhythmic pattern of doing CSR, which does not 




CSR in a short period may be beneficial to the improvement of CSR capability. As shown in model (5), 
the main relationship between home CSR efforts and host country CSR requirements is negatively 
moderated by CSR Rhythm. Thus, we support hypothesis 2b. 
In model (6) and (7), we use the institutional distance between China and the host country as the 
moderating variable on the main relationship between home-country-CSR efforts and host-country-CSR 
requirements. We find that the institutional distance negatively moderates the relationship between home 
country CSR efforts on host country CSR requirements, indicating that CSR experience developed at 
home are less useful when SOEs enter the host country with more significant institutional distance. 
Therefore, we support hypothesis 3a, which states from the legitimacy challenge perspective instead of 
hypothesis 3b from the springboard view. 
Finally, model (8) and (9) test the moderating effect of international experience on home country 
CSR efforts–host country CSR requirements relationship. We find that international experience 
positively moderates the relationship between home CSR efforts and host country CSR requirements, 
suggesting that international experience helps a firm obtain international experience, include but not 
limited to CSR experience, which finally promotes their probability of entrance into higher-CSR 
requirement countries. We thus support hypothesis 4a, which predicts from legitimacy challenge view 
and reject hypothesis 4b, which states from the springboard perspective. The above three moderating 
effects can be visualized from figure 3-1 to figure 3-3. 
[Insert Table 3-6 about here] 
[Insert Figure 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 about here] 
Robustness Check  




access the robustness of our results. We test our main relationship under the OLS model with the robust 
standard error. We find the same results in OLS as in the hierarchical model. Given that the firm’s CSR 
decision may be endogenous, we further run our data under 2sls model, including the direct and all 
moderating effects, the main results are roughly identical to the results found in the hierarchical 
regression equation. Therefore, after considering the potential endogeneity problems by using 
instrumental variables, we can still get the same results. 
[Insert Table 3-7 about here] 
DISCUSSION 
This study investigated the relationship between CSR activities at home and EM-SOEs’ foreign 
location choice. Our results show that through engaging in CSR activities at home, EM-SOEs can 
develop their CSR experience, which equips them to overcome the higher CSR barriers in the host 
country. We find that, under the same extent of CSR efforts, firms can develop stronger CSR experience 
when they engage in CSR activities in a dynamic rather than a regular manner, which helps them deal 
with higher CSR requirements from the host country. We also proposed that the relationship between 
the CSR efforts at home and the entry of host countries with higher CSR requirements becomes 
strengthened if firms focus on a few dimensions of CSR when they engage in CSR activities at home 
instead of dispersing efforts among many dimensions. However, we could not find a significant 
moderating effect to support this hypothesis. One potential reason is that it is still an early stage for 
Chinese firms getting involved with CSR activities; the average number of dimensions of CSR 
engagements is relatively low. Our findings also show that EM-SOEs can better utilize home-developed 
CSR experience in internationalization if they possess stronger international experience; in contrast, the 




host country with more significant institutional distance. 
In general, our findings extend the literature on the legitimacy effect of CSR in internationalization. 
In particular, we contribute to CSR capability and emerging market literature. We explain our key 
findings and contributions in more detail in the following. 
First, we go beyond previous literature on CSR legitimacy effect at the host country by arguing that 
firms need to ensure their CSR activities to meet or even exceed the expectations of the local 
stakeholders in order to achieve legitimacy. In this situation, EM-SOEs need to possess a certain level 
of CSR capability before they enter into the international market. Based on the dynamic capability 
perspective, we identify two aspects of CSR experience, namely managerial attention and awareness, 
and organizational experience in dealing with expectations of stakeholders. Through conducting CSR 
activities at home, EM-SOEs can develop their CSR experience, which helps them overcome the CSR 
barriers of the host country. 
Second, previous studies have already identified the importance of overcoming the market-based 
barriers of the host country (Eden and Miller, 2004; Hymer, 1960/1976; Zaheer, 2002). However, fewer 
studies have emphasized the social and environmental barriers in the host country and correspondingly 
the way to overcome these non-market barriers. Our study specifies the different levels of CSR 
experience by engaging in CSR activities at home with different patterns, which helps firms to deal with 
social and environmental requirements with different levels in the host country. 
Thirdly, we further develop a CSR capability concept in an international context by specifying the 
conditions when firms can better utilize the home-developed CSR experience in the different 
institutional contexts. We extend the prior literature on the market-based knowledge transfer between 




capability across borders. The constraining effect of the home-developed CSR experience at the host 
country with more significant distance can corroborate the path-dependence nature of the CSR capability 
(Hart, 1995; Hart and Dowell, 2011). 
Practical implications 
Our findings suggest that managers should be aware of the importance of developing CSR 
experience before they enter into international markets. Even though nowadays people have noticed the 
importance of being socially responsible, they may lack the ability to identify and understand the 
different requirements and expectations in different institutional environments. Our research also 
provides suggestions for managers on how more efficiently develop CSR capability and utilize such 
home-developed capabilities in the international context. Our results suggest managers should pay 
particular attention to the institutional policies at the host country, that they cannot directly copy their 
home CSR practices, as the CSR requirements and policies may be mostly different when they try to 
enter into the host country with different institutional environment.  
Limitations and future research 
We also notice several limitations in our research that present future research opportunities. First, 
while we argue the EM-SOEs can develop CSR experience at home through engaging CSR activities in 
terms of managerial awareness and organizational capabilities in meeting stakeholder needs, we do not 
directly measure and assess CSR experience in these two aspects. Future studies may utilize a survey to 
directly test whether engaging CSR at home can help firms develop their CSR experience. Second, we 
examine the general CSR requirement from the host country stakeholders as the barriers to enter into 
the host market. Future research can focus on different specific social and environmental standards. 




other types of firms. The importance of social and environmental requirements from the host country 
has been increasing, so that MNEs from western countries also need to develop their CSR experience 
because of the localization nature of CSR (Husted, Montiel, and Christmann, 2016). Future studies can 




Table 3-1: FDI Destinations of Sample Firms in the Period of 2010-2016 
location Number location number location Number Location Number 
ARE 19 GAB 2 MUS 1 USA 133 
AUS 58 GBR 27 MYS 26 VEN 3 
BEL 7 GHA 4 NGA 2 VNM 9 
BGD 1 HUN 1 NIC 1 ZAF 17 
BGR 1 IDN 28 NLD 21   
BLR 2 IND 26 NOR 1   
BOL 3 IRL 3 NZL 13   
BRA 23 ISR 4 PAK 3   
CAN 37 ITA 14 PAN 17   
CHE 5 JPN 32 PHL 2   
CHL 3 KAZ 4 PNG 2   
CHN 1 KEN 3 POL 8   
CIV 3 KGZ 1 RUS 25   
CMR 2 KHM 7 SAU 3   
COD 4 KOR 11 SGP 121   
COG 1 LAO 11 SLE 1   
CZE 3 LBR 2 SVN 3   
DEU 41 LKA 1 TGO 2   
DNK 1 LTU 1 THA 23   
ECU 1 LUX 12 TJK 1   
EGY 2 MEX 7 TTO 1   
ESP 4 MLT 6 TUR 8   
ETH 1 MMR 11 TZA 4   
FRA 29 MNG 4 URY 1 Total  926 




Table 3-2: Host-Country CSR Requirements and Home-Country CSR Activities 








Home country CSR 
spread (6)-(2) 
Host country CSR 
spread (6)-(2) 
Two sample T-test 
(t-stats) p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
All firms home 
country CSR 548 27.14 32.31 39.85 46.83 66.42 42.51 39.280  -23.824*** 0.000 
Host CSR  
requirements  5.130 5.075 5.247 5.181 5.370 5.201  0.240 -3.811*** 0.000 
Firms with below- 
median CSR 281 24.39 27.90 31.48 33.05 37.24 30.81 12.857  -22.963*** 0.000 
Host CSR  
requirements  5.004 5.125 5.222 5.141 5.035 5.105  0.032 -0.330 0.742 
Firms with above- 
median CSR 267 40.04 43.02 47.66 57.38 74.07 52.49 34.036  -26.822*** 0.000 
Host CSR  
requirements  5.002 5.412 5.314 5.339 5.404 5.294  0.403 -4.248*** 0.000 
Note: This table reports the average difference of host country CSR requirements for all home firms, home firms with above-median CSR activities, and below-median 
CSR activities. The observations are sorted into five classes according to home-country firms’ CSR activities (2 = Low, 6 = High). “Host country CSR spread (6)-(2)” 
is the host country CSR difference between home country best-CSR firms (6 High) and home country worst-CSR firms (2 Low) in each group (all home country firms, 
home country firms with above and below-median CSR). “Home country CSR spread (6)-(2)” is the home country CSR difference between home best-CSR firms and 
home worst-CSR firms in each group (all home country firms, home country firms with above and below-median CSR).Significance level: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** 




Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics of Heckman First-Stage Predictors 
 mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
CSR Dummy 0.5023 0.5003          
Debt ratio 0.0797 0.1024 0.1749*         
Age 11.3021 5.1432 -0.2689* -0.0662        
ROA 0.0516 0.0515 0.1077* -0.1028* -0.2933*       
Size 23.4899 1.4798 0.3046* 0.1998* -0.2310* 0.0455      
Fixed asset ratio 0.2461 0.1705 0.007 0.5482* -0.0508 -0.1473* 0.1814*     
Intangible asset ratio 0.0442 0.0572 0.0949* 0.1930* 0.0455 -0.0841* 0.0768* 0.0446    
Visibility 0.0420 0.0470 -0.0381 -0.3180* 0.037 0.0645 -0.1926* -0.1777* -0.0541   
GDP per capita 10.9546 0.4735 -0.1480* -0.044 0.0512 -0.1391* 0.2246* -0.0142 -0.0643 -0.0758*  
Industry level of CSR 40.8858 8.2910 0.0365 0.1069* -0.1212* -0.0055 0.4775* 0.1525* 0.2745* -0.1443* 0.1637* 




Table 3-4: Probit Estimates for Heckman First-Stage Model: CSR Choice Regressed on Firm, 
National Variables, with Industry and Year Effects 
CSR Dummy M1 M2 M3 
Debt ratiot-1 2.703** 2.538** 1.041 
 (4.57) (4.28) (1.32) 
Age t-1 -0.055** -0.060** -0.045** 
 (-5.52) (-5.86) (-3.82) 
ROA t-1 0.011 -0.075 -0.764 
 (0.01) (-0.08) (-0.72) 
Size t-1 0.319** 0.386** 0.451** 
 (8.32) (9.16) (9.44) 
Fixed asset ratio t-1 -1.460** -1.282** -1.532** 
 (-4.40) (-3.85) (-3.75) 
Intangible asset ratio t-1 1.800* 2.820** 2.044* 
 (1.68) (2.60) (1.71) 
Visibility t-1 1.320 1.017 1.078 
 (1.27) (0.96) (0.88) 
GDP per capita t-1 -0.598** -0.578** -0.301** 
 (-5.84) (-5.59) (-2.37) 
Industry-level of CSR t-1  -0.028** -0.006 
  (-4.05) (-0.55) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Intercept -0.294 -0.948 -4.955** 
 (-0.24) (-0.75) (-2.90) 
N 864 864 864 
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.180 0.264 
Log likelihood -499.161 -490.811 -440.732 
LR chi2(22) 199.419 216.117 316.277 
Incremental χ2 of (2) to (1)  16.699***  
Incremental χ2 of (3) to (2)   100.159*** 
Note: CSR choice was measured for year t; firm, subnational, and industry level predictors, for year 




Table 3-5: Descriptive Statistics of Heckman Second-Stage Predictors 
 mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Location Choice 5.230  0.501            
CSR 41.613  15.197  0.230*          
Debt ratio 0.078  0.098  -0.054* 0.003          
GDP per capita 11.033  0.447  0.028  0.382* -0.065*        
Age 12.086  5.259  -0.030  -0.125* -0.087* 0.058*       
ROA 0.036  0.074  0.156* -0.006  -0.059* -0.070* -0.305*      
Size 23.589  1.478  0.110* 0.579* 0.232* 0.199* -0.235* 0.203*     
Fixed asset ratio 0.236  0.165  -0.012  0.086* 0.514* -0.017 -0.013 -0.203* 0.120*    
Intangible asset ratio 0.046  0.059  0.081* 0.173* 0.204* -0.067* 0.035 0.019 0.042 0.053    
Visibility 0.045  0.058  0.100* -0.047  -0.259* -0.034 0.082* 0.051 -0.147* -0.146* -0.056*  
Host GDP Per Capita 8.725  1.926  -0.069* -0.079* -0.062* -0.003 0.076* 0.035 -0.022 0.001  -0.057* 0.107* 
Host Competition 4.844  0.744  -0.141* 0.049 0 0.107* 0.082* 0.075* -0.146* 0.050 0.080* 0.008  -0.009 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.869  0.541  -0.018  -0.013  -0.280* 0.243* 0.487* -0.274* -0.574* -0.052  -0.147* 0.103* 
Number of Subsidiaries 8.150  7.407  -0.053  0.045  0.122* 0.327* 0.020 -0.286* 0.064*   0.140* -0.048  -0.060* 
Institutional Distance 0.672  0.470  -0.047  -0.102* 0.136* -0.049 0.012 -0.044 -0.017 0.046  0.019  0.050 
CSR Rhythm -1.355  1.815  0.247* 0.262* -0.291* 0.049 0.049 0.186* -0.160* -0.121* 0.077* 0.221* 
CSR Scope 0.578  0.494  0.140* 0.317* -0.315* 0.037 0.029 -0.015 -0.162* -0.182* 0.169* -0.001 
 mean sd 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Host GDP Per Capita 8.725  1.926        
Host Competition 4.844  0.744  0.278*      
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.869  0.541  0.118* 0.079*     
Number of Subsidiaries 8.150  7.407  -0.086* 0.109* -0.043    
Institutional Distance 0.672  0.470  0.376* 0.529* 0.025 0.026   
CSR Rhythm -1.355  1.815  0.207* 0.000 0.372* -0.320* 0.014  
CSR Scope 0.578  0.494  0.064* -0.018 0.266* -0.127* -0.034 0.358* 




Table 3-6: Estimates of Heckman Second-Stage Model 
Multi-level Regression of Host country CSR requirements on Predicted CSR, Firm, Industry, Subnational-Level Controls 
DV: Host country CSR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CSR t+1 0.0067** 0.0055* 0.0083*** 0.0060* 0.0026 0.0068** 0.0106*** 0.0069*** -0.0023 
 (2.83) (2.35) (4.04) (2.14) (0.65) (3.01) (3.94) (3.57) (-0.76)    
Firm, subnational-level Control Variables:          
Debt ratio t 0.3447 0.3946 0.4123 0.5505 0.5972† 0.2812 0.2896 0.3048 0.3774 
 (0.91) (0.98) (1.16) (1.49) (1.80) (0.71) (0.74) (0.79) (1.04) 
GDP per capita t -0.0531 0.0007 0.0079 0.0009 -0.0128 -0.0026 0.0049 -0.0428 -0.0559 
 (-0.75) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (-0.18) (-0.04) (0.07) (-0.45) (-0.69)    
Age t -0.0039 0.0021 0.002 -0.0016 0.0003 0.0008 0.0003 0.0021 0.0021 
 (-0.54) (0.29) (0.28) (-0.23) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.34) (0.33) 
ROA t 0.8749** 0.9015** 0.9921** 0.5987† 1.2614*** 0.8383** 0.7776* 0.8445*** 1.0428*** 
 (2.92) (2.58) (3.03) (1.89) (5.30) (2.86) (2.43) (3.53) (3.44) 
Size t 0.0102 -0.0448 -0.0467 -0.033 -0.028 -0.0434 -0.0435 -0.0424 -0.0125 
 (0.60) (-1.21) (-1.16) (-0.89) (-0.74) (-1.15) (-1.16) (-1.11) (-0.32)    
Fixed asset ratio t 0.1736 0.3159† 0.3228 0.1901 0.128 0.3327† 0.3292† 0.3879* 0.3457*   
 (1.04) (1.78) (1.62) (1.21) (0.81) (1.87) (1.90) (2.29) (2.09) 
Intangible asset ratio t -0.0358 -0.3883 -0.216 -0.3277 -0.29 -0.19 -0.26 -0.2169 -0.3376 
 (-0.09) (-0.89) (-0.45) (-0.80) (-0.64) (-0.45) (-0.59) (-0.54) (-0.84)    
Visibility t 0.2886 0.2303 0.226 -0.0467 -0.138 0.0978 0.1688 0.2004 0.215 
 (0.67) (0.54) (0.53) (-0.10) (-0.33) (0.22) (0.37) (0.51) (0.57) 
Host Country Control Variables:          
Foreign Competition t -0.0569† -0.0555† -0.0561† -0.0594† -0.0569 -0.0826† -0.0970* -0.0599* -0.0463 
 (-1.88) (-1.85) (-1.83) (-1.84) (-1.63) (-1.85) (-2.27) (-2.13) (-1.44)    
Foreign GDP Per Capita t -0.0349 -0.0338 -0.0333 -0.0354 -0.0378† -0.039 -0.0397 -0.0318 -0.0321 
 (-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.40) (-1.58) (-1.70) (-1.55) (-1.64) (-1.35) (-1.29)    
Inverse Mills Ratio t  0.0841*** 0.3193*                   




CSR Scope t  -0.2442* -0.2428* -0.2044* -0.1422 -0.2242* -0.2168* -0.1864† -0.1307 
  (-2.45) (-2.46) (-1.96) (-1.35) (-2.26) (-2.06) (-1.72) (-1.09)    
CSR Scope t *CSR t   -0.0054                   
   (-1.25)                   
CSR Rhythm t    0.0706** 0.1630**                 
    (3.03) (2.70)                 
CSR Rhythm t *CSR t     -0.0027*                 
     (-2.06)                 
Institutional Distance t      0.0803† 0.3365***               
      (1.71) (3.31)               
Institutional Distance t *CSR t       -0.0057**               
       (-2.65)               
International Experience t        0.0092† -0.0381*   
        (1.65) (-2.35)    
International Experience t *CSR t         0.0011**  
         (2.70) 
Intercept 5.1901*** 5.8705*** 5.7149*** 5.7050*** 5.8984*** 5.9651*** 5.7617*** 6.1932*** 6.0653*** 
 (4.63) (4.53) (4.24) (4.64) (4.88) (4.55) (4.44) (4.32) (5.22) 
N 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 
Log Likelihood -312.03  -309.89  -308.50  -305.39  -303.18  -310.12  -308.09  -309.40  -299.20  
LR test (Multilevel vs. Linear) 30.59*** 33.17*** 33.78*** 12.43** 10.39** 29.24*** 29.81*** 32.65*** 31.74*** 
Note: t statistics using robust standard error provided in parentheses. The level of host country’s CSR requirement was measured for year t+1; firm, sub-national, and 








Robustness Check: Two-stage Ordinary Least Square (2sls) 
Table 3-7: 2sls Regressions of Host country CSR requirements on Predicted CSR, Firm, Industry, Subnational-Level Controls 
 OLS 2sls 
 
(1) (2) 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage Moderating effects 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 






                      
 (3.79) (3.71)                       
Predicted CSR1 t    0.0203**                     
    (3.10)                     
Predicted CSR2 t      0.0198**                   
      (3.17)                   







        (3.37) (2.11) (2.84) (3.93) (1.51) 
Instrumental Variables:             
City Green Area Ratio t   -0.3052*    -0.2571+                  
   (-2.197)    (-1.799)                  
City Green Space Per capita t     -0.1286+  -0.0988                  
     (-1.895)  (-1.418)                  
Industry Adjusted CSR t   0.6659***  0.6806***  0.6874***                  
   (8.65)  (8.67)  (8.77)                  
Host Country Variables:             
Foreign Competition t -0.0693* -0.0693*  -0.0697+  -0.0686+  -0.0683+ -0.0694+ -0.0680+ -0.1148** -0.0543+   
 (-1.997) (-1.995)  (-1.958)  (-1.941)  (-1.930) (-1.937) (-1.910) (-2.598) (-1.699)    
Host Country GDP per capita t -0.0268+ -0.0269+  -0.0319*  -0.0323*  -0.0321* -0.0325* -0.0310* -0.0398* -0.0331*   
 (-1.896) (-1.891)  (-2.216)  (-2.235)  (-2.232) (-2.267) (-2.183) (-2.464) (-2.404)    




ROA t 0.9684** 0.9692** -18.9080* 1.2361** -16.0165* 1.2318** -17.4791* 
1.2625**
* 1.2367** 1.2884** 1.1404** 1.3301*** 
 (2.74) (2.75) (-2.519) (3.25) (-2.124) (3.28) (-2.310) (3.34) (3.21) (3.14) (3.01) (3.51) 
Debt Ratio t 0.4338 0.4342 -13.5500* 0.6539* -14.8612** 0.6321* -14.1059* 0.6611* 0.7108* 0.7507* 0.6454* 0.6536*   
 (1.36) (1.37) (-2.420) (2.12) (-2.652) (2.05) (-2.516) (2.16) (2.32) (2.30) (2.09) (2.15) 
GDP Per Capita t -0.0504 -0.0513 1.5778 -0.0765 1.3453 -0.0751 1.3555 -0.0785 -0.0853 -0.0812 -0.0672 -0.0992 
 (-0.798) (-0.719) (1.40) (-1.164) (1.18) (-1.151) (1.19) (-1.198) (-1.303) (-1.251) (-1.032) (-1.541)    
Age t -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.3064** 0.0012 -0.3041** 0.001 -0.3111** 0.0015 0.0007 0.0017 0.0011 0.0058 
 (-0.423) (-0.355) (-2.934) (0.19) (-2.909) (0.17) (-2.980) (0.24) (0.10) (0.28) (0.19) (0.94) 
Size t 0.0052 0.0064 3.8051*** -0.0641 3.8661*** -0.0607 3.7918*** -0.0691 -0.0613 -0.068 -0.0702 -0.0635 
 (0.20) (0.14) (8.53) (-1.469) (8.69) (-1.442) (8.51) (-1.630) (-1.425) (-1.605) (-1.635) (-1.512)    
Fixed Asset Ratio t 0.2566 0.2532 -8.7359** 0.3065 -7.9407* 0.3098 -8.6059** 0.3146 0.3274 0.3111 0.3139 0.3750+   
 (1.40) (1.10) (-2.687) (1.55) (-2.455) (1.59) (-2.649) (1.59) (1.63) (1.57) (1.59) (1.87) 
Intangible Asset t 0.1493 0.1518 24.7069** -0.313 23.9772** -0.2905 24.8828*** -0.3429 -0.3228 -0.4543 -0.3469 -0.4342 
 (0.39) (0.37) (3.29) (-0.696) (3.20) (-0.657) (3.32) (-0.769) (-0.718) (-0.997) (-0.799) (-1.061)    
Advertising Intensity t 0.2033 0.2061 28.9557** -0.0864 24.3304* -0.0622 27.4531** -0.1019 -0.1865 -0.0286 -0.0948 -0.2701 
 (0.43) (0.41) (2.91) (-0.174) (2.46) (-0.123) (2.74) (-0.201) (-0.383) (-0.055) (-0.192) (-0.587)    
IMR t  0.0051                       
  (0.03)                       
CSR3 Rhythm t         0.1712*                
         (2.02)                
CSR3 Rhythm t *CSR3 t         -0.0036*                
         (-1.968)                
CSR Scope t          -0.0229               
          (-0.110)               
CSR Scope t *CSR3 t          0.0017               
          (0.39)               
Institutional Distance t           0.4867**              
           (2.65)              




           (-2.375)              
International experience t            
-
0.0663*** 
            (-4.119)    
CSR3 t *International experience t            0.0017*** 

























 (5.86) (5.21) (-6.161) (5.73) (-6.091) (5.82) (-5.803) (5.94) (5.99) (6.08) (5.87) (6.65) 
N 525 525 548 525 548 525 548 525 525 525 525 525 
R Square 0.26 0.26 0.65 0.25 0.65 0.25 0.65 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.3 
Log likelihood -326.48 -326.48 -1978.88 -328.5 -1979.52 -328.93 -1977.82 -327.79 -324.67 -327.12 -323.82 -310.7 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F 






(P<0.01)      
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all 
instruments): 






    









    
Note: t statistics using robust standard error provided in parentheses. The level of host country’s CSR requirements was measured for year t+1; firm, subnational, and 
industry level predictors, for year t. Significance level: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The dependent variable in models (1), (2), (4), (6), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12) is host country CSR requirements. Model (1) and model (2) use OLS regression to 
predict CSR-host country CSR requirement relationship. From the endogeneity test in the model (4), (6), and (8), the p-value is smaller than 0.05 in each of three 
models, indicating that our independent variable CSR is endogenous. To explicitly address these potential endogeneity problems, we perform 2sls regression analyses 
using industry-level CSR score, subnational percentage of green space and green space per capita as instrumental variables. The above instrumentals may impact a 
firm’s CSR behavior while rarely impacts a firm’s internationalization, satisfying the exclusion condition of instruments. From the Cragg-Donald (1993) instrument 
relevance test, the p-value is less than 0.001, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. From Sargan (1958) overidentification test, the exogeneity of 
the instrumental variables is confirmed in each of the above three models (i.e., accept the null hypothesis of no significant correlations between the instrumental 
variables and the error terms in the host country CSR requirements regressions). Thus, we believe that these instrumental variables are valid. The dependent variable 
in models (3), (5) and (7) is adjusted CSR, a predicted variable from first-stage regression. It is estimated as the function of several instrumental variables, firm, industry, 
subnational-level controls and year dummy. Using the predicted value of CSR as the adjusted independent variable in each of the above three models, we find a 




institutional distance, and international experience base on the predicted value of CSR in model (7) (the largest Loglikelihood in model (7) indicates the best model fit) 
from model (9) to model (12), we find that CSR scope and CSR Rhythm do not have significant moderating effects. In contrast, international experience and institutional 










































Figure 3-2: Interaction Effect of CSR and CSR Rhythm on Location Choice   
 











Appendix Table 3-1: Variables Description 
Variables Description Resource 
Dependent Variable: Host country 
CSR requirement 
The average value of three items from SSI database http://www.ssfindex.com/  
Independent Variable: Level of CSR 
investment 
The score of CSR investment Rankins CSR Rating (RKS) database 
Instrumental variables:   
Industry-level CSR Arithmetic Mean of CSR within each industry in each year CSMAR 
City Green Space Ratio The ratio of Greenspace of a province China Statistic Year Book 
City Green Space Per Capita The total area of Greenspace scaled by province population China Statistic Year Book 
Moderating Variables: 
CSR Scope 
Dummy: Higher than industry-year mean coded as 1, otherwise 0. CSMAR 
CSR Rhythm Kurtosis*(-1) CSMAR 
Institutional Distance Dummy: Higher than the mean level of Institutional distance coded as 
1, otherwise 0. 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) Dataset database 
International Experience Number of foreign subsidiaries in prior years Firm’s Annual Report 
Control Variables:  
Size Natural Log of firm’s total asset CSMAR  
Age Observation year-IPO year CSMAR 
ROA Net income divided by total asset CSMAR 
Intangible ratio Intangible asset /total assets CSMAR 
Tangible asset Tangible asset/total assets CSMAR 
Visibility  Selling expense/ total revenue  CSMAR 
Debt ratio Long term debt/ total assets CSMAR 
Industry-level of CSR The mean level of CSR within each industry CSMAR 
Home country GDP Per Capita Regional GDP divided by total regional population  WIND 
Host country GDP Per Capita Host Country GDP divided by the total population Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) Dataset database 





Based on publicly listed firms in the Chinese market over the past decade, we find the impact of 
firms’ CSR activities on firms’ financial performance, investment, and their foreign location portfolio. 
First, we take a capability-development perspective on CP–CFP relationship and demonstrate that CP–
CFP relationship changes from negative to positive as firms move from the development stage to 
maturity. This result helps us reconcile previous literature in terms of how CP impacts on CFP: the 
relationship between CP and CFP is not merely positive or negative or even curve-linear, but it changes 
from negative to positive as firms move from the development stage to mature stage. Therefore, 
disentangling CP–CFP relationship within life-cycle stages not only help us reconcile the CP-CFP 
debate in previous literature but also incorporate the concept of resource-utilizing capability in firms’ 
socially responsible activities. Second, taking an integrated information asymmetry and stakeholder 
perspective, we release the assumption of investment–cash flow sensitivity by inducing a social-
acceptance view into corporate investment literature. Facing competitive pressures from other bidders, 
whether a firm can build a trustful relationship with stakeholders who hold investment opportunities, 
will be of much importance in improving their investment expenditure. We not only find a positive 
relationship between CSR and investment but also uncover the black box of this relationship through 
finding a mediating effect of investment opportunities. To this end, we enrich the previous corporate 
investment literature by taking into consideration the CSR and switch the research focus from investors 
to investment targets who hold investment opportunities. Third, to investigate factors that may impact 
firms’ internationalization location choice portfolio, we believe that non-market barriers constitute 
another aspect that hinders the home firms’ entrance into the host country with high social requirements. 
We regard that firms’ CSR as a critical aspect of non-market strategy that will help home country’s 
firms develop a non-market capability that is essential to overcome such barriers and increase their 
possibility of entering the country with a high social requirement. With the increasing level of CSR 
experience developed in the home country, home country firms are more likely to identify, meet, and 
exceed the host country stakeholders’ needs, which promote their likelihood of entrance into countries 
with a high social requirement. We induce the CSR into internationalization entrance literature through 




contribution to both international business and CSR.  
In sum, we use CSR as an angle to investigate firm-level outcomes such as firm financial 
performance, investment expenditure, and foreign market entrance. We support the argument that CSR 
can mostly help firms build social legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders both in the home country and 
the host country. Thus, firms may use CSR to build legitimacy in the home country and get critical 
resources that are of paramount importance for their development. Besides, how to deal with multiple 
institutional logics and understand different stakeholders’ expectations at a specific time point in the 
host country are becoming the central challenges for MNEs’ managers. Through developing CSR 
experience in the home country, we extend CSR activities to the host country and explain how MNEs’ 
managers deal with the pressure from diversified international stakeholders’ expectations through 
developing CSR experience in the home country. We use CSR as a vehicle to explain the stakeholder-
firm relationship in both home and host countries by focusing on how firms engage in CSR. By 
extending CSR as a learning process or a capability that has a “path-dependent” characteristic, we 
believe that our research makes a timely contribution to previous literature and has important 
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